190 research outputs found
Logics for modelling collective attitudes
We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional
attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian
aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment
aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on
a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes.
Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are
then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In
this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained
Neutrality and Many-Valued Logics
In this book, we consider various many-valued logics: standard, linear,
hyperbolic, parabolic, non-Archimedean, p-adic, interval, neutrosophic, etc. We
survey also results which show the tree different proof-theoretic frameworks
for many-valued logics, e.g. frameworks of the following deductive calculi:
Hilbert's style, sequent, and hypersequent. We present a general way that
allows to construct systematically analytic calculi for a large family of
non-Archimedean many-valued logics: hyperrational-valued, hyperreal-valued, and
p-adic valued logics characterized by a special format of semantics with an
appropriate rejection of Archimedes' axiom. These logics are built as different
extensions of standard many-valued logics (namely, Lukasiewicz's, Goedel's,
Product, and Post's logics). The informal sense of Archimedes' axiom is that
anything can be measured by a ruler. Also logical multiple-validity without
Archimedes' axiom consists in that the set of truth values is infinite and it
is not well-founded and well-ordered. On the base of non-Archimedean valued
logics, we construct non-Archimedean valued interval neutrosophic logic INL by
which we can describe neutrality phenomena.Comment: 119 page
Farewell to Suppression-Freedom
Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan argued from their joint paper The Semantics of First Degree Entailment (Routley and Routley in Noûs 6(4):335–359, 1972, https://doi.org/10.2307/2214309) and onward that the variable sharing property is but a mere consequence of a good entailment relation, indeed they viewed it as a mere negative test of adequacy of such a relation, the property itself being a rather philosophically barren concept. Such a relation is rather to be analyzed as a sufficiency relation free of any form of premise suppression. Suppression of premises, therefore, gained center stage. Despite this, however, no serious attempt was ever made at analyzing the concept. This paper shows that their suggestions for how to understand it, either as the Anti-Suppression Principle or as the Joint Force Principle, turn out to yield properties strictly weaker than that of variable sharing. A suggestion for how to understand some of their use of the notion of suppression which clearly is not in line with these two mentioned principles is given, and their arguments to the effect that the Anderson and Belnap logics T, E and R are suppressive are shown to be both technically and philosophically wanting. Suppression-freedom, it is argued, cannot do the job Plumwood and Sylvan intended it to do.publishedVersio
Ruitenburg's Theorem mechanized and contextualized
In 1984, Wim Ruitenburg published a surprising result about periodic
sequences in intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC). The property
established by Ruitenburg naturally generalizes local finiteness
(intuitionistic logic is not locally finite, even in a single variable).
However, one of the two main goals of this note is to illustrate that most
"natural" non-classical logics failing local finiteness also do not enjoy the
periodic sequence property; IPC is quite unique in separating these properties.
The other goal of this note is to present a Coq formalization of Ruitenburg's
heavily syntactic proof. Apart from ensuring its correctness, the formalization
allows extraction of a program providing a certified implementation of
Ruitenburg's algorithm.Comment: This note has been prepared for the informal (pre-)proceedings of
FICS 2024. The version to be submitted to the post-proceedings volume is
going to be significantly different, focusing on the Coq formalization, as
requested by referees and the P
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