Finding Safety in Numbers with Secure Allegation Escrows

For fear of retribution, the victim of a crime may be willing to report it only if other victims of the same perpetrator also step forward. Common examples include 1) identifying oneself as the victim of sexual harassment, especially by a person in a position of authority or 2) accusing an influential politician, an authoritarian government, or ones own employer of corruption. To handle such situations, legal literature has proposed the concept of an allegation escrow: a neutral third-party that collects allegations anonymously, matches them against each other, and de-anonymizes allegers only after de-anonymity thresholds (in terms of number of co-allegers), pre-specified by the allegers, are reached. An allegation escrow can be realized as a single trusted third party; however, this party must be trusted to keep the identity of the alleger and content of the allegation private. To address this problem, this paper introduces Secure Allegation Escrows (SAE, pronounced "say"). A SAE is a group of parties with independent interests and motives, acting jointly as an escrow for collecting allegations from individuals, matching the allegations, and de-anonymizing the allegations when designated thresholds are reached. By design, SAEs provide a very strong property: No less than a majority of parties constituting a SAE can de-anonymize or disclose the content of an allegation without a sufficient number of matching allegations (even in collusion with any number of other allegers). Once a sufficient number of matching allegations exist, the join escrow discloses the allegation with the allegers' identities. We describe how SAEs can be constructed using a novel authentication protocol and a novel allegation matching and bucketing algorithm, provide formal proofs of the security of our constructions, and evaluate a prototype implementation, demonstrating feasibility in practice.Comment: To appear in NDSS 2020. New version includes improvements to writing and proof. The protocol is unchange

TumbleBit: an untrusted Bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub

This paper presents TumbleBit, a new unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that is fully compatible with today s Bitcoin protocol. TumbleBit allows parties to make fast, anonymous, off-blockchain payments through an untrusted intermediary called the Tumbler. TumbleBits anonymity properties are similar to classic Chaumian eCash: no one, not even the Tumbler, can link a payment from its payer to its payee. Every payment made via TumbleBit is backed by bitcoins, and comes with a guarantee that Tumbler can neither violate anonymity, nor steal bitcoins, nor print money by issuing payments to itself. We prove the security of TumbleBit using the real/ideal world paradigm and the random oracle model. Security follows from the standard RSA assumption and ECDSA unforgeability. We implement TumbleBit, mix payments from 800 users and show that TumbleBits offblockchain payments can complete in seconds.https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/575.pdfPublished versio

The Refund Booth: Using the Principle of Symmetric Information to Improve Campaign Finance Regulation

On March 22, 2006, Professor of Law, Ian Ayres of Yale Law School, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s twenty-sixth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: The Refund Booth: Using the Principle of Symmetric Information to Improve Campaign Finance Regulation. The article, The Secret Refund Booth, was co-authored with Professor Bruce Ackerman of Yale University. Ian Ayres is a lawyer and an economist. He is the William K. Townsend Professor of Law and Anne Urowsky Professorial Fellow in Law at Yale Law School and a Professor at Yale\u27s School of Management. He is the editor of the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. Professor Ayres is a regular commentator on public radio’s Marketplace and a columnist for Forbes magazine and regularly writes opeds for The New York Times. He received his B.A. (majoring in Russian studies and economics) and J.D. from Yale and his Ph.D in economics from M.I.T. Professor Ayres clerked for the Honorable James K. Logan of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. He has previously taught at Illinois, Northwestern, Stanford, and Virginia law schools and has been a research fellow of the American Bar Foundation. Professor Ayres has published eight books and over 100 articles on a wide range of topics

Collective Dynamics of Dark Web Marketplaces

Dark markets are commercial websites that use Bitcoin to sell or broker transactions involving drugs, weapons, and other illicit goods. Being illegal, they do not offer any user protection, and several police raids and scams have caused large losses to both customers and vendors over the past years. However, this uncertainty has not prevented a steady growth of the dark market phenomenon and a proliferation of new markets. The origin of this resilience have remained unclear so far, also due to the difficulty of identifying relevant Bitcoin transaction data. Here, we investigate how the dark market ecosystem re-organises following the disappearance of a market, due to factors including raids and scams. To do so, we analyse 24 episodes of unexpected market closure through a novel datasets of 133 million Bitcoin transactions involving 31 dark markets and their users, totalling 4 billion USD. We show that coordinated user migration from the closed market to coexisting markets guarantees overall systemic resilience beyond the intrinsic fragility of individual markets. The migration is swift, efficient and common to all market closures. We find that migrants are on average more active users in comparison to non-migrants and move preferentially towards the coexisting market with the highest trading volume. Our findings shed light on the resilience of the dark market ecosystem and we anticipate that they may inform future research on the self-organisation of emerging online markets