A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?

An important, though oft neglected, distinction between multilateral treaty obligations separates obligations of the bilateral nature from those of the collective or erga omnes partes type. Multilateral obligations of the bilateral type can be reduced to a compilation of bilateral, state-to-state relations. They can be compared to contracts. Collective obligations, in contrast, cannot be divided into bilateral components. They are concluded in pursuit of a collective interest that transcends the individual interests of the contracting parties. The standard example of such obligations are those arising under a human rights treaty. In domestic law, collective obligations can be compared to criminal law statutes or even domestic constitutions. This essay examines the origins of the distinction between bilateral and collective obligations, as well as its major consequences, both in law of treaties and the law on state responsibility. On that basis, a wider typology of multilateral treaty obligations is suggested. In the exercise, obligations arising under the World Trade Organization are used as a case study. The argument is made that WTO obligations remain essentially of the bilateral type; they are not collective in nature

"You can see how things will end by the way they begin". The contribution of early mutual obligations for the development of the psychological contract

This study explores dynamic processes in the development of the psychological contract, focusing on the interaction of obligations related to the two parties (i.e., employees' perceptions of both their own and the organization's obligations fulfillment) on attitudinal outcomes (organizational commitment and turnover intention) during the initial stage of the employment relationship. In a twofold cross-sectional and two-wave study on newly hired correctional police officers, we examined: (a) whether perception of organizational obligations fulfillment moderates the relationship between employee obligations and their attitudes (Study 1, n.500); (b) the direct and moderated influence of perceived obligations at the entrance stage on those in the following months (Study 2, n.223). Results confirmed that, in the eyes of the newcomer, the obligations fulfillment of each of the two parties interact, having an additional effect beyond the main direct effects, in influencing both subsequent obligations perceptions and, through this, the outcome variables. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed

Deriving individual obligations from collective obligations

A collective obligation is an obligation directed to a group of agents so that the group, as a whole, is obliged to achieve a given task. The problem investigated here is the impact of collective obligations on individual obligations,i.e. obligations directed to single agents of the group. In this case, we claim that the derivation of individual obligations from collective obligations depends on several parameters among which the ability of the agents (i.e. what they can do) and their own personal commitments (i.e. what they are determined to do). As for checking if these obligations are fulfilled or not, we need to know what are the actual actions performed by the agents

The Content of the Psychological Work Contract for Frontline Police Officers

Adding to the field of knowledge on the content of the psychological work contract, structured interviews with 35 frontline police officers generated 662 responses relating to the content of the psychological work contract for this employment sector. Analysis of these responses resulted in the development of an initial two-component measure of the contract. One component (17 items) reflected the obligations arising from the promises officers believed the organisation had made to them. The other component (19 items) reflected the obligations arising from the promises officers believed they had made to the organisation. The measure was included in a survey completed by 84 frontline police officers. Factor analysis revealed two factors in each component. For the organisation's obligations component, one factor reflected obligations related more to the organisational environment, whereas the other factor reflected obligations related more to the job environment. For the employee's obligations component, one factor reflected obligations related more to behaviours on the job, whereas the other factor reflected obligations related more to the pursuit of development opportunities. The nature of the relationships that emerged between the psychological contract and the nomological network variables included in the study provide strong support for the validity of this measure of the psychological contract

On pricing risky loans and collateralized fund obligations

Loan spreads are analyzed for two types of loans. The first type takes losses at maturity only; the second follows the formulation of collateralized fund obligations, with losses registered over the lifetime of the contract. In both cases, the implementation requires the choice of a process for the underlying asset value and the identification of the parameters. The parameters of the process are inferred from the option volatility surface by treating equity options as compound options with equity itself being viewed as an option on the asset value with a strike set at the debt level following Merton. Using data on the stock of General Motors during 2002-3, we show that the use of spectrally negative Lévy processes is capable of delivering realistic spreads without inflating debt levels, deflating debt maturities or deviating from the estimated probability laws

