We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP)
mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with n buyers and independent but
not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms
by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the
revenue optimal mchanism, namely the Myersonian mechanism, via the taxation
principle and the other that posts a uniform price. Our pricing rules are
rather generalizable and yield the first improvement over long-established
approximation factors in several settings. We design factor-revealing
mathematical programs that crisply capture the approximation factor of our SPP
mechanism. In the single-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields a better
approximation factor than the state of the art prior to our work (Azar,
Chiplunkar & Kaplan, 2018). In the multi-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields
the first improved approximation factor over the state of the art after over
nine years (Yan, 2011 and Chakraborty et al., 2010). Our results on SPP
mechanisms immediately imply improved performance guarantees for the equivalent
free-order prophet inequality problem. In the position auction setting, our SPP
mechanism yields the first higher-than 1−1/e approximation factor. In eager
second-price (ESP) auctions, our two simple pricing rules lead to the first
improved approximation factor that is strictly greater than what is obtained by
the SPP mechanism in the single-unit setting.Comment: Accepted to Operations Researc