Intergenerational Equity and the Forest Management Problem

The paper re-examines the foundations of representation of intertemporal preferences that satisfy intergenerational equity, and provides an axiomatic characterization of those social welfare relations, which are representable by the utilitarian ordering, in ranking consumption sequences which are eventually identical. A maximal point of this ordering is characterized in a standard model of forest management. Maximal paths are shown to converge over time to the forest with the maximum sustained yield, thereby providing a theoretical basis for the tradition in forest management, which has emphasized the goal of maximum sustained yield. Further, it is seen that a maximal point coincides with the optimal point according to the well-known overtaking criterion. This result indicates that the more restrictive overtaking criterion is inessential for a study of forest management under intergenerational equity, and provides a more satisfactory basis for the standard forestry model.

Should we discount the welfare of future generations? : Ramsey and Suppes versus Koopmans and Arrow

Ramsey famously pronounced that discounting “future enjoyments” would be ethically indefensible. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion implying that all individuals’ welfare should be treated equally. By contrast, Arrow (1999a, b) accepted, perhaps rather reluctantly, the logical force of Koopmans’ argument that no satisfactory preference ordering on a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams satisfies equal treatment. In this paper, we first derive an equitable utilitarian objective based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, extended to allow a variable and uncertain population with no finite bound. Following the work of Chichilnisky and others on sustainability, slightly weakening the conditions of Koopmans and co-authors allows intergenerational equity to be satisfied. In fact, assuming that the expected total number of individuals who ever live is finite, and that each individual’s utility is bounded both above and below, there is a coherent equitable objective based on expected total utility. Moreover, it implies the “extinction discounting rule” advocated by, inter alia, the Stern Review on climate change

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics

The most fundamental questions of economics are often philosophical in nature, and philosophers have, since the very beginning of Western philosophy, asked many questions that current observers would identify as economic. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is an outstanding reference source for the key topics, problems, and debates at the intersection of philosophical and economic inquiry. It captures this field of countless exciting interconnections, affinities, and opportunities for cross-fertilization. Comprising 35 chapters by a diverse team of contributors from all over the globe, the Handbook is divided into eight sections: I. Rationality II. Cooperation and Interaction III. Methodology IV. Values V. Causality and Explanation VI. Experimentation and Simulation VII. Evidence VIII. Policy The volume is essential reading for students and researchers in economics and philosophy who are interested in exploring the interconnections between the two disciplines. It is also a valuable resource for those in related fields like political science, sociology, and the humanities.</p

From micro to macro: Essays on rationality, bounded rationality, and microfoundations.

This thesis examines some issues at the heart of theoretical macroeconomics, namely the possibility of establishing a predictive theory of individual behaviour and transforming it into a theory of the economy using aggregation. As regards individual behaviour, the basic idea in economics is that homo economicus follows the prescriptions of the expected utility theory. The thesis argues that the expected utility theory takes the agent's view of the economy as given, and is silent about how he models his choice situation and defines his decision problem. As a consequence, it is of only a minor contribution to the analysis of economic phenomena. To explain how the agent learns about the economy and thus models his choice situation, new classical economists have relatively recently proposed that the agent behaves like a statistician. That is, like a statistician, he theorises, estimates, and adapts in attempting to learn about the economy. The usefulness of this hypothesis for modelling the economy depends on the existence of a 'tight enough' theory of statistical inference. To address this issue, the thesis proposes a preliminary conjecture about how a statistician perceives and models a choice situation: the statistician regards measurable features of the environment as realisations of some random variables, with an unknown joint probability distribution. He first uses the data on these quantities to discover the joint probability distribution of the variables and then uses the estimate of the distribution to uncover the causal structure of the variables. If the resulting model turns out to be inadequate, the initial set of variables is modified and the two phases of inference are repeated. This setting allows the separation of probabilistic inference issues from those of causal inference. The thesis studies both stages of learning from data to argue why there cannot be a 'tight enough' theory of statistical learning. As a result, the marriage of the hypothesis that the agent behaves like a decision scientist with the one that he behaves like a statistician is not of much help in predicting behaviour and modelling the economy. The thesis next turns to the other issue relating to the move from a theory of individual behaviour to a theory of the economy. It argues that to explain economic phenomena it is necessary to view the economy as a society of interactive, and heterogeneous, agents. However, the regularities emerging in such a society are not directly related to the laws operating at the micro level. The connection between the individual and the aggregate levels is highly complex