Obligation Blackwell Games and p-Automata

We recently introduced p-automata, automata that read discrete-time Markov chains. We used turn-based stochastic parity games to define acceptance of Markov chains by a subclass of p-automata. Definition of acceptance required a cumbersome and complicated reduction to a series of turn-based stochastic parity games. The reduction could not support acceptance by general p-automata, which was left undefined as there was no notion of games that supported it. Here we generalize two-player games by adding a structural acceptance condition called obligations. Obligations are orthogonal to the linear winning conditions that define winning. Obligations are a declaration that player 0 can achieve a certain value from a configuration. If the obligation is met, the value of that configuration for player 0 is 1. One cannot define value in obligation games by the standard mechanism of considering the measure of winning paths on a Markov chain and taking the supremum of the infimum of all strategies. Mainly because obligations need definition even for Markov chains and the nature of obligations has the flavor of an infinite nesting of supremum and infimum operators. We define value via a reduction to turn-based games similar to Martin's proof of determinacy of Blackwell games with Borel objectives. Based on this definition, we show that games are determined. We show that for Markov chains with Borel objectives and obligations, and finite turn-based stochastic parity games with obligations there exists an alternative and simpler characterization of the value function. Based on this simpler definition we give an exponential time algorithm to analyze finite turn-based stochastic parity games with obligations. Finally, we show that obligation games provide the necessary framework for reasoning about p-automata and that they generalize the previous definition

On individual and shared obligations: in defense of the activist’s perspective

We naturally attribute obligations to groups, and take such obligations to have consequences for the obligations of group members. The threat posed by anthropogenic climate change provides an urgent case. It seems that we, together, have an obligation to prevent climate catastrophe, and that we, as individuals, have an obligation to contribute. However, understood strictly, attributions of obligations to groups might seem illegitimate. On the one hand, the groups in question—the people alive today, say—are rarely fully-fledged moral agents, making it unclear how they can be subjects of obligations. On the other, the attributions can rarely be understood distributively, as concerned with members’ obligations, because obligations to do something require a capacity to do it, and individual members often lack the relevant capacities. Moreover, even if groups can have obligations, it is unclear why that would be relevant for members, exactly because members often lack control over whether group obligations are fulfilled. In previous work, I have argued that a general understanding of individual obligations extends non-mysteriously to irreducibly shared obligations, rendering attributions of obligations to groups legitimate. In this paper, I spell out how the proposed account also helps us understand the relation between individual and shared obligations. Even though few individual human agents have any significant control over whether we will be successful in preventing climate catastrophe, our collective capacity to prevent catastrophe and shared preventative obligation to do so can give rise to significant individual obligations to contribute to its fulfillment

Changing Perceptions into Reality: Fiduciary Standards to Match the American Directors’ Monitoring Function

This paper describes the historical fiduciary obligations of the American outside director and contrasts those obligations with prevailing obligations in today’s environment of the monitoring director. Special attention is devoted to the role of outside directors when their firm is the target of a takeover. In no other context are the demands on the outside director greater and more strain placed on the monitoring model than in the context of a corporate takeover. The final section of this paper examines the relief modern statutory provisions provide to the director and the monitoring functio

A methodological approach to developing a measure of the psychological contract for managers

With a focus on a specific employment group this research attempted to add to the knowledge on the content of the psychological contract. Structured interviews with 35 managers generated 651 responses relating to the content of their psychological contracts. Analysis of those responses resulted in the development of an initial two-component measure of the contract. One component (23 items) included the managers' expectations relating to the organisation's obligations. The other component (16 items) included the managers' obligations relating to the perceived organisation's expectations. Validation of the measure was based on a questionnaire completed by 124 managers. Participants considered all items to be important aspects of the contract. Participants also rated as high the obligation of each party to meet the expectations of the other. Factor analysis of the measure revealed two factors in each component which, in line with previous research, were termed relational obligations and transactional obligations. A robust methodology is proposed for continuing research into the content of the psychological work contract

The Jurisdiction Argument for Immigration Control

Jurisdictionism offers a new rationale for restricting immigration. Immigrants impose new obligations on the people whose territories they enter. Insofar as these obligations are unwanted, polities are justified in turning immigrants away, so long as the immigrants are from a country that respects their rights. The theory, however, employs a flawed account of obligation, which overlooks how we can be obliged to take on new duties to immigrants. Jurisdictionism also employs different standards when determining whether an obligation exists, only one of which is sensitive to consequences. Finally, the theory falsely claims that obligations necessarily reduce the freedom of the obliged