A two‐step authentication framework for Mobile ad hoc networks

The lack of fixed infrastructure in ad hoc networks causes nodes to rely more heavily on peer nodes for communication. Nevertheless, establishing trust in such a distributed environment is very difficult, since it is not straightforward for a node to determine if its peer nodes can be trusted. An additional concern in such an environment is with whether a peer node is merely relaying a message or if it is the originator of the message. In this paper, we propose an authentication approach for protecting nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using several authentication protocols are analyzed. Protocols based on zero knowledge and challenge response techniques are presented and their performance is evaluated through analysis and simulation

Layered security design for mobile ad hoc networks

When security of a given network architecture is not properly designed from the beginning, it is difficult to preserve confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation in practical networks. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad hoc networks rely on individual nodes to keep all the necessary interconnections alive. In this article we investigate the principal security issues for protecting mobile ad hoc networks at the data link and network layers. The security requirements for these two layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using multiple lines of defense against malicious attacks are discussed

Formal verification of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols using deductive model-checking

Ad-hoc networks do not rely on a pre-installed infrastructure, but they are formed by end-user devices in a self-organized manner. A consequence of this principle is that end-user devices must also perform routing functions. However, end-user devices can easily be compromised, and they may not follow the routing protocol faithfully. Such compromised and misbehaving nodes can disrupt routing, and hence, disable the operation of the network. In order to cope with this problem, several secured routing protocols have been proposed for ad-hoc networks. However, many of them have design flaws that still make them vulnerable to attacks mounted by compromised nodes. In this paper, we propose a formal verification method for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols that helps increasing the confidence in a protocol by providing an analysis framework that is more systematic, and hence, less error-prone than the informal analysis. Our approach is based on a new process calculus that we specifically developed for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols and a deductive proof technique. The novelty of this approach is that contrary to prior attempts to formal verification of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols, our verification method can be made fully automated

Multifold node authentication in mobile ad hoc networks

An ad hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a predefined infrastructure to keep the network connected. Nodes communicate amongst each other using wireless radios and operate by following a peer-to-peer network model. In this article we propose a multifold node authentication approach for protecting mobile ad hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using multiple authentication protocols are analysed. Such protocols, which are based on zero knowledge and challenge response techniques, are presented through proofs and simulation results

Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications

Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes, thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial

Security Verification of Secure MANET Routing Protocols

Secure mobile ad hoc network (MANET) routing protocols are not tested thoroughly against their security properties. Previous research focuses on verifying secure, reactive, accumulation-based routing protocols. An improved methodology and framework for secure MANET routing protocol verification is proposed which includes table-based and proactive protocols. The model checker, SPIN, is selected as the core of the secure MANET verification framework. Security is defined by both accuracy and availability: a protocol forms accurate routes and these routes are always accurate. The framework enables exhaustive verification of protocols and results in a counter-example if the protocol is deemed insecure. The framework is applied to models of the Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) and Secure OLSR protocol against five attack vectors. These vectors are based on known attacks against each protocol. Vulnerabilities consistent with published findings are automatically revealed. No unknown attacks were found; however, future attack vectors may lead to new attacks. The new framework for verifying secure MANET protocols extends verification capabilities to table-based and proactive protocols

Two‐Step Authentication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The lack of fixed infrastructure in ad hoc networks causes nodes to rely more heavily on peer nodes for communication. Nevertheless, establishing trust in such a distributed environment is very difficult, since it is not straightforward for a node to determine if its peer nodes can be trusted. An additional concern in such an environment is with whether a peer node is merely relaying a message or if it is the originator of the message. In this paper, we propose an authentication approach for protecting nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using several authentication protocols are analyzed. Protocols based on zero knowledge and challenge response techniques are presented and their performance is evaluated through analysis and simulation

Formal verication of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols using deductive model-checking

Ad-hoc networks do not rely on a pre-installed infrastructure, but they are formed by end-user devices in a self-organized manner. A consequence of this principle is that end-user devices must also perform routing functions. However, end-user devices can easily be compromised, and they may not follow the routing protocol faithfully. Such compromised and misbehaving nodes can disrupt routing, and hence, disable the operation of the network. In order to cope with this problem, several secured routing protocols have been proposed for ad-hoc networks. However, many of them have design aws that still make them vulnerable to attacks mounted by compromised nodes. In this paper, we propose a formal verication method for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols that helps increasing the condence in a protocol by providing an analysis framework that is more systematic, and hence, less error-prone than the informal analysis. Our approach is based on a new process algebra that we specically developed for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols and a deductive proof technique. The novelty of this approach is that contrary to prior attempts to formal verication of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols, our verication method can be made fully automated, and provides expressiveness for explicitly modelling cryptography privitive