300,548 research outputs found
Post-Compromise Security in Self-Encryption
In self-encryption, a device encrypts some piece of information for itself to decrypt in the future. We are interested in security of self-encryption when the state occasionally leaks. Applications that use self-encryption include cloud storage, when a client encrypts files to be stored, and in 0-RTT session resumptions, when a server encrypts a resumption key to be kept by the client. Previous works focused on forward security and resistance to replay attacks. In our work, we study post-compromise security (PCS). PCS was achieved in ratcheted instant messaging schemes, at the price of having an inflating state size. An open question was whether state inflation was necessary. In our results, we prove that post-compromise security implies a super-linear state size in terms of the number of active ciphertexts which can still be decrypted. We apply our result to self-encryption for cloud storage, 0-RTT session resumption, and secure messaging. We further show how to construct a secure scheme matching our bound on the state size up to a constant factor
Post-Compromise Security
In this work we study communication with a party whose secrets have already been compromised. At first sight, it may seem impossible to provide any type of security in this scenario. However, under some conditions, practically relevant guarantees can still be achieved. We call such guarantees ``post-compromise security\u27\u27.
We provide the first informal and formal definitions for post-compromise security, and show that it can be achieved in several scenarios. At a technical level, we instantiate our informal definitions in the setting of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, and develop two new strong security models for two different threat models. We show that both of these security models can be satisfied, by proposing two concrete protocol constructions and proving they are secure in the models. Our work leads to crucial insights on how post-compromise security can (and cannot) be achieved, paving the way for applications in other domains
Algorithmic Security is Insufficient: A Comprehensive Survey on Implementation Attacks Haunting Post-Quantum Security
This survey is on forward-looking, emerging security concerns in post-quantum
era, i.e., the implementation attacks for 2022 winners of NIST post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) competition and thus the visions, insights, and discussions
can be used as a step forward towards scrutinizing the new standards for
applications ranging from Metaverse, Web 3.0 to deeply-embedded systems. The
rapid advances in quantum computing have brought immense opportunities for
scientific discovery and technological progress; however, it poses a major risk
to today's security since advanced quantum computers are believed to break all
traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms. This has led to active
research on PQC algorithms that are believed to be secure against classical and
powerful quantum computers. However, algorithmic security is unfortunately
insufficient, and many cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks (SCA), where an attacker passively or actively gets side-channel data
to compromise the security properties that are assumed to be safe
theoretically. In this survey, we explore such imminent threats and their
countermeasures with respect to PQC. We provide the respective, latest
advancements in PQC research, as well as assessments and providing visions on
the different types of SCAs
TokenWeaver: Privacy Preserving and Post-Compromise Secure Attestation
Modern attestation based on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) can significantly reduce the risk of secret compromise by attackers, while allowing users to authenticate across various services. However, this has also made TEEs a high-value attack target, driving an arms race between novel compromise attacks and continuous TEEs updates.
Ideally, we would like to ensure that we achieve Post-Compromise Security (PCS): even after a compromise, we can update the TEE into a secure state. However, at the same time, we would like the privacy of users to be respected, preventing providers (such as Intel, Google, or Samsung) or services from tracking users.
In this work, we develop TokenWeaver, the first privacy-preserving post-compromise secure attestation method with automated formal proofs for its core properties. We base our construction on weaving together two types of token chains, one of which is linkable and the other is unlinkable. We provide the full formal models, including protocol, security properties, and proofs for reproducibility, as well as a proof-of-concept implementation in python that shows the simplicity and applicability of
our solution
ASMesh: Anonymous and Secure Messaging in Mesh Networks Using Stronger, Anonymous Double Ratchet
The majority of secure messengers have single, centralized service providers that relay ciphertexts between users to enable asynchronous communication. However, in some scenarios such as mass protests in censored networks, relying on a centralized provider is fatal. Mesh messengers attempt to solve this problem by building ad hoc networks in which user clients perform the ciphertext-relaying task. Yet, recent analyses of widely deployed mesh messengers discover severe security weaknesses (Albrecht et al. CT-RSA\u2721 & USENIX Security\u2722).
To support the design of secure mesh messengers, we provide a new, more complete security model for mesh messaging. Our model captures forward and post-compromise security, as well as forward and post-compromise anonymity, both of which are especially important in this setting. We also identify novel, stronger confidentiality goals that can be achieved due to the special characteristics of mesh networks (e.g., delayed communication, distributed network and adversary).
Finally, we develop a new protocol, called ASMesh, that provably satisfies these security goals. For this, we revisit Signal\u27s Double Ratchet and propose non-trivial enhancements. On top of that, we add a mechanism that provides forward and post-compromise anonymity. Thus, our protocol efficiently provides strong confidentiality and anonymity under past and future user corruptions. Most of our results are also applicable to traditional messaging.