Supply Chain

Traditionally supply chain management has meant factories, assembly lines, warehouses, transportation vehicles, and time sheets. Modern supply chain management is a highly complex, multidimensional problem set with virtually endless number of variables for optimization. An Internet enabled supply chain may have just-in-time delivery, precise inventory visibility, and up-to-the-minute distribution-tracking capabilities. Technology advances have enabled supply chains to become strategic weapons that can help avoid disasters, lower costs, and make money. From internal enterprise processes to external business transactions with suppliers, transporters, channels and end-users marks the wide range of challenges researchers have to handle. The aim of this book is at revealing and illustrating this diversity in terms of scientific and theoretical fundamentals, prevailing concepts as well as current practical applications

On the Nature of Suppes-Sen Maximal Paths In an Aggregative Growth Model

This article investigates the nature of paths in the standard neoclassical aggregative model of economic growth that are maximal according to the Suppes-Sen grading principle. This is accomplished by relating such paths to paths which are utilitarian maximal when an increasing (but not necessarily concave) utility function evaluates each period\u27s consumption. Dynamic properties of Suppes-Sen maximal paths, which lie entirely above or entirely below the golden-rule, are analyzed. An example is presented in which an explicit form of a consumption function is described, which generates only Suppes-Sen maximal paths. This consumption function is shown to generate consumption cycles, and violate the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle

