Thinking about Attention in Games: Backward and Forward Induction

Behavioral economics improves economic analysis by using psychological regularity to suggest limits on rationality and self-interest (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). Expressing these regularities in formal terms permits productive theorizing, suggests new experiments, can contribute to psychology, and can be used to shape economic policies which make normal people better off

Progress in Behavioral Game Theory

Is game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or not? It is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely ignoring this question. The seminal book by von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, was clearly about how rational players would play against others they knew were rational. In more recent work, game theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise. At one extreme, highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions. At the other extreme, adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple models-mostly developed to describe nonhuman animals-in which players may not realize they are playing a game at all. When game theory does aim to describe behavior, it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing

Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

This paper reports laboratory data for a series of two-person games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment for which behavior conforms quite nicely to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case we change a key payoff parameter in a manner that does not alter the equilibrium predictions, but this theoretically neutral payoff change has a major (often dramatic) effect on observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple economic intuition and with a model of iterated noisy introspection for one-shot games.Nash equilibrium, noncooperative games, experiments, bounded rationality, introspection

What's a face worth: Noneconomic factors in game playing

Where behavior defies economic analysis, one explanation is that individuals consider more than the immediate payoff. We present evidence that noneconomic factors influence behavior. Attractiveness influences offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Facial resemblance, a cue of relatedness, increases trusting in a two-node trust game. Only by considering the range of possible influences will game-playing behavior be explained

Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?

The way economists and other social scientists model how people make interdependent decisions is through the theory of games. Psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have established many deviations from the predictions of game theory. In response to these findings, a broad movement has arisen to salvage the core of game theory. Extant models of interdependent decision-making try to improve their explanatory domain by adding some corrective terms or limits. We will make the argument that this approach is misguided. For this approach to work, the deviations would have to be consistent. Drawing in part on our experimental results, we will argue that deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In turn, the problem of finding an equilibrium strategy is not easier but rather is exponentially more difficult. It does not seem that game theory can be repaired by adding corrective terms (such as consideration of personal characteristics, social norms, heuristic or bias terms, or cognitive limits on choice and learning). In what follows, we describe new methods for investigating interdependent decision-making. Our experimental results show that people do not choose consistently, do not hold consistent beliefs, and do not in general align actions and beliefs. We will show that experimental choices are inconsistent in ways that prevent us from drawing general characterizations of an individual’s choices or beliefs or of the general population\u27s choices and beliefs. A general behavioral game theory seems a distant and, at present, unfulfilled hope

Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games

We perform a further experiment to check the robustness of the main result in Rey Biel (2005) to sequential play. We find that Equilibrium predictions work even better when the same games are played sequentially: 85% of first movers choose the Equilibrium strategy and 85% of second movers best respond to the action taken by first movers. We conclude by identifying constant sum games as a class of games where experimental subjects' choices coincide with theory predictions and we argue that in such games distributional and reciprocal preferences do not influence subjects' decisions.Experiments, Constant Sum Games, Best Response

Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test

How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is by itself worthless. A principal can pre-commit to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the first half as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half upon delivery of the service. This contract design is known as "indenture". It is selfenforcing and incentive-compatible. This paper experimentally tests the efficacy of the "indenture game" and its implications for cooperation in one-shot environments. We find that cooperation rates are high and stable over time. Its efficacy is moderated by expected losses due to the existence of uncooperative types.Cooperation, Experiment, Contracts, Indenture, Reciprocity