10 research outputs found

    On the Tree Conjecture for the Network Creation Game

    Get PDF
    Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al.[PODC\u2703] is the network creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which buy incident edges for the price of alpha per edge to minimize their total distance to all other nodes. The model is well-studied but still has intriguing open problems. The most famous conjectures state that the price of anarchy is constant for all alpha and that for alpha >= n all equilibrium networks are trees. We introduce a novel technique for analyzing stable networks for high edge-price alpha and employ it to improve on the best known bounds for both conjectures. In particular we show that for alpha > 4n-13 all equilibrium networks must be trees, which implies a constant price of anarchy for this range of alpha. Moreover, we also improve the constant upper bound on the price of anarchy for equilibrium trees

    One n Remains to Settle the Tree Conjecture

    Full text link
    In the famous network creation game of Fabrikant et al. a set of agents play a game to build a connected graph. The nn agents form the vertex set VV of the graph and each vertex v∈Vv\in V buys a set EvE_v of edges inducing a graph G=(V,⋃v∈VEv)G=(V,\bigcup\limits_{v\in V} E_v). The private objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of its building cost (the cost of the edges it buys) plus its connection cost (the total distance from itself to every other vertex). Given a cost of α\alpha for each individual edge, a long-standing conjecture, called the tree conjecture, states that if α>n\alpha > n then every Nash equilibrium graph in the game is a spanning tree. After a plethora of work, it is known that the conjecture holds for any α>3n−3\alpha>3n-3. In this paper we prove the tree conjecture holds for α>2n\alpha>2n. This reduces by half the open range for α\alpha with only [n,2n)[n, 2n) remaining in order to settle the conjecture

    Selfish Creation of Social Networks

    Full text link
    Understanding real-world networks has been a core research endeavor throughout the last two decades. Network Creation Games are a promising approach for this from a game-theoretic perspective. In these games, selfish agents corresponding to nodes in a network strategically decide which links to form to optimize their centrality. Many versions have been introduced and analyzed, but none of them fits to modeling the evolution of social networks. In real-world social networks, connections are often established by recommendations from common acquaintances or by a chain of such recommendations. Thus establishing and maintaining a contact with a friend of a friend is easier than connecting to complete strangers. This explains the high clustering, i.e., the abundance of triangles, in real-world social networks. We propose and analyze a network creation model inspired by real-world social networks. Edges are formed in our model via bilateral consent of both endpoints and the cost for establishing and maintaining an edge is proportional to the distance of the endpoints before establishing the connection. We provide results for generic cost functions, which essentially only must be convex functions in the distance of the endpoints without the respective edge. For this broad class of cost functions, we provide many structural properties of equilibrium networks and prove (almost) tight bounds on the diameter, the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. Moreover, as a proof-of-concept we show via experiments that the created equilibrium networks of our model indeed closely mimics real-world social networks. We observe degree distributions that seem to follow a power-law, high clustering, and low diameters. This can be seen as a promising first step towards game-theoretic network creation models that predict networks featuring all core real-world properties.Comment: Appears in the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 202

    35th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science: STACS 2018, February 28-March 3, 2018, Caen, France

    Get PDF
    corecore