Evidence of coevolution in multi-objective evolutionary algorithms

This paper demonstrates that simple yet important characteristics of coevolution can occur in evolutionary algorithms when only a few conditions are met. We find that interaction-based fitness measurements such as fitness (linear) ranking allow for a form of coevolutionary dynamics that is observed when 1) changes are made in what solutions are able to interact during the ranking process and 2) evolution takes place in a multi-objective environment. This research contributes to the study of simulated evolution in a at least two ways. First, it establishes a broader relationship between coevolution and multi-objective optimization than has been previously considered in the literature. Second, it demonstrates that the preconditions for coevolutionary behavior are weaker than previously thought. In particular, our model indicates that direct cooperation or competition between species is not required for coevolution to take place. Moreover, our experiments provide evidence that environmental perturbations can drive coevolutionary processes; a conclusion that mirrors arguments put forth in dual phase evolution theory. In the discussion, we briefly consider how our results may shed light onto this and other recent theories of evolution

The Impact of Coevolution and Abstention on the Emergence of Cooperation

This paper explores the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple model to coevolve game strategy and link weights of agents playing the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game. We consider a population of agents placed in a lattice grid with boundary conditions. A number of Monte Carlo simulations are performed to investigate the impacts of the COPD game on the emergence of cooperation. Results show that the coevolutionary rules enable cooperators to survive and even dominate, with the presence of abstainers in the population playing a key role in the protection of cooperators against exploitation from defectors. We observe that in adverse conditions such as when the initial population of abstainers is too scarce/abundant, or when the temptation to defect is very high, cooperation has no chance of emerging. However, when the simple coevolutionary rules are applied, cooperators flourish.Comment: To appear at Studies in Computational Intelligence (SCI), Springer, 201

Sustainable Cooperative Coevolution with a Multi-Armed Bandit

This paper proposes a self-adaptation mechanism to manage the resources allocated to the different species comprising a cooperative coevolutionary algorithm. The proposed approach relies on a dynamic extension to the well-known multi-armed bandit framework. At each iteration, the dynamic multi-armed bandit makes a decision on which species to evolve for a generation, using the history of progress made by the different species to guide the decisions. We show experimentally, on a benchmark and a real-world problem, that evolving the different populations at different paces allows not only to identify solutions more rapidly, but also improves the capacity of cooperative coevolution to solve more complex problems.Comment: Accepted at GECCO 201

Coevolutionary Competence in the Realm of Corporate Longevity: How Long-lived Firms Strategically Renew Themselves

Understanding the phenomena of corporate longevity and self-renewing organizations has become an important topic in recent management literature. However, the majority of the research contributions focus on internal determinants of longevity and self-renewal. Using a co-evolutionary framework, the purpose of this paper is to address the dynamic interaction between organizations and environments in the realm of sustained strategic renewal, i.e. corporate longevity. To this end, we will focus on the competence of long-lived firms to coevolve due to the joint effect of managerial intentionality and environmental selection pressures. Building on coevolutionary framework, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights an organization’s coevolutionary competence. Two longitudinal case studies are presented illustrating the arguments.strategic renewal;corporate longevity;competence-based management;adaptive open systems;coevolutionary competence

Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation

This paper develops a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the coevolution of norm compliance. Thereby we link the multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, to the evolutionary analysis: Individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments will favor conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others' cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators

Extended Inclusive Fitness Theory bridges Economics and Biology through a common understanding of Social Synergy

Inclusive Fitness Theory (IFT) was proposed half a century ago by W.D. Hamilton to explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperation between individuals that allows the existence of society. Contemporary evolutionary ecology identified several factors that increase inclusive fitness, in addition to kin-selection, such as assortation or homophily, and social synergies triggered by cooperation. Here we propose an Extend Inclusive Fitness Theory (EIFT) that includes in the fitness calculation all direct and indirect benefits an agent obtains by its own actions, and through interactions with kin and with genetically unrelated individuals. This formulation focuses on the sustainable cost/benefit threshold ratio of cooperation and on the probability of agents sharing mutually compatible memes or genes. This broader description of the nature of social dynamics allows to compare the evolution of cooperation among kin and non-kin, intra- and inter-specific cooperation, co-evolution, the emergence of symbioses, of social synergies, and the emergence of division of labor. EIFT promotes interdisciplinary cross fertilization of ideas by allowing to describe the role for division of labor in the emergence of social synergies, providing an integrated framework for the study of both, biological evolution of social behavior and economic market dynamics.Comment: Bioeconomics, Synergy, Complexit