Carnap ja tieteiden ykseys

This dissertation concentrates on a particular exemplification of the ideal of the unity of science in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Taking Rudolf Carnap (1891--1970) as an exemplar of a scholar whose work in philosophy of science was at bottom motivated by the ideal of a unified conception of science, it attempts to distillate the essential characteristics and methodological significance of such a conception by a combination of historical and systematic analysis. Given the conspicuously holoscopic character of Carnap's philosophical orientation, there arises an interesting question about the relation of his work to that of other prominent ``seekers of the wider view'' in the history of philosophy (and history of science). On a more general level, we ask what kind of intellectual and moral characteristics are associated with a scholar who is motivated by the unification of science. Making it explicit: if a coherent conception of a unified conception of science is conceivable, what kind of normative criteria can then be applied to a scholar and his actions? In other words, what are the external and internal qualifications of scholar's vocation under the unified conception of science? In the first part of the dissertation we provide a general account of the problem's background in the intersection of intellectual history and systematics. In the first chapter main emphasis will be put to the dialectic between agent-based and structural explanations in historiography. The survey of a few exemplars of models of historical explanation is intended to provide a background framework for discussing the relation between descriptive analysis and analysis of values. In as much as our modern scientific world conception and the general, essentially human, consciousness of the domain of validity seem to be in a fundamental conflict, a philosophical clarification of the issues that depend on this fundamental distinction is contingent on having proper tools at its disposal. Indeed, it is necessary to acknowledge -- with respect to both scientific knowledge and moral positions -- that the issues of genesis and validity have little in common. Both the image of nature, built upon the masses of scientific and technological knowledge gathered, and the modern conceptions of the moral have developed in the course of history. The lesson that historicism can teach us is the possibility to adopt a symmetrical attitude with respect to the status of the questions of genesis and validity within these (very different) domains. This symmetric attitude enables us to see that the validity of a theory or position (in science or in moral philosophy) cannot depend on the diachronic aspects of its genesis. Rather, it is precisely the case that the late appearance of certain scientific theories and certain moral positions is an index that they are complex and presuppose a great deal genetically, and this is seen to be a common feature of all good theories. Thus, in order to approach the evolution of these ideas from a general perspective, we have to acknowledge their fundamental ontological difference and adopt a variety of tools to study these domains. I present four different approaches to the study of historical phenomena that appertain to the themes of this dissertation. In the second chapter we provide a synopsis of the important thematic about the relationship between morals and science. After a brief examination of the concepts of the moral and the scientific, we proceed to give an account of the concept of scientific self which acts as a kind of normative meta-concept co-ordinating the interaction between the epistemic and the ethical requirements appertaining to the education and professional formation of a scientist. From a historical perspective it is easy to to see that the intension of the concept of scientific self varies according to the contingent factors such as the external conditions of education and the requirements set by new experimental techniques, but the essential, axiologically relevant, internal determinates of the concept are seen to accumulate over time in a conservative manner. Especially interesting here are the determinates that can be traced back to the complementary intellectual traditions of Enlightenment and Romanticism. One of the most important exemplifications of an articulated conception of scientific self can be found in J. G. Fichte's ``Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten'' of 1794. In these lectures Fichte develops a beautiful -- and still highly relevant -- conception of the true goals of a scholar as well as the qualifications he must fulfill to attain those goals. From Fichte we turn to study the history of one particular intellectual virtue that has direct relevance for the questions tackled in the second part of the dissertation, viz. tolerance. In the third chapter we focus on the importance of a priori knowledge for both ethics and science. These themes are developed only in their barest outlines in order to provide some theoretical support to the fundamental philosophical thesis of the dissertation concerning the distinction between Is and Ought, and its relevance for the question of the unity of science. We will briefly touch upon the question about the relationship of a priori and empirical knowledge in ethics, and provide a brief synopsis of the relevance of the distinction