A game theory of organizational ecology : a model of managerial inertia and market selection

This paper merges two theoretical perspectives in a mathematical game model: industrial organization on the one hand, which basically is the economic theory of market competition and firm strategies, and organizational ecology on the other, which is a major sociological tradition that studies the evolution of organizational populations. The merger is instrumental in analyzing a key question in organization studies: what is the role of flexibility, inertia and efficiency in facilitating firm performance in a selection environment, in terms of both profitability and survival? Particularly, we argue that game theory can offer a mathematical model of organizational ecology. Such a game-theoretic model reveals that an inert firm may push a flexible rival from the market, even if the inert market leader faces a cost disadvantage. Moreover, this may happen in a munificent environment. That is, cut-throat rivalry can be the result of strategic competition only - being facilitated by organizational inertia. This paper operationalizes relative inertia by modeling managerial resistance against downsizing. The model clearly supports the key claim of organizational ecology that relative inertia facilitates rather than impedes survival chances.industrial organization ;

Building monologue

To build an argument--and particularly an argument presented as a monologue--a writer must assemble and marshal a battery of supports for a claim. Some of those supports will be arranged in convergent structures, some as linked; some will be expressed , some will be left implicit; sometimes a support will need further support of its own--and sometimes, not. This paper explores the factors which lead a writer to make particular choices, the interactions between those factors, and the constraints on a w riter\u27s freedom in exercising her power, drawing on recent findings in computational modelling of the generation process

Criminal Responsibility of the Addict: Conviction by Force of Habit

This article addresses questions of criminal responsibility of drug addicts in light of Robinson v. California, holding criminal sanctions for a status of drug addiction to be unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. The article evaluates key court cases relating the insanity defense, and argues that in cases where addicts commit criminal acts as a result of drug addictions, the addict should not suffer criminal penalties but should instead be treated through rehabilitation facilities or other methods

The Limits of Litigation: Putting the Education Back into \u3cem\u3eBrown v. Board of Education\u3c/em\u3e

A Review of Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation edited by Derrick Bel

Unions, Pension Wealth, and Age-Compensation Profiles

This paper examines the effect of unions on both the magnitude and distribution of pension benefits. Our empirical results show that beneficiaries in collectively bargained plans receive larger benefits when they retire, receive larger increases in their benefits after they retire, and retire at an earlier age than beneficiaries in other pension plans. As a result, the pension wealth of union beneficiaries is 50 to 109 percent greater than that of nonunion beneficiaries. Just as wage differentials within and across establishments are smaller among union workers, benefit differentials within and across cohorts of retirees are smaller among union beneficiaries. This results from the smaller weight given to salary average in determining initial benefits and the larger percentage increases given to those who have been retired the longest under post-retirement increases. The more compressed benefit structure under unionism causes the union-nonunion compensation (wages plus pension contributions) differential to decline more quickly than the union-nonunion wage differential over the life cycle.