Polynomial Convergence of Bandit No-Regret Dynamics in Congestion Games

We introduce an online learning algorithm in the bandit feedback model that, once adopted by all agents of a congestion game, results in game-dynamics that converge to an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium in a polynomial number of rounds with respect to $1/\epsilon$, the number of players and the number of available resources. The proposed algorithm also guarantees sublinear regret to any agent adopting it. As a result, our work answers an open question from arXiv:2206.01880 and extends the recent results of arXiv:2306.15543 to the bandit feedback model. We additionally establish that our online learning algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time for the important special case of Network Congestion Games on Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) by constructing an exact $1$-barycentric spanner for DAGs

Local Mutual Exclusion for Dynamic, Anonymous, Bounded Memory Message Passing Systems

Mutual exclusion is a classical problem in distributed computing that provides isolation among concurrent action executions that may require access to the same shared resources. Inspired by algorithmic research on distributed systems of weakly capable entities whose connections change over time, we address the local mutual exclusion problem that tasks each node with acquiring exclusive locks for itself and the maximal subset of its "persistent" neighbors that remain connected to it over the time interval of the lock request. Using the established time-varying graphs model to capture adversarial topological changes, we propose and rigorously analyze a local mutual exclusion algorithm for nodes that are anonymous and communicate via asynchronous message passing. The algorithm satisfies mutual exclusion (non-intersecting lock sets) and lockout freedom (eventual success with probability 1) under both semi-synchronous and asynchronous concurrency. It requires ?(?) memory per node and messages of size ?(1), where ? is the maximum number of connections per node. We conclude by describing how our algorithm can implement the pairwise interactions assumed by population protocols and the concurrency control operations assumed by the canonical amoebot model, demonstrating its utility in both passively and actively dynamic distributed systems

On Bioelectric Algorithms

Cellular bioelectricity describes the biological phenomenon in which cells in living tissue generate and maintain patterns of voltage gradients across their membranes induced by differing concentrations of charged ions. A growing body of research suggests that bioelectric patterns represent an ancient system that plays a key role in guiding many important developmental processes including tissue regeneration, tumor suppression, and embryogenesis. This paper applies techniques from distributed algorithm theory to help better understand how cells work together to form these patterns. To do so, we present the cellular bioelectric model (CBM), a new computational model that captures the primary capabilities and constraints of bioelectric interactions between cells and their environment. We use this model to investigate several important topics from the relevant biology research literature. We begin with symmetry breaking, analyzing a simple cell definition that when combined in single hop or multihop topologies, efficiently solves leader election and the maximal independent set problem, respectively - indicating that these classical symmetry breaking tasks are well-matched to bioelectric mechanisms. We then turn our attention to the information processing ability of bioelectric cells, exploring upper and lower bounds for approximate solutions to threshold and majority detection, and then proving that these systems are in fact Turing complete - resolving an open question about the computational power of bioelectric interactions

Approximating Nash Equilibria in Tree Polymatrix Games

We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of tree polymatrix games in which the number of actions per player is a fixed constant. Further, for trees with constant degree, the running time of the algorithm matches the best known upper bound for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games (Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta 2003). Notably, this work closely complements the hardness result of Rubinstein (2015), which establishes the inapproximability of Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over constant-degree bipartite graphs with two actions per player