analytic/synthetic in this domain. Finally we address cursorily the ontologically crucial problem about the moral element in man and present -- with a view to the Enlightenment virtues -- a synopsis of the process of the dissociation of the concept of the moral from the concept of the scientific. We describe the characteristics of ethical impulse in modern times and the quite idiosyncratic view on morals and especially on moral justification advocated by the members of Vienna Circle. We will see how the dissociation of the moral from the domain of the rational discourse inevitably results in the philosophically poverished stance of moral non-cognitivism which Carnap maintained throughout his career. In the second part of the dissertation we can finally address the adduced problem in its particular ramifications in the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Given this general problematic, we attempt to vindicate the underlying overall motivation of Carnap's philosophy and to reconstruct the architectonic of Carnap's systematic thought in the light of recent research. One of the main tasks is to evaluate the coherence of interpretations provided in the research literature which place Carnap in the continuum of thinkers that are, in some sense, committed to the ideals and values of Enlightenment. The most explicit rendering of this line of thought is the recent monograph, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought, by A.W. Carus which puts Carnap's method of explication on center stage. I critically examine this line of interpretation indicated by Carus and explore more deeply its historical dimensions. Over and above the interpretation of Carus, we assess to what extent Carnap's philosophical program fulfills the criteria that are imposed upon it by the requirement of an Enlightenment conception of unified science. The central significance of logic and mathematics in Carnap's philosophical program is seen to derive from the fundamental conception of Carnap that within the total system of knowledge logic and mathematics are performing the essential role of supplying the forms of concepts, statements, and inferences, forms which are then applicable everywhere, hence also to non-logical knowledge. Therefore, the demarcation between logical and non-logical expressions, along with the Principle of Tolerance and logical pluralism, constitutes one of the central strands of Carnap's thought. Indeed, the Principle of Tolerance and the logicality criterion are seen to be two inextricably entwined aspects of a solution to a fundamental problem that Carnap searches a solution to and which characterizes his aspirations throughout the period under consideration here, i.e. the problem of the rationality of scientific discourse under the variability of linguistic systems of knowledge representation. I depict the overall development of Carnap's philosophy with this central idea continually in focus. As a supplement to the interpretation of Carnap's program as a concerted attempt to look for the fundamental invariants of thought and experience, I provide the view that a necessary condition for implementing his ideal of explication is a coherent formulation of what might be called the task of providing genealogies of important scientific concepts and ideas. This complies with the attractive account represented by Howard Stein about the two basic functions of philosophy, i.e., a distinction between ``the enterprise of knowledge'' and the ``enterprise of understanding''. It is argued here that an essential ingredient of Carnap's method of explication is a variety of philosophical history of science which provides the necessary insight into the problem complex one is tackling with under the purview of explication. Therefore, a significant role is bestowed upon historical knowledge and historiography. I attempt to accommodate this aspect of the ``enterprise of understanding'' within the more explicitly confined ``enterprise of knowledge'' that Carnap was overtly concerned with. However, it is argued that the ``enterprise of understanding'' constituted an equally important aspect of Carnap's philosophical program, although it remained covert in his publications.Väitöskirjan aihepiirinä on tieteen ykseyden ideaalin merkitys Rudolf Carnapin (1891 - 1970) ajattelussa ja tuotannossa, sekä tämän ideaalin ja sen julkilausumattomien ennakkoedellytysten analyysi tieteenfilosofian ja -historian modernissa traditiossa. Keskittymällä Rudolf Carnapin ajatteluun työssä pyritään tuomaan esille tieteen ykseyden ideaalin olennaiset piirteet ja metodologinen merkitys historiallisen ja systemaattisen analyysin valossa. Yleisellä tasolla työssä kysytään, minkälaisia intellektuaalisia ja moraalisia piirteitä voidaan liittää tutkijaan ja hänen työhönsä, erityisesti sellaisen tutkijaan, joka ammentaa vaikutteensa tieteen ykseyden ideaalista. Työssä pyritään eksplikoiman ne normatiiviset ehdot, joita voidaan soveltaa tutkijaan ja hänen työhönsä carnapilaisen tieteenkäsityksen puitteissa; toisin sanoen esitetään ne ulkoiset sekä sisäiset epistemologiset ja moraalifilosofiset kriteerit, jotka tutkijan työtä määrittävät tieteen ykseyden ideaalin mukaisesti. Työn ensimmäisessä osassa tarkastellaan tieteiden ykseyden ja tieteentekijän moraalisen kehityksen välistä suhdetta historiallisesta ja systemaattisesta perspektiivistä. Keskeisenä tieteenhistoriallisena vertailukohtana on objektiivisuuden