On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues

Traveling salesman problems with revenues form a generalization of traveling salesman problems.Here, next to travel costs an explicit revenue is generated by visiting a city.We analyze routing problems with revenues, where a predetermined route on all cities determines the tours along subgroups.Corresponding routing games with revenues are analyzed.It is shown that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided.

Enabling the freight traffic controller for collaborative multi-drop urban logistics: practical and theoretical challenges

There is increasing interest in how horizontal collaboration between parcel carriers might help alleviate problems associated with last-mile logistics in congested urban centers. Through a detailed review of the literature on parcel logistics pertaining to collaboration, along with practical insights from carriers operating in the United Kingdom, this paper examines the challenges that will be faced in optimizing multicarrier, multidrop collection, and delivery schedules. A “freight traffic controller” (FTC) concept is proposed. The FTC would be a trusted third party, assigned to equitably manage the work allocation between collaborating carriers and the passage of vehicles over the last mile when joint benefits to the parties could be achieved. Creating this FTC concept required a combinatorial optimization approach for evaluation of the many combinations of hub locations, network configuration, and routing options for vehicle or walking to find the true value of each potential collaboration. At the same time, the traffic, social, and environmental impacts of these activities had to be considered. Cooperative game theory is a way to investigate the formation of collaborations (or coalitions), and the analysis used in this study identified a significant shortfall in current applications of this theory to last-mile parcel logistics. Application of theory to urban freight logistics has, thus far, failed to account for critical concerns including (a) the mismatch of vehicle parking locations relative to actual delivery addresses; (b) the combination of deliveries with collections, requests for the latter often being received in real time during the round; and (c) the variability in travel times and route options attributable to traffic and road network conditions

Strategic Trip Planning: Striking a Balance Between Competition and Cooperation

In intelligent transportation systems, cooperative mobility planning is considered to be one of the challenging problems. Mobility planning as it stands today is an in- dividual decision-making effort that takes place in an environment governed by the collective actions of various competing travellers. Despite the extensive research on mobility planning, a situation in which multiple behavioural-driven travellers partic- ipate in a cooperative endeavour to help each other optimize their objectives has not been investigated. Furthermore, due to the inherent multi-participant nature of the mobility problem, the existing solutions fail to produce ground truth optimal mobil- ity plans in the practical sense - despite their claimed and well proven theoretical optimality. This thesis proposes a multi-module team mobility planning framework to address the team trip planning problem with a particular emphasis on modelling the inter- action between behaviour-driven rational travellers. The framework accommodates the travellers’ individual behaviours, preferences, and goals in cooperative and com- petitive scenarios. The individual behaviours of the travellers and their interaction processes are viewed as a team trip planning game. For this game, a theoretical anal- ysis is presented, which includes an analysis of the existence and the balancedness of the final solution. The proposed framework is composed of three principal modules: cooperative trip planning, team formation, and traveller-centric trip planning (TCTP). The cooper- ative trip planning module deploys a bargaining model to manage conflicts between the travellers that could occur in their endeavour to discover a general, satisfactory solution. The number of players and their interaction process is controlled by the team formation module. The TCTP module adopts an alternative perspective to the individualized trip-planning problem in the sense that it is being behavioural driven problem. This allows for multitudes of traveler centric objectives and constraints, as well as aspects of the environment as they pertain to the traveller’s preferences, to be incorporated in the process. Within the scope of the team mobility planning frame- work, the TCTP is utilized to supply the travellers with personalized strategies that are incorporated in the cooperative game. The concentration problem is used in this thesis to demonstrate the effectiveness of the TCTP module as a behavioural-driven trip planner. Finally, to validate the theoretical set-up of the team trip planning game, we introduce the territory sharing problem for social taxis. We use the team mobility framework as a basis to solve the problem. Furthermore, we present an argument for the convergence and the efficiency of a coarse correlated equilibrium. In addition to the validation of a variety of theoretical concepts, the territory sharing problem is used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed framework in dealing with cooperative mobility planning problems

On the core of routing games with revenues

Routing problems, Revenues, Core, C71,

On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues

Traveling salesman problems with revenues form a generalization of traveling salesman problems. Here, next to travel costs an explicit revenue is generated by visiting a city. We analyze routing problems with revenues, where a predetermined route on all cities determines the tours along subgroups. Corresponding routing games with revenues are analyzed. It is shown that these games have a nonempty core and a complete description of the core is provided