Flow for Meta Control

The psychological state of flow has been linked to optimizing human performance. A key condition of flow emergence is a match between the human abilities and complexity of the task. We propose a simple computational model of flow for Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents. The model factors the standard agent-environment state into a self-reflective set of the agent's abilities and a socially learned set of the environmental complexity. Maximizing the flow serves as a meta control for the agent. We show how to apply the meta-control policy to a broad class of AI control policies and illustrate our approach with a specific implementation. Results in a synthetic testbed are promising and open interesting directions for future work

Open Programming Language Interpreters

Context: This paper presents the concept of open programming language interpreters and the implementation of a framework-level metaobject protocol (MOP) to support them. Inquiry: We address the problem of dynamic interpreter adaptation to tailor the interpreter's behavior on the task to be solved and to introduce new features to fulfill unforeseen requirements. Many languages provide a MOP that to some degree supports reflection. However, MOPs are typically language-specific, their reflective functionality is often restricted, and the adaptation and application logic are often mixed which hardens the understanding and maintenance of the source code. Our system overcomes these limitations. Approach: We designed and implemented a system to support open programming language interpreters. The prototype implementation is integrated in the Neverlang framework. The system exposes the structure, behavior and the runtime state of any Neverlang-based interpreter with the ability to modify it. Knowledge: Our system provides a complete control over interpreter's structure, behavior and its runtime state. The approach is applicable to every Neverlang-based interpreter. Adaptation code can potentially be reused across different language implementations. Grounding: Having a prototype implementation we focused on feasibility evaluation. The paper shows that our approach well addresses problems commonly found in the research literature. We have a demonstrative video and examples that illustrate our approach on dynamic software adaptation, aspect-oriented programming, debugging and context-aware interpreters. Importance: To our knowledge, our paper presents the first reflective approach targeting a general framework for language development. Our system provides full reflective support for free to any Neverlang-based interpreter. We are not aware of any prior application of open implementations to programming language interpreters in the sense defined in this paper. Rather than substituting other approaches, we believe our system can be used as a complementary technique in situations where other approaches present serious limitations

Ethical and Political Implications of Reflective Practice among Preservice Teachers

This study investigates the ethical and political implications of reflective practice among preservice teachers. The author reviewed previous research which suggests the need for a more critical analysis of teacher education programs to implement more intensive reflective methodologies that foster authentic, caring, dispositional development as a moral obligation toward socially just practice rather than mere audited compliance with standards-based technical training. This position paper then analyzes preservice teacher education as an interdependent process of methodological development, perceptive development, and cognitive/affective development. Finally, the author makes recommendations for program modification to better prepare preservice teachers to conceptualize their transformative role in society

On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification in Political Liberalism

Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls’s view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form of justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of political justice to political matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public justification in his doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. The paper engages this second, more fundamental idea. Public justification in this second sense is actualist and fundamental. It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as reasonable to begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite the long-standing concern that actualist political liberalism is objectionably exclusionary. I argue that the exclusion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in own right than it seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and discursive respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves proponents and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in public justification

Expect the unexpected: the co-construction of assistive artifacts

This paper aims to explain emerging design activities within community-based rehabilitation contexts through the science of self-organization and adaptivity. It applies an evolutionary systematic worldview (Heylighen, 2011) to frame spontaneous collaboration between different local agents which produce self-made assistive artifacts. Through a process of distinction creation and distinction destruction occupational therapist, professional non-designers, caregivers and disabled people co-evolve simultaneously towards novel possibilities which embody a contemporary state of fitness. The conversation language is build on the principles of emotional seeding through stigmergic prototyping and have been practically applied as a form of design hacking which blends design time and use time. Within this process of co-construction the thought experiment of Maxwell’s Demon is used to map perceived behavior and steer the selecting process of following user-product adaptation strategies. This practice-based approach is illustrated through a case study and tries to integrate both rationality and intuition within emerging participatory design activities

Is a bad will a weak will? Cognitive dispositions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account

Distal engagement: Intentions in perception

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use

Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias

In this chapter, we explore whether agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias. Recent research shows that implicit biases are widespread and they have a wide variety of epistemic effects on our doxastic attitudes. First, we offer some examples and features of implicit biases. Second, we clarify what it means to have an epistemic duty, and discuss the kind of epistemic duties we might have regarding implicit bias. Third, we argue that we have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit biases that have negative epistemic impact. Finally, we defend this view against the objection that we lack the relevant control over implicit bias that’s required for such a duty. We argue that we have a kind of reflective control over the implicit biases that we are duty-bound to eradicate. And since, as we show, we have this control over a wide variety of implicit biases, there are a lot of implicit biases that we have epistemic duties to eradicate

Working together, driven apart: Reflecting on a joint endeavour to address sustainable development within a university

A holistic and transformational approach to Sustainable Development within a university requires systemic change and embraces new ways of working. Champions must challenge silo mentalities, develop new processes to encourage synergies across university functions, and strive to re-align systems and goals towards the common endeavour of sustainability. But how easy is this to achieve? It is well documented that working across disciplines presents challenges but forging a synergistic relationship between the environmental management function of Estates and an academic champion for ESD is not only logical but might be an easier place to explore how two roles can work together to achieve change. This paper provides a reflective account of such an alliance, outlining a joint endeavour to address sustainable development. An analysis is provided of those factors which impede such working and the different role tensions that make working together challenging. It will also consider the benefits of collaboration, as the perspectives from the operational and academic domains provide a broader context for understandings, access to different forums, an ability to tackle conflicting agendas together and an opportunity to genuinely effect change, providing mutual support through shared perseverance. The paper will conclude by questioning the extent to which progress made will endure, if the benefits of this synergy are not acknowledged by university leadership