käsitteen kehitys, jota mm. Lorraine Daston ja Peter Galison ovat ansiokkaasti kuvanneet teoksessaan Objectivity (2007). Sen lisäksi että Daston ja Galison esittävät tieteen metodologiaan liittyviä keskeisiä huomioita objektiivisuuden käsitteen merkityksestä ja soveltamisesta eri aikoina, he asettavat keskeiselle sijalle minän, persoonan tai itsen käsitteen tieteellisessä tutkimusprosessissa. Tarkastelemalla kuinka erilaiset käsitykset itsestä -- ja etenkin nk. "tieteellisestä itsestä" ("scientific self") -- ovat kehittyneet objektiivisuuden käsitteen rinnalla, he päätyvät tulokseen, että ns. episteemiset hyveet ovat kiinteässä vuorovaikutuksessa eettisiin arvoihin sekä yksilön moraaliseen kehitykseen, ja muodostavat välttämättömät ehdot tieteenharjoittamiselle. Episteemisten hyveiden keskeisenä tehtävänä on ohjata tieteellistä tutkimusta siten, että ne vahvistavat tiedonhankinnan pragmaattista tehokkuutta ja edistävät "totuuteen pyrkivää tutkimusta" vetoamalla eettisiin arvoihin -- arvoihin, jotka ohjaavat yksilön intellektuaalista ja moraalista kehitystä ja luovat pohjan erilaisille tavoille ("techniques of the self") harjoittaa kykyjä, taitoja ja taipumuksia, jotka ovat tieteenharjoittamisessa keskeisiä. Historian valossa on selvää, että käsitykset "tieteellisestä itsestä" ovat muuttuneet aikojen kuluessa. Syynä tähän ovat olleet mm. kehittyneet käsitykset objektiivisuudesta sekä tieteen tavoitteista ja menetelmistä. Myös havaintolaitteiden kehityksellä on ollut tässä ratkaiseva merkitys (esimerkiksi kameran (daguerrotypia) ja fonografin keksiminen 1800-luvulla). Erityisen kiinnostavia ovat ne käsitykset itsestä, jotka liittyvät valistuksen ja romantiikan rikkaisiin traditiohin. Yhden merkittävän näkemyksen tieteellisestä itsestä ja tutkijan ammatin merkityksestä esitti J. G. Fichte luennoissaan ``Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten'' vuodelta 1794. Näissä luennoissa Fichte esittelee kauniin -- ja edelleen ajankohtaisen -- näkemyksen tieteellisestä tutkimuksesta ja niistä ehdoista, jotka tutkijan tulisi täyttää saavuttaakseen tavoitteensa. Fichten näkemysten esittelyn jälkeen siirrytään tutkimaan yhden Carnapin filosofianäkemyksen kannalta keskeisen käsitteen, suvaitsevaisuusperiaatteen (Principle of Tolerance), historiaa. Lisäksi eritellään niitä apriorisen tiedon ja empiirisen tiedon lajeja, joilla on merkitystä moraalifilosofian kannalta ja toisaalta analyysin käsitteen historiaa siltä osin, kuin se muodostaa olennaisen taustan Carnapin filosofian ja filosofisen metodin ymmärtämiselle. Työn toisessa osassa siirrytään tarkastelemaan eksplisiittisesti Rudolf Carnapin filosofiaa ja sen kehitystä 1900-luvun ensimmäisiltä vuosikymmeniltä 1950-luvulle. Työn ensimmäisessä osassa esitellyn problematiikan valossa yritetään kuvata ja perustella Carnapin filosofianäkemyksen taustalla vaikuttava keskeinen motivaatio sekä esittää hänen ajattelunsa kokonaisrakenne, sen "arkkitektoniikka" viimeaikaisen tutkimuksen pohjalta. Yksi tutkimuksen keskeisiä tavoitteita on arvioida tutkimuskirjallisuudessa esiintyneitä tulkintoja, jotka asettavat Carnapin niiden ajattelijoiden jatkumoon, jotka ovat jossakin mielessä sidoksissa valistuksen traditioon, sen arvoihin ja ideaaleihin. Yksi tässä suhteessa tärkeimmistä tulkinnoista esitetään A. W. Caruksen monografiassa Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought (2007), joka asettaa Carnapin eksplikaation metodin tutkimukselliseen keskiöön. Arvioin kriittisesti Caruksen tulkintaa ja tutkin syvemmin sen historiallisia ennakkoehtoja ja aatetaustaa. Pyrin arvioimaan sitä, missä määrin Carnapin filosofinen ohjelma täyttää ne ehdot, jotka liittyvät valistukselle ominaiseen tieteiden ykseyden käsitykseen. Logiikan ja matematiikan keskeinen merkitys Carnapin filosofiassa seuraa siitä Carnapin perustavasta näkemyksestä, että tiedon kokonaisesityksessä logiikan ja matematiikan tehtävänä on tarjota käsitteiden, lausumien ja päättelyjen formaaliset mallit (muodot), mallit jotka ovat siten sovellettavissa kaikkialla, myös ei--loogisen tiedon piirissä. Siten jako loogisten ja ei-loogisten ilmaisujen välillä sekä toleranssiperiaate ja tähän liittyvä looginen pluralismi muodostavat Carnapin ajattelun yhden keskeisen säikeen. Kuvaan Carnapin ajattelun kehitystä tämä keskeinen ajatus silmämääränäni. Täydentävänä näkökulmana käsitykselle, että Carnapin ohjelma tarkoitti keskitettyä yritystä etsiä systemaattisesti ajattelun ja kokemuksen perustavia invariansseja, tuon esille näkemyksen, jonka mukaan eksplikaation ideaalin välttämättömänä ehtona on koherentti muotoilu ja määritelmä sille, mitä voitaisiin kutsua tärkeiden tieteellisten käsitteiden ja ideoiden syntyhistorioiden esitykseksi. Tämä on yhdenmukaista sen Howard Steinin esittämän näkemyksen kanssa, jonka mukaan Carnapin filosofiaa luonnehtii kaksi toisiaan täydentävää tutkimuslinjaa. Stein erottelee yhtäältä "tiedon hankkeen" ("enterprise of knowledge") ja "ymmärtämisen hankkeen" ("enterprise of understanding"). Esitän, että olennainen osa Carnapin eksplikaation metodia on filosofisen tieteenhistorian tutkimusote, joka tarjoaa välttämättömät ennakkoedellytykset -- käsitteelliset mahdollisuudet eksplikaatioavaruudessa -- annetun eksplikaatiotoiminnan piirissä. Tästä syystä historiallisella tiedolla ja "ymmärtämisen hankkeella" on keskeinen merkitys Carnapin metodin kannalta, vaikkakin tämä ulottuvuus säilyi pitkälti julkilausumattomana hänen julkaistuissa teoksissaan

