19 research outputs found
HySIM: A Hybrid Spectrum and Information Market for TV White Space Networks
We propose a hybrid spectrum and information market for a database-assisted
TV white space network, where the geo-location database serves as both a
spectrum market platform and an information market platform. We study the
inter- actions among the database operator, the spectrum licensee, and
unlicensed users systematically, using a three-layer hierarchical model. In
Layer I, the database and the licensee negotiate the commission fee that the
licensee pays for using the spectrum market platform. In Layer II, the database
and the licensee compete for selling information or channels to unlicensed
users. In Layer III, unlicensed users determine whether they should buy the
exclusive usage right of licensed channels from the licensee, or the
information regarding unlicensed channels from the database. Analyzing such a
three-layer model is challenging due to the co-existence of both positive and
negative network externalities in the information market. We characterize how
the network externalities affect the equilibrium behaviours of all parties
involved. Our numerical results show that the proposed hybrid market can
improve the network profit up to 87%, compared with a pure information market.
Meanwhile, the achieved network profit is very close to the coordinated
benchmark solution (the gap is less than 4% in our simulation).Comment: This manuscript serves as the online technical report of the article
published in IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications
(INFOCOM), 201
Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks
This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio
networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to
delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two
paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we
examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary
markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic
shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium
behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents
the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF
channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing
delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU
traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players
employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition
and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators,
two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization
and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator
exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated
separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the
equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal
pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market,
we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and
exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a
backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for
this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac
Optimal Pricing Strategies in Cognitive Radio Networks with Heterogeneous Secondary Users and Retrials
In a cognitive radio (CR) system, excessive access services for secondary users (SUs) lead to a substantial increase in congestion and the retrial phenomenon, both of which degrade the performance of CR networks, especially in overload conditions. This paper investigates the price-based spectrum access control policy that characterizes the network operator\u27s provision to heterogeneous and delay-sensitive SUs through pricing strategies. Based on shared-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), the SUs can occupy the dedicated spectrum without degrading the operations of primary users (PUs). The service to transmission of SUs can be interrupted by an arriving PU, while the interrupted SUs join a retrial pool called an orbit, later trying to use the spectrum to complete the service. In the retrial orbit, the interrupted SU competes fairly with other SUs in the orbit. Such a DSA mechanism is formulated as a retrial queue with service interruptions and general service times. Regarding the heterogeneity of delay-sensitive SUs, we consider two cases: the delay-sensitive parameter follows a discrete distribution and a continuous distribution, respectively. In equilibrium, we find that the revenue-optimal price is unique, while there may exist a continuum of equilibria for the socially optimal price. In addition, the socially optimal price is always not greater than the revenue-optimal price, and thus the socially optimal arrival rate is not less than the revenue-optimal one, which is contrary with the conclusion, i.e., the socially optimal and revenue-optimal arrival rates are consistent, drawn in the literature for homogeneous SUs. Finally, we present numerical examples to show the effect of various parameters on the operator\u27s pricing strategies and SUs\u27 behavior
Re-implement incentive mechanisms the global wireless village
Wireless Community Network (WCN) can be viewed as a modern mechanical
development. Community networks can possibly offer high data rate wireless
Internet access for mobile users, one of the central point that added to their
development was the low penetration of broadband access technologies in few
nations .Currently the larger part of ISPs do not permit connection sharing for
their subscribers, which is the most critical problem in the way of establishing a
global wireless community. Furthermore, motivating mechanisms for both users
and ISPs are not duly designed in global wireless community networks. However,
key ingredients of creating a global wireless village, both user collaboration and
Internet Service Providers (ISP) support. In this paper we re-implement the
economic interactions in global wireless community networks based on users,
ISPs and community providers (Biczoket al, 2011). We found that in addition to
the roaming cost, revenue share and the method of distribution of income, the cost
of entry have a significant impact on stimulating the user to participate in the
community. The analytical result of this work, which carried out in
MATLAB2013a tool, show that in fact a really global wireless community
network emergence is possible