10 research outputs found
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games
We show that the problem of finding an {\epsilon}-approximate Nash
equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in
PPAD, when the approximation parameter {\epsilon} is exponentially small in the
number of players.Comment: full versio
Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games
We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms
that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff
function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is
\emph{query complexity}, that is, how many queries are necessary or sufficient
to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium.
We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms.
We also give an example of a 2-strategy, 3-player anonymous game that does not
have any exact Nash equilibrium in rational numbers. However, more positive
query-complexity bounds are attainable if either further symmetries of the
utility functions are assumed or we focus on approximate equilibria. We
investigate four sub-classes of anonymous games previously considered by
\cite{bfh09, dp14}.
Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm that finds a
-approximate Nash equilibrium querying
payoffs and runs in time . This improves on the running
time of pre-existing algorithms for approximate equilibria of anonymous games,
and is the first one to obtain an inverse polynomial approximation in
poly-time. We also show how this can be utilized as an efficient
polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Furthermore, we prove that
payoffs must be queried in order to find any
-well-supported Nash equilibrium, even by randomized algorithms
Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games
We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative
games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted
congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the
equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we give an
efficient weak mediator: a mechanism which has only the power to listen to
reported types and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that (a) it is
an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully report their type
to the mediator, and then follow its suggested action; and (b) that when
players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact,
truthful reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our
solution applies even in settings of incomplete information, and even when
player types are arbitrary or worst-case (i.e. not drawn from a common prior).
We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially private algorithm for
computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence to
equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of
players . We also apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game.
Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust
version of the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational
assumptions (no common prior), yet provide a stronger solution concept (ex-post
Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium). In comparison to previous work, our main
conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators are a game theoretic
object that exist in a wide variety of games -- previously, they were only
known to exist in traffic routing games
PPP-Completeness with Connections to Cryptography
Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle (PPP) is an important subclass of TFNP with
profound connections to the complexity of the fundamental cryptographic
primitives: collision-resistant hash functions and one-way permutations. In
contrast to most of the other subclasses of TFNP, no complete problem is known
for PPP. Our work identifies the first PPP-complete problem without any circuit
or Turing Machine given explicitly in the input, and thus we answer a
longstanding open question from [Papadimitriou1994]. Specifically, we show that
constrained-SIS (cSIS), a generalized version of the well-known Short Integer
Solution problem (SIS) from lattice-based cryptography, is PPP-complete.
In order to give intuition behind our reduction for constrained-SIS, we
identify another PPP-complete problem with a circuit in the input but closely
related to lattice problems. We call this problem BLICHFELDT and it is the
computational problem associated with Blichfeldt's fundamental theorem in the
theory of lattices.
Building on the inherent connection of PPP with collision-resistant hash
functions, we use our completeness result to construct the first natural hash
function family that captures the hardness of all collision-resistant hash
functions in a worst-case sense, i.e. it is natural and universal in the
worst-case. The close resemblance of our hash function family with SIS, leads
us to the first candidate collision-resistant hash function that is both
natural and universal in an average-case sense.
Finally, our results enrich our understanding of the connections between PPP,
lattice problems and other concrete cryptographic assumptions, such as the
discrete logarithm problem over general groups
A Size-Free CLT for Poisson Multinomials and its Applications
An -Poisson Multinomial Distribution (PMD) is the distribution of the
sum of independent random vectors supported on the set of standard basis vectors in . We show
that any -PMD is -close in total
variation distance to the (appropriately discretized) multi-dimensional
Gaussian with the same first two moments, removing the dependence on from
the Central Limit Theorem of Valiant and Valiant. Interestingly, our CLT is
obtained by bootstrapping the Valiant-Valiant CLT itself through the structural
characterization of PMDs shown in recent work by Daskalakis, Kamath, and
Tzamos. In turn, our stronger CLT can be leveraged to obtain an efficient PTAS
for approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games, significantly improving the
state of the art, and matching qualitatively the running time dependence on
and of the best known algorithm for two-strategy anonymous
games. Our new CLT also enables the construction of covers for the set of
-PMDs, which are proper and whose size is shown to be essentially
optimal. Our cover construction combines our CLT with the Shapley-Folkman
theorem and recent sparsification results for Laplacian matrices by Batson,
Spielman, and Srivastava. Our cover size lower bound is based on an algebraic
geometric construction. Finally, leveraging the structural properties of the
Fourier spectrum of PMDs we show that these distributions can be learned from
samples in -time, removing
the quasi-polynomial dependence of the running time on from the
algorithm of Daskalakis, Kamath, and Tzamos.Comment: To appear in STOC 201
Search and optimization with randomness in computational economics: equilibria, pricing, and decisions
In this thesis we study search and optimization problems from computational economics with primarily stochastic inputs. The results are grouped into two categories: First, we address the smoothed analysis of Nash equilibrium computation. Second, we address two pricing problems in mechanism design, and solve two economically motivated stochastic optimization problems.
Computing Nash equilibria is a central question in the game-theoretic study of economic systems of agent interactions. The worst-case analysis of this problem has been studied in depth, but little was known beyond the worst case. We study this problem in the framework of smoothed analysis, where adversarial inputs are randomly perturbed. We show that computing Nash equilibria is hard for 2-player games even when input perturbations are large. This is despite the existence of approximation algorithms in a similar regime. In doing so, our result disproves a conjecture relating approximation schemes to smoothed analysis. Despite the hardness results in general, we also present a special case of co-operative games, where we show that the natural greedy algorithm for finding equilibria has polynomial smoothed complexity. We also develop reductions which preserve smoothed analysis.
In the second part of the thesis, we consider optimization problems which are motivated by economic applications. We address two stochastic optimization problems. We begin by developing optimal methods to determine the best among binary classifiers, when the objective function is known only through pairwise comparisons, e.g. when the objective function is the subjective opinion of a client. Finally, we extend known algorithms in the Pandora's box problem --- a classic optimal search problem --- to an order-constrained setting which allows for richer modelling.
The remaining chapters address two pricing problems from mechanism design. First, we provide an approximately revenue-optimal pricing scheme for the problem of selling time on a server to jobs whose parameters are sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. We then tackle the problem of fairly dividing chores among a collection of economic agents via a competitive equilibrium, which balances assigned tasks with payouts. We give efficient algorithms to compute such an equilibrium