Collective irrationality

Kollektive Irrationalität durchdringt alle Bereiche des sozialen Lebens. Von der Herdenbildung an Börsen zur politischen Polarisierung und sogar bis in die epistemische Gemeinschaft der Wissenschaft misslingt es Gruppen, die optimalen Mittel zu wählen, um ihre Ziele zu erreichen. Der Begriff der kollektiven Rationalität lässt sich präzise fassen durch eine Analyse der Argumente, die seine Zuschreibung rechtfertigen. Dazu ist es erforderlich, die Entscheidungsumgebung, die ablaufenden sozialen Prozesse und die relevanten normativen Standards zu erfassen, wozu sich insbesondere agentenbasierte Modellierung und Simulationen eignen. Diese Methode wird auf zwei Fallstudien angewendet, jeweils eines aus dem Bereich der theoretischen und eines aus dem der praktischen Rationalität. Die erste Fallstudie beschreibt die Entstehung sogenannter \textit{unpopular social norms}, also solcher sozialer Normen, die dem Interesse der überwiegenden Mehrheit der Gruppe zuwiderlaufen. Die Analyse eines entsprechenden Modells, in dem begrenzt rationale Akteure mit eingeschränkter Information versuchen, eine optimale Norm zu wählen, zeigt, dass der zugrundeliegende Prozess zwar ineffiziente Normen generieren kann, häufig jedoch effiziente Ergebnisse liefert. Das unmittelbare Urteil der kollektiven Irrationalität muss daher zurückgewiesen werden. In der zweiten Fallstudie wird der Einfluss strategischen Verhaltens in einer Gruppe von Agenten, die Informationen aggregieren, untersucht. Simulationen unterstützen die These, dass es keine universell optimale epistemische Strategie gibt: Agenten, die unter idealen Bedingungen erfolgreich sind, unterliegen im Falle strategischer Einflüsse konkurrierenden Agenten, die wiederum unter idealen Bedingungen suboptimale Ergebnisse erzielen. Eine evolutionäre Analyse des Modells belegt darüber hinaus, dass nichtepistmisch motiviertes Verhalten unter einem wengistens teilweise auf epistemischen Werten basierenden Belohnungssystem zurückgedrängt wird, ohne jedoch vollständig zu verschwinden. Die Verwendung agentenbasierter Modellierung und Simulation lässt sich insbesondere durch die epistemischen Eigenschaften der Methode rechtfertigen. Anders als Computersimulationen im Allgemeinen sind Modelle epistemisch transparent, das heißt nicht opak. Sie können außerdem unter den richtigen Bedingungen auch Bestätigung liefern. Gepaart mit der großen Flexibilität in der Modellierung handelt es sich daher ABM um ein wertvolles Werkzeug für ingenieursmäßig betriebene Philosophie. Dieser Ansatz strebt konkrete Lösungen für spezifische philosophische Probleme an, ohne vorher die Rechtfertigung einer fundamentalen Theorie zu fordern. Philosophische Probleme sind real und allgegenwärtig und verlangen daher Lösungen; die obigen Untersuchungen schlagen solche Lösungen vor

PSA 2016

These preprints were automatically compiled into a PDF from the collection of papers deposited in PhilSci-Archive in conjunction with the PSA 2016