On the Modal Logic of Jeffrey Conditionalization

We continue the investigations initiated in the recent papers \cite{BGyR,GyBLst} where Bayes logics have been introduced to study the general laws of Bayesian belief revision. In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises (updates) his prior belief by conditionalizing \ud the prior on some evidence using the Bayes rule. In this paper we take the more general Jeffrey formula as a conditioning device and study the corresponding modal logics that we call Jeffrey logics, focusing mainly on the countable case. The containment relations among \ud these modal logics are determined and it is shown that the logic of Bayes and Jeffrey updating are very close. It is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite or countably infinite set of elementary propositions is {\em not finitely axiomatizable}.\ud The significance of this result is that it clearly indicates that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited

Data Obsolescence Detection in the Light of Newly Acquired Valid Observations

The information describing the conditions of a system or a person is constantly evolving and may become obsolete and contradict other information. A database, therefore, must be consistently updated upon the acquisition of new valid observations that contradict obsolete ones contained in the database. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for dealing with the information obsolescence problem. Our approach aims to detect, in real-time, contradictions between observations and then identify the obsolete ones, given a representation model. Since we work within an uncertain environment characterized by the lack of information, we choose to use a Bayesian network as our representation model and propose a new approximate concept, $\epsilon$-Contradiction. The new concept is parameterised by a confidence level of having a contradiction in a set of observations. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm for detecting obsolete information. We show that the resulting obsolete information is better represented by an AND-OR tree than a simple set of observations. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a real elderly fall-prevention database and showcase how this tree can be used to give reliable recommendations to doctors. Our experiments give systematically and substantially very good results

The modal logic of Bayesian belief revision

In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using Bayes’ rule. We define a hierarchy of modal logics that capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in the hierarchy are distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions on which the agent’s prior is defined. Inclusions among the modal logics in the hierarchy are determined. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the strongest modal companion of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems it is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable