Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs

This paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms with a two-dimensional policy space and no monetary transfers. Contrary to the one-dimensional setting, when a single principal controls two activities undertaken by his agent (cooperative design), the optimal communication mechanism never exhibits any pooling and the agent's ideal policies are never chosen. However, when the conflicts of interests between the agent and the principal on each dimension of the agent's activity are close to each other, simpler mechanisms that generalize those optimal in the one-dimensional case perform quite well. These simple mechanisms exhibit much pooling. When each activity of the agent is controlled by a different principal (non-cooperative design) and enters separately into the agent's utility function, optimal mechanisms under private communication take again the form of simple delegation sets, exactly as in the one-dimensional case. When instead the agent finds some benefits in coordinating actions, a one-sided contractual externality arises between principals under private communication. Under public communication instead, there does not exist any pure strategy Nash equilibrium with continuous and piecewise differentiable communication mechanisms. Relaxing the commitment ability of the principals restores equilibrium existence under public communication and yields partitional equilibria. Compared with private communication, public communication generates discipline or subversion effects among principals depending on the profile of their respective biases with respect to the agent's ideal policies.communication ; delegation ; mechanism design ; multi-dimensional decision ; common agency

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent additive bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints. This reduction provides a poly-time solution to the optimal mechanism design problem in all auction settings where welfare optimization can be solved efficiently, but it is fragile to approximation and cannot provide solutions to settings where welfare maximization can only be tractably approximated. In this paper, we extend the reduction to accommodate approximation algorithms, providing an approximation preserving reduction from (truthful) revenue maximization to (not necessarily truthful) welfare maximization. The mechanisms output by our reduction choose allocations via black-box calls to welfare approximation on randomly selected inputs, thereby generalizing also our earlier structural results on optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms to approximately optimal mechanisms. Unlike [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518], our results here are obtained through novel uses of the Ellipsoid algorithm and other optimization techniques over {\em non-convex regions}

Multi-Objective Design Optimization of the Leg Mechanism for a Piping Inspection Robot

This paper addresses the dimensional synthesis of an adaptive mechanism of contact points ie a leg mechanism of a piping inspection robot operating in an irradiated area as a nuclear power plant. This studied mechanism is the leading part of the robot sub-system responsible of the locomotion. Firstly, three architectures are chosen from the literature and their properties are described. Then, a method using a multi-objective optimization is proposed to determine the best architecture and the optimal geometric parameters of a leg taking into account environmental and design constraints. In this context, the objective functions are the minimization of the mechanism size and the maximization of the transmission force factor. Representations of the Pareto front versus the objective functions and the design parameters are given. Finally, the CAD model of several solutions located on the Pareto front are presented and discussed.Comment: Proceedings of the ASME 2014 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences \& Computers and Information in Engineering Conference, Buffalo : United States (2014

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with $n$ buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the revenue optimal mchanism, namely the Myersonian mechanism, via the taxation principle and the other that posts a uniform price. Our pricing rules are rather generalizable and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors in several settings. We design factor-revealing mathematical programs that crisply capture the approximation factor of our SPP mechanism. In the single-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields a better approximation factor than the state of the art prior to our work (Azar, Chiplunkar & Kaplan, 2018). In the multi-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields the first improved approximation factor over the state of the art after over nine years (Yan, 2011 and Chakraborty et al., 2010). Our results on SPP mechanisms immediately imply improved performance guarantees for the equivalent free-order prophet inequality problem. In the position auction setting, our SPP mechanism yields the first higher-than $1-1/e$ approximation factor. In eager second-price (ESP) auctions, our two simple pricing rules lead to the first improved approximation factor that is strictly greater than what is obtained by the SPP mechanism in the single-unit setting.Comment: Accepted to Operations Researc

Reducing symmetry in topology optimization of two-dimensional porous phononic crystals

In this paper we present a comprehensive study on the multi-objective optimization of two-dimensional porous phononic crystals (PnCs) in both square and triangular lattices with the reduced topology symmetry of the unit-cell. The fast non-dominated sorting-based genetic algorithm II is used to perform the optimization, and the Pareto-optimal solutions are obtained. The results demonstrate that the symmetry reduction significantly influences the optimized structures. The physical mechanism of the optimized structures is analyzed. Topology optimization combined with the symmetry reduction can discover new structures and offer new degrees of freedom to design PnC-based devices. Especially, the rotationally symmetrical structures presented here can be utilized to explore and design new chiral metamaterials.Comment: 24 pages, 11 figures in AIP Advances 201