How to Balance Privacy and Money through Pricing Mechanism in Personal Data Market

A personal data market is a platform including three participants: data owners (individuals), data buyers and market maker. Data owners who provide personal data are compensated according to their privacy loss. Data buyers can submit a query and pay for the result according to their desired accuracy. Market maker coordinates between data owner and buyer. This framework has been previously studied based on differential privacy. However, the previous study assumes data owners can accept any level of privacy loss and data buyers can conduct the transaction without regard to the financial budget. In this paper, we propose a practical personal data trading framework that is able to strike a balance between money and privacy. In order to gain insights on user preferences, we first conducted an online survey on human attitude to- ward privacy and interest in personal data trading. Second, we identify the 5 key principles of personal data market, which is important for designing a reasonable trading frame- work and pricing mechanism. Third, we propose a reason- able trading framework for personal data which provides an overview of how the data is traded. Fourth, we propose a balanced pricing mechanism which computes the query price for data buyers and compensation for data owners (whose data are utilized) as a function of their privacy loss. The main goal is to ensure a fair trading for both parties. Finally, we will conduct an experiment to evaluate the output of our proposed pricing mechanism in comparison with other previously proposed mechanism

Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we give an efficient weak mediator: a mechanism which has only the power to listen to reported types and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that (a) it is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully report their type to the mediator, and then follow its suggested action; and (b) that when players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact, truthful reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our solution applies even in settings of incomplete information, and even when player types are arbitrary or worst-case (i.e. not drawn from a common prior). We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially private algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence to equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of players $n$. We also apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game. Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust version of the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational assumptions (no common prior), yet provide a stronger solution concept (ex-post Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium). In comparison to previous work, our main conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators are a game theoretic object that exist in a wide variety of games -- previously, they were only known to exist in traffic routing games

Independent Set, Induced Matching, and Pricing: Connections and Tight (Subexponential Time) Approximation Hardnesses

We present a series of almost settled inapproximability results for three fundamental problems. The first in our series is the subexponential-time inapproximability of the maximum independent set problem, a question studied in the area of parameterized complexity. The second is the hardness of approximating the maximum induced matching problem on bounded-degree bipartite graphs. The last in our series is the tight hardness of approximating the k-hypergraph pricing problem, a fundamental problem arising from the area of algorithmic game theory. In particular, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis, our two main results are: - For any r larger than some constant, any r-approximation algorithm for the maximum independent set problem must run in at least 2^{n^{1-\epsilon}/r^{1+\epsilon}} time. This nearly matches the upper bound of 2^{n/r} (Cygan et al., 2008). It also improves some hardness results in the domain of parameterized complexity (e.g., Escoffier et al., 2012 and Chitnis et al., 2013) - For any k larger than some constant, there is no polynomial time min (k^{1-\epsilon}, n^{1/2-\epsilon})-approximation algorithm for the k-hypergraph pricing problem, where n is the number of vertices in an input graph. This almost matches the upper bound of min (O(k), \tilde O(\sqrt{n})) (by Balcan and Blum, 2007 and an algorithm in this paper). We note an interesting fact that, in contrast to n^{1/2-\epsilon} hardness for polynomial-time algorithms, the k-hypergraph pricing problem admits n^{\delta} approximation for any \delta >0 in quasi-polynomial time. This puts this problem in a rare approximability class in which approximability thresholds can be improved significantly by allowing algorithms to run in quasi-polynomial time.Comment: The full version of FOCS 201

The Green Choice: Learning and Influencing Human Decisions on Shared Roads

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase the capacity of roads via platooning, even when human drivers and autonomous vehicles share roads. However, when users of a road network choose their routes selfishly, the resulting traffic configuration may be very inefficient. Because of this, we consider how to influence human decisions so as to decrease congestion on these roads. We consider a network of parallel roads with two modes of transportation: (i) human drivers who will choose the quickest route available to them, and (ii) ride hailing service which provides an array of autonomous vehicle ride options, each with different prices, to users. In this work, we seek to design these prices so that when autonomous service users choose from these options and human drivers selfishly choose their resulting routes, road usage is maximized and transit delay is minimized. To do so, we formalize a model of how autonomous service users make choices between routes with different price/delay values. Developing a preference-based algorithm to learn the preferences of the users, and using a vehicle flow model related to the Fundamental Diagram of Traffic, we formulate a planning optimization to maximize a social objective and demonstrate the benefit of the proposed routing and learning scheme.Comment: Submitted to CDC 201