160 research outputs found
Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities
Consider a gambler and a prophet who observe a sequence of independent,
non-negative numbers. The gambler sees the numbers one-by-one whereas the
prophet sees the entire sequence at once. The goal of both is to decide on
fractions of each number they want to keep so as to maximize the weighted
fractional sum of the numbers chosen.
The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1977-78) asserts that if both
the gambler and the prophet can pick one number, then the gambler can do at
least half as well as the prophet. Recently, Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) have
generalized this result to settings where the numbers that can be chosen are
subject to a matroid constraint.
In this note we go one step further and show that the bound carries over to
settings where the fractions that can be chosen are subject to a polymatroid
constraint. This bound is tight as it is already tight for the simple setting
where the gambler and the prophet can pick only one number. An interesting
application of our result is in mechanism design, where it leads to improved
results for various problems
Constrained Monotone Function Maximization and the Supermodular Degree
The problem of maximizing a constrained monotone set function has many
practical applications and generalizes many combinatorial problems.
Unfortunately, it is generally not possible to maximize a monotone set function
up to an acceptable approximation ratio, even subject to simple constraints.
One highly studied approach to cope with this hardness is to restrict the set
function. An outstanding disadvantage of imposing such a restriction on the set
function is that no result is implied for set functions deviating from the
restriction, even slightly. A more flexible approach, studied by Feige and
Izsak, is to design an approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio
depends on the complexity of the instance, as measured by some complexity
measure. Specifically, they introduced a complexity measure called supermodular
degree, measuring deviation from submodularity, and designed an algorithm for
the welfare maximization problem with an approximation ratio that depends on
this measure.
In this work, we give the first (to the best of our knowledge) algorithm for
maximizing an arbitrary monotone set function, subject to a k-extendible
system. This class of constraints captures, for example, the intersection of
k-matroids (note that a single matroid constraint is sufficient to capture the
welfare maximization problem). Our approximation ratio deteriorates gracefully
with the complexity of the set function and k. Our work can be seen as
generalizing both the classic result of Fisher, Nemhauser and Wolsey, for
maximizing a submodular set function subject to a k-extendible system, and the
result of Feige and Izsak for the welfare maximization problem. Moreover, when
our algorithm is applied to each one of these simpler cases, it obtains the
same approximation ratio as of the respective original work.Comment: 23 page
Approximating Holant problems by winding
We give an FPRAS for Holant problems with parity constraints and
not-all-equal constraints, a generalisation of the problem of counting
sink-free-orientations. The approach combines a sampler for near-assignments of
"windable" functions -- using the cycle-unwinding canonical paths technique of
Jerrum and Sinclair -- with a bound on the weight of near-assignments. The
proof generalises to a larger class of Holant problems; we characterise this
class and show that it cannot be extended by expressibility reductions.
We then ask whether windability is equivalent to expressibility by matchings
circuits (an analogue of matchgates), and give a positive answer for functions
of arity three
Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid =(,) where each ground (indivisible) element is a selfish agent. The cost of each element (i.e., for selling the item or performing a service) is only known to the element itself. There is a buyer with a budget having additive valuations over the set of elements E. The goal is to design an incentive compatible (truthful) budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to the buyer. Our result is a deterministic, polynomial-time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with 4-approximation to the optimal independent set. Then, we extend our mechanism to the setting of matroid intersections in which the goal is to procure common independent sets from multiple matroids. We show that, given a polynomial time deterministic blackbox that returns -approximation solutions to the matroid intersection problem, there exists a deterministic, polynomial time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with (3+1) -approximation to the optimal common independent set
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