On the Continuity of Ethical Social Welfare Orders

In this paper we study the extent to which ethical social welfare orders on infinite utility streams can be continuous. For a class of metrics, we show that ethical preferences can be continuous if and only if the continuity requirement is in terms of a metric which satisfies a simplex condition. This condition requires that the distance from the origin to the unit simplex in the space of utility streams be positive. We use this characterization result to establish that the metric used by Svensson (1980) induces the weakest topology for which there exist continuous ethical preferences.

Ordering infinite utility streams: Efficiency, continuity, and no impatience

[EN]We study two related versions of the no-impatience postulate in the context of transitive and reflexive relations on infinite utility streams which are not necessarily complete. Both are excluded by the traditional (weak) anonymity axiom. We show explicit social welfare relations satisfying Strong Pareto and the weaker version of no-impatience that are compatible with continuity in all the traditional topologies in this field. However the stronger version of no-impatience is violated by all lower semicontinuous (in the sup or Campbell topologies) social welfare relations satisfying the Weak Pareto axiom

Quasi-metrics for possibility results: intergenerational preferences and continuity

In this paper, we provide the counterparts of a few celebrated impossibility theorems for continuous social intergenerational preferences according to P. Diamond, L.G. Svensson and T. Sakai. In particular, we give a topology that must be refined for continuous preferences to satisfy anonymity and strong monotonicity. Furthermore, we suggest quasi-pseudo-metrics as an appropriate quantitative tool for reconciling topology and social intergenerational preferences. Thus, we develop a metric-type method which is able to guarantee the possibility counterparts of the aforesaid impossibility theorems and, in addition, it is able to give numerical quantifications of the improvement of welfare. Finally, a refinement of the previous method is presented in such a way that metrics are involved

Intergenerational Preferences and Continuity: Reconciling Order and Topology

In this paper we focus our efforts on studying how a preorder and topology can be made compatible. Thus we provide a characterization of those that are continuous-compatible. Such a characterization states that such topologies must be finer than the so-called upper topology induced by the preorder and, thus, it clarifies which topology is the smallest one among those that make the preorder continuous. Moreover, we provide sufficient conditions that allows us to discard in an easy way the continuity of a preference. In the light of the obtained results, we provide possibility counterparts of the a few celebrate impossibility theorems for continuous social social intergenerational preferences due to P. Diamond, L.G. Svensson and T. Sakai. Furthermore, we suggest quasi-pseudo-metrics as appropriate quantitative tool for reconciling topology and social intergenerational preferences. Thus, we develop a metric type method which is able to guarantee possibility counterparts of the aforesaid impossibility theorems and, in addition, it is able to give numerical quantifications of the improvement of welfare. We also show that our method makes always the intergenerational preferences semi-continuous multi-utility representables in the sense of \"{O}zg\"{u} Evern and Efe O. Ok. Finally, in order to keep close to the classical way of measuring in the literature, a refinement of the previous method is presented in such a way that metrics are involved

The Ethics of Distribution in a Warming Planet

The discounted-utilitarian social welfare function (DU) is used by the great majority of researchers studying intergenerational resource allocation in the presence of climate change (e.g., W. Nordhaus, M. Weitzman, N. Stern, and P. Dasgupta). I present three justifications for using DU: (1) the view that the first generation’s preferences should be hegemonic, (2) the viewpoint of a utilitarian Ethical Observer who maximizes expected utility when the existence of future generations is uncertain, and (3) axiomatic justifications (as in classical social-choice theory). I argue that only justification (2) provides an ethically convincing justification, and that, only if one endorses utilitarianism as a good ethic. Recent work by Llavador, Roemer and Silvestre challenges the utilitarian assumption, and argues that sustaining human welfare at the highest possible level forever, or sustaining the growth rate of human welfare (at a fixed exogenous growth rate), are more attractive ethical choices. The work of these authors, which studies the optimal intergenerational paths of resource allocatiobn under the sustainabilitarian objectives, is briefly reviewed and contrasted with the discounted-utilitarian approach

How can pure social discounting be ethically justified?

The evaluation of long-term effects of climate change in cost-benefit analysis has a long tradition in environmental economics. Since the publication of the Stern Review in 2006 the debate about the "appropriate" discounting of future welfare and utility levels was revived and the most renowned scholars of the profession participated in this debate. In two recent contributions in Environmental and Resource Economics, there was dispute about intertemporal welfare economics between Partha Dasgupta and John Roemer about the correct interpretation of the topic. The aim of this work is to bring together economic and philosophical reasoning about justice and intergenerational equity in the context of climate change. So we adopt the normative view in order to present the most important ethical issues that, particularly in the context of climate policy, are most relevant for the choice of intertemporal discounting. Subsequently we explore whether ethical considerations may also be helpful to justify pure social discounting per se

Liberal approaches to ranking infinite utility streams: When can we avoid interference?

[EN]In this work we analyse social welfare relations on sets of finite and infinite utility streams that satisfy various types of liberal non-interference principles. Earlier contributions have established that (finitely) anonymous and strongly Paretian quasiorderings exist that verify non-interference axioms together with weak preference continuity and further consistency. Nevertheless Mariotti and Veneziani prove that a fully liberal non-interfering view of a finite society leads to dictatorship if the weak Pareto principle is imposed. We first prove that this impossibility result vanishes when we extend the horizon to infinity. Then we investigate a related problem: namely, the possibility of combining \standard" semicontinuity with eficiency in the presence of non-interference. We provide several impossibility results that prove that there is a generalised incompatibility between relaxed forms of continuity and non- interference principles, both under ordinal and cardinal views of the problem

Liberal approaches to ranking infinite utility streams: When can we avoid interference?

[EN]In this work we analyse social welfare relations on sets of finite and infinite utility streams that satisfy various types of liberal non-interference principles. Earlier contributions have established that (finitely) anonymous and strongly Paretian quasiorderings exist that verify non-interference axioms together with weak preference continuity and further consistency. Nevertheless Mariotti and Veneziani prove that a fully liberal non-interfering view of a finite society leads to dictatorship if the weak Pareto principle is imposed. We first prove that this impossibility result vanishes when we extend the horizon to infinity. Then we investigate a related problem: namely, the possibility of combining \standard" semicontinuity with eficiency in the presence of non-interference. We provide several impossibility results that prove that there is a generalised incompatibility between relaxed forms of continuity and non- interference principles, both under ordinal and cardinal views of the problem