Structural completeness in propositional logics of dependence

In this paper we prove that three of the main propositional logics of dependence (including propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic), none of which is structural, are structurally complete with respect to a class of substitutions under which the logics are closed. We obtain an analogues result with respect to stable substitutions, for the negative variants of some well-known intermediate logics, which are intermediate theories that are closely related to inquisitive logic

A temporal semantics for Nilpotent Minimum logic

In [Ban97] a connection among rough sets (in particular, pre-rough algebras) and three-valued {\L}ukasiewicz logic {\L}3 is pointed out. In this paper we present a temporal like semantics for Nilpotent Minimum logic NM ([Fod95, EG01]), in which the logic of every instant is given by {\L}3: a completeness theorem will be shown. This is the prosecution of the work initiated in [AGM08] and [ABM09], in which the authors construct a temporal semantics for the many-valued logics of G\"odel ([G\"od32], [Dum59]) and Basic Logic ([H\'aj98]).Comment: 19 pages, 2 table

Interval-valued algebras and fuzzy logics

In this chapter, we present a propositional calculus for several interval-valued fuzzy logics, i.e., logics having intervals as truth values. More precisely, the truth values are preferably subintervals of the unit interval. The idea behind it is that such an interval can model imprecise information. To compute the truth values of ‘p implies q’ and ‘p and q’, given the truth values of p and q, we use operations from residuated lattices. This truth-functional approach is similar to the methods developed for the well-studied fuzzy logics. Although the interpretation of the intervals as truth values expressing some kind of imprecision is a bit problematic, the purely mathematical study of the properties of interval-valued fuzzy logics and their algebraic semantics can be done without any problem. This study is the focus of this chapter

AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later