We prove security of our protocols and evaluate their performance in simulated mesh networks. Finally, we develop a proof of concept implementation
ANCHOR: logically-centralized security for Software-Defined Networks
While the centralization of SDN brought advantages such as a faster pace of
innovation, it also disrupted some of the natural defenses of traditional
architectures against different threats. The literature on SDN has mostly been
concerned with the functional side, despite some specific works concerning
non-functional properties like 'security' or 'dependability'. Though addressing
the latter in an ad-hoc, piecemeal way, may work, it will most likely lead to
efficiency and effectiveness problems. We claim that the enforcement of
non-functional properties as a pillar of SDN robustness calls for a systemic
approach. As a general concept, we propose ANCHOR, a subsystem architecture
that promotes the logical centralization of non-functional properties. To show
the effectiveness of the concept, we focus on 'security' in this paper: we
identify the current security gaps in SDNs and we populate the architecture
middleware with the appropriate security mechanisms, in a global and consistent
manner. Essential security mechanisms provided by anchor include reliable
entropy and resilient pseudo-random generators, and protocols for secure
registration and association of SDN devices. We claim and justify in the paper
that centralizing such mechanisms is key for their effectiveness, by allowing
us to: define and enforce global policies for those properties; reduce the
complexity of controllers and forwarding devices; ensure higher levels of
robustness for critical services; foster interoperability of the non-functional
property enforcement mechanisms; and promote the security and resilience of the
architecture itself. We discuss design and implementation aspects, and we prove
and evaluate our algorithms and mechanisms, including the formalisation of the
main protocols and the verification of their core security properties using the
Tamarin prover.Comment: 42 pages, 4 figures, 3 tables, 5 algorithms, 139 reference
On the Cost of Post-Compromise Security in Concurrent Continuous Group-Key Agreement
Continuous Group-Key Agreement (CGKA) allows a group of users to maintain a shared key.
It is the fundamental cryptographic primitive underlying group messaging schemes and related protocols, most notably TreeKEM, the underlying key agreement protocol of the Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol, a standard for group messaging by the IETF.
CKGA works in an asynchronous setting where parties only occasionally must come online, and their messages are relayed by an untrusted server.
The most expensive operation provided by CKGA is that which allows for a user to refresh their key material in order to achieve forward secrecy (old messages are secure when a user is compromised) and post-compromise security (users can heal from compromise).
One caveat of early CGKA protocols is that these update operations had to be performed sequentially, with any user wanting to update their key material having had to receive and process all previous updates.
Late versions of TreeKEM do allow for concurrent updates at the cost of a communication overhead per update message that is linear in the number of updating parties.
This was shown to be indeed necessary when achieving PCS in just two rounds of communication by [Bienstock et al. TCC\u2720].
The recently proposed protocol CoCoA [Alwen et al. Eurocrypt\u2722], however, shows that this overhead can be reduced if PCS requirements are relaxed, and only a logarithmic number of rounds is required.
The natural question, thus, is whether CoCoA is optimal in this setting.
In this work we answer this question, providing a lower bound on the cost (concretely, the amount of data to be uploaded to the server) for CGKA protocols that heal in an arbitrary number of rounds, that shows that CoCoA is very close to optimal.
Additionally, we extend CoCoA to heal in an arbitrary number of rounds, and propose a modification of it, with a reduced communication cost for certain .
We prove our bound in a combinatorial setting where the state of the protocol progresses in rounds, and the state of the protocol in each round is captured by a set system, each set specifying a set of users who share a secret key.
We show this combinatorial model is equivalent to a symbolic model capturing building blocks including PRFs and public-key encryption, related to the one used by Bienstock et al.
Our lower bound is of order , where is the number of updates per user the protocol requires to heal.
This generalizes the bound for from Bienstock et al.
This bound almost matches the or efficiency we get for the variants of the CoCoA protocol also introduced in this paper
There Can Be No Compromise: The Necessity of Ratcheted Authentication in Secure Messaging
Modern messaging applications often rely on out-of-band communication to achieve entity authentication, with human users actively verifying and attesting to long-term public keys. This user-mediated authentication is done primarily to reduce reliance on trusted third parties by replacing that role with the user. Despite a great deal of research focusing on analyzing the confidentiality aspect of secure messaging, the authenticity aspect of it has been largely assumed away. Consequently, while many existing protocols provide some confidentiality guarantees after a compromise, such as post-compromise security (PCS), authenticity guarantees are generally lost. This leads directly to potential man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks within the intended threat model. In this work, we address this gap by proposing a model to formally capture user-mediated entity authentication in ratcheted secure messaging protocols that can be composed with any ratcheted key exchange. Our threat model captures post-compromise entity authentication security. We demonstrate that the Signal application\u27s user-mediated authentication protocol cannot be proven secure in this model and suggest a straightforward fix for Signal that allows the detection of an active adversary. Our results have direct implications for other existing and future ratcheted secure messaging applications
Adoption of Community Security Initiatives against Protracted Insecurity in Laikipia North, Kenya
This article interrogates the underlying factors that cause communities residing in areas affected by communal conflicts in Laikipia North, Kenya, to embrace community security initiatives as a way of addressing protracted insecurity. In the context of peripheral territories such as Laikipia North, security as a right is contested due to factors such as protraction of insecurity, civilian militarization, and overall absence of the state as a security provider. Critical to the study is the understanding that the state as a political entity is impacted by a myriad of geo-political, security and socio-economic forces. These geo-political, security and socio-economic forces may compromise the functionality of the state as far as fulfilling its mandate to the citizens is concerned. In this regard, the adoption of community security initiatives raises fundamental questions as to whether the state has failed to deliver on its mandate of providing security, given that Kenya is a functioning state. This phenomenological study aimed at examining the underlying forces that inform internal security experiences among communities in communal conflict regions. Specifically, the study explored the post-2010 factors in relation to state of (in)security in Laikipia County. The study used qualitative approach in which data was collected using FGDs, interviews and observation checklist. Data was analyzed thematically in line with the objectives of the study. Key Words: Community Protection Initiatives, Insecurity, Protracted, Violence DOI: 10.7176/RHSS/11-18-07 Publication date:September 30th 202
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