Hidden information transfer in an autonomous swinging robot

This paper describes a hitherto overlooked aspect of the information dynamics of embodied agents, which can be thought of as hidden information transfer. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a minimal model of an autonomous agent. While it is well known that information transfer is generally low between closely synchronised systems, here we show how it is possible that such close synchronisation may serve to “carry” signals between physically separated endpoints. This creates seemingly paradoxical situations where transmitted information is not visible at some intermediate point in a network, yet can be seen later after further processing. We discuss how this relates to existing theories relating information transfer to agent behaviour, and the possible explanation by analogy to communication systems

What do You Want to do Today? : Relevant-Information Bookkeeping in Goal-Oriented Behaviour

We extend existing models and methods for the informational treatment of the perception-action loop to the case of goaloriented behaviour and introduce the notion of relevant goal information as the amount of information an agent necessarily has to maintain about its goal. Starting from the hypothesis that organisms use information economically, we study the structure of this information and how goal-information parsimony can guide behaviour. It is shown how these methods lead to a general definition and quantification of sub-goals and how the biologically motivated hypothesis of information parsimony gives rise to the emergence of behavioural properties such as least-commitment and goal-concealing

Dreaming the Whole Cat: Generative Models, Predictive Processing, and the Enactivist Conception of Perceptual Experience

Does the material basis of conscious experience extend beyond the boundaries of the brain and central nervous system? In Clark 2009 I reviewed a number of ‘enactivist ’ arguments for such a view and found none of them compelling. Ward (2012) rejects my analysis on the grounds that the enactivist deploys an essentially world-involving concept of experience that transforms the argumenta-tive landscape in a way that makes the enactivist conclusion inescapable. I present an alternative (prediction-and-generative-model-based) account that neatly ac-commodates all the positive evidence that Ward cites on behalf of this enactivist conception, and that (I argue) makes richer and more satisfying contact with the full sweep of human experience. 1. Dialogues concerning experience and action In Clark 2009 I explore and reject a number of arguments meant — or so it seemed — to favour a ‘hypothesis of the extended conscious mind ’ (ECM). ECM, as I characterized it, was the claim that ‘the local [material] vehicles of some of our conscious experiences might include more than the whirrings and grindings of the brain/CNS’ (Clark 2009, p. 967). Despite strongly believing (see Clark 1997) that the best way to understand mind and cognition is by attending to complex webs of structure spanning brain, body, and world, and despite arguing (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Clark 2008, and elsewhere) that certain non-conscious cognitive states might be realized by mate-rial circuits that loop through brain, body, and aspects of surrounding ‘designer environments’, I thus rejected — on empirical grounds — the suggestion that the material vehicles of conscious experience actu-ally do loop outside the brain and central nervous system of the experiencing animal

Backwards is the way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the expected future

Clark offers a powerful description of the brain as a prediction machine, which offers progress on two distinct levels. First, on an abstract conceptual level, it provides a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition (including subdivisions such as attention, expectation, and imagination). Second, hierarchical prediction offers progress on a concrete descriptive level for testing and constraining conceptual elements and mechanisms of predictive coding models (estimation of predictions, prediction errors, and internal models)

Extending the Extended Mind : From Cognition to Consciousness

Where does conscious experience stop and the rest of the world begin? Is the material basis of consciousness confined to the brain, or can it be extended to include other parts of the body and environmental elements? This study proposes an extended account: when all the requirements are fulfilled, an external tool may become part of the realising basis for certain experiential processes. Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued famously that the material basis of cognitive states sometimes extends out of the barriers of skin and skull to external objects such as notebooks and other everyday tools. However, they draw the line there: only cognition, but not consciousness can have an extended base. The central argument of this study is that their constraint is not legitimate. If one is accepted, the other one follows. The first chapter lays an overview of the theoretical background of externalism and the 4E-theories in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. It also examines the central concepts, accounts and methodological questions that will be used and further developed in later chapters. The second chapter presents three arguments for the position defended in this thesis, namely the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The third chapter analyses the ongoing debate in the interface of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science about the causal–constitution distinction, and argues that rather than in mechanist terms, the causal–constitution distinction should be interpreted in diachronic terms when dealing with mental phenomena. When depicted that way, the extension relation in the hypothesis of extended conscious mind counts as constitutive. The fourth chapter distinguishes between several different levels of extension, from mere short-term extension to more robust functional incorporation, where the external tool has become part of the transparent bodily point of view of the subject. Based on the notion of functional incorporation, a set of demarcation criteria for the hypothesis of extended conscious mind will be developed. The chapter closes by discussing sensory substitution as a concrete example of functional incorporation. Finally, the fifth chapter introduces the most influential counter-arguments that have been set forth against the hypothesis of extended conscious mind. The critiques will be examined and answered.Väitöstutkimus esittää, että mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen rajat laajentuvat pään ja ruumiin ulkopuolelle, esimerkiksi teknologisiin apuvälineisiin. Tutkimus kyseenalaistaa mielenfilosofiassa perinteisesti vallassa olleen näkemyksen, jonka mukaan mielen toiminnot voitaisiin selittää pelkän aivotoiminnan pohjalta – sen sijaan mielen toiminnot syntyvät aivojen, ruumiin ja ympäristön vuorovaikutuksessa. Andy Clark ja David Chalmers esittivät kuuluisassa artikkelissaan, että jokapäiväiset apuvälineet voivat olla kognitiivisten prosessien muodostamisessa mukana biologisen ruumiin ohella. Clark ja Chalmers kuitenkin rajoittivat laajentumisen tähän: heidän mukaansa pelkästään kognitiivisilla prosesseilla voi olla laajentunut perusta, mutta tietoinen kokemus rajoittuu pään sisään. Tämän tutkimuksen uusi avaus ja ydinargumentti on, että tällaista rajanvetoa ei ole mahdollista tehdä johdonmukaisesti. Jos hyväksymme kognitiivisten tilojen laajentumisen, tietoinen kokemus seuraa mukana. Biologisten toimintojen ohella esimerkiksi muistikirja tai älypuhelin voi toimia muistoja ja uskomuksia osaltaan toteuttavana välineenä, ja sokeankeppi tai tekoraaja osana tuntoaistimuksen toteuttavaa materiaalista pohjaa. Jotta laajentuminen voi tapahtua, ulkoisen välineen tulee täyttää tietyt ehdot, sen täytyy muun muassa tulla osaksi funktionaalista ruumiillista identiteettiä. Ulkoisiin apuvälineisiin laajentuminen on mahdollista aivojen ja ruumiin rakenteellisen muovautuvuuden ansiosta: ruumiillistetun osan ei tarvitse olla biologinen, mutta sen täytyy tulla ”läpinäkyväksi” osaksi subjektin näkökulmaa. Käsitteellisen analyysin lisäksi työssä käsitellään useita empiirisiä tutkimustapauksia (kuten aistikorvaavuuslaite-teknologia ja empiirinen unitutkimus). Mielen ja tietoisen kokemuksen laajentumisella on kauaskantoinen vaikutus, joka näkyy filosofian ohella useilla muillakin aloilla. Tutkimus auttaa vastaamaan erittäin ajankohtaisiin kysymyksiin, kuten millainen status käyttämillemme jokapäiväisille teknologisille laitteille tulisi antaa: tulisiko niitä pitää vain fyysisinä esineinä vai kognitiivisten prosessien jatkeena? Yksi esiin nouseva käytännönläheinen kysymys jatkotutkimukselle on kuinka ympäristön muokkaaminen (esim. hoitolaitoksissa tehtävät ratkaisut) vaikuttaa mieleen – ja tästä seuraa myös monenlaisia eettisiä kysymyksiä

Artificial societies and information theory: modelling of sub system formation based on Luhmann's autopoietic theory

This thesis develops a theoretical framework for the generation of artificial societies. In particular it shows how sub-systems emerge when the agents are able to learn and have the ability to communicate. This novel theoretical framework integrates the autopoietic hypothesis of human societies, formulated originally by the German sociologist Luhmann, with concepts of Shannon's information theory applied to adaptive learning agents. Simulations were executed using Multi-Agent-Based Modelling (ABM), a relatively new computational modelling paradigm involving the modelling of phenomena as dynamical systems of interacting agents. The thesis in particular, investigates the functions and properties necessary to reproduce the paradigm of society by using the mentioned ABM approach. Luhmann has proposed that in society subsystems are formed to reduce uncertainty. Subsystems can then be composed by agents with a reduced behavioural complexity. For example in society there are people who produce goods and other who distribute them. Both the behaviour and communication is learned by the agent and not imposed. The simulated task is to collect food, keep it and eat it until sated. Every agent communicates its energy state to the neighbouring agents. This results in two subsystems whereas agents in the first collect food and in the latter steal food from others. The ratio between the number of agents that belongs to the first system and to the second system, depends on the number of food resources. Simulations are in accordance with Luhmann, who suggested that adaptive agents self-organise by reducing the amount of sensory information or, equivalently, reducing the complexity of the perceived environment from the agent's perspective. Shannon's information theorem is used to assess the performance of the simulated learning agents. A practical measure, based on the concept of Shannon's information ow, is developed and applied to adaptive controllers which use Hebbian learning, input correlation learning (ICO/ISO) and temporal difference learning. The behavioural complexity is measured with a novel information measure, called Predictive Performance, which is able to measure at a subjective level how good an agent is performing a task. This is then used to quantify the social division of tasks in a social group of honest, cooperative food foraging, communicating agents

Physical activity in development of motor skills and cognitive processes in preschool children: consequences in school readiness.

A survey of the scientific literature shows that there is a large consensus in the scientific and education communities on the beneficial effects of physical activity on health; accordingly, recommendations on levels and types of activities to be performed by children and adults have been published by scientific associations and international organizations (WHO, NASPE, AAP, HAH). Good health is a fundamental right of children important for both well being and for school success; good health is also important for development of executive functions, which also contribute to well being and school readiness. Despite this correlation, the relationship between motor and cognitive development in children has not been extensively studied, also because the methodological difficulties occurring when the focus are rapidly developing human beings of age ranging from 3 to 6 years. Note that most of the studies addressing physical and cognitive competences in this population of children are based on parent's reports and interviews and that methods for objective and reliable quantitative and qualitative data acquisition have only recently been introduced. In addition, the classical view that children "mature by themselves" and that acquisition of skills depends on chronological age rather that experience, environment and cultural context is still very popular among parents and educators as well as among some components of the scientific community. On the other hand a new era on the science of development is approaching. Recent data from neuroscientific studies suggest a positive association between physical activity, physical fitness, executive functions and academic performance. In the international congress of Seattle (2013) on Child Development data were presented showing that the practice of physical activity can promote development of executive functions and school success in children; in line with these suggestions, new data were recently published (Verburgh, 2014) and more are now expected to appear. The ICSSPE (International Council of Sport Science and Physical Education) has organized a "by invitation only" symposium held in Berlin in September 2014 where a task of world experts of science, education, business and politics was asked to discuss on the scientific and practical aspects of promoting cognitive development with physical activity. In those two days of "brain storming", we concluded on the need of interdisciplinary approaches to promote both the growth of scientific knowledge and the identification and implementation of specific programs to develop school readiness in children. In that meeting some important different points of view by different cultural contexts also emerged, confirming that an ecological perspective is necessary to understand and promote motor and cognitive development. In this thesis I investigate the possible association between physical activity, physical fitness, executive functions and school achievement. In the first section I discuss the theoretical framework of development by reviewing past and recent theories of child development. In the second section I review the methodological aspects of my approach to the study of 3-6 years old children for acquiring both qualitative and quantitative information on their development. In the third section I present the data and the studies that I have performed during my PhD course addressing three basic questions: a) What is the role of the environment in developing physical activity in preschool children?” b) “How may we develop motor skills in children?” c) If and how may we develop cognitive processes by means of physical activity?". The last sections summarises and draws the conclusions of my studies that highlight the role of the environment (physical and cultural) in child physical development and proposes new approaches to physical education that may contribute to cognitive development and school readiness in preschool childre