MARKET ANALYSIS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET – THE CASE OF CROATIA

The structure of the telecommunications market is an extremely important factor in the development of each country. Generally, it can be said that the structure of the market is moving from a monopoly, which initially defined the Croatian market, through liberalization into an oligopolistic market, and then finally into a market of monopolistic competition. The mobile networks industry is characteristically a natural monopoly since only a limited number of companies can remain within the market equilibrium, regardless of the size of the market. The aim of this research is to determine the characteristics and specifics of the telecommunication market in Croatia. Furthermore, by conducting an in-depth analysis of the telecommunication services in Croatia, conclusions will be drawn about the current market competitors, the marketing aspect as well as the legal regulations within this field

Supply chain network capacity competition with outsourcing: a variational equilibrium framework

This paper develops a supply chain network game theory framework with multiple manufacturers/producers, with multiple manufacturing plants, who own distribution centers and distribute their products, which are distinguished by brands, to demand markets, while maximizing profits and competing noncooperatively. The manufacturers also may avail themselves of external distribution centers for storing their products and freight service provision. The manufacturers have capacities associated with their supply chain network links and the external distribution centers also have capacitated storage and distribution capacities for their links, which are shared among the manufacturers and competed for. We utilize a special case of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem, known as a variational equilibrium, in order to formulate and solve the problem. A case study on apple farmers in Massachusetts is provided with various scenarios, including a supply chain disruption, to illustrate the modeling and methodological framework as well as the potential benefits of outsourcing in this sector

MARKET ANALYSIS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET – THE CASE OF CROATIA

The structure of the telecommunications market is an extremely important factor in the development of each country. Generally, it can be said that the structure of the market is moving from a monopoly, which initially defined the Croatian market, through liberalization into an oligopolistic market, and then finally into a market of monopolistic competition. The mobile networks industry is characteristically a natural monopoly since only a limited number of companies can remain within the market equilibrium, regardless of the size of the market. The aim of this research is to determine the characteristics and specifics of the telecommunication market in Croatia. Furthermore, by conducting an in-depth analysis of the telecommunication services in Croatia, conclusions will be drawn about the current market competitors, the marketing aspect as well as the legal regulations within this field

Network Game Theory Models of Services and Quality Competition with Applications to Future Internet Architectures and Supply Chains

The Internet has transformed the way in which we conduct business and perform economic and financial transactions. One key challenge of the Internet is the inefficiency of the mechanisms by which technology is deployed and the business and economic models surrounding these processes (Wolf et al. (2014)). Equilibrium models for the Internet generally assume basic economic relationships. However, in new paradigms for the Internet and in supply chain networks, price is not the only factor; quality of service (QoS) is also of increasing importance. Supply chains networks, which give us the means to manufacture products and deliver them to points of demand across the globe, are also under many pressures to offer differentiated products and services (Nagurney (2014)). It is well-known today that success is determined by how well the entire supply chain performs, rather than the performance of its individual entities. This dissertation contributes to the analysis, design, and management of the future Internet and supply chain networks with a focus on price and quality competition in service-oriented networks. Specifically, I focus on economic models for the Internet of the future by developing both a basic and a general network economic game theory model of a quality-based service-oriented Internet to study competition among service providers. To study and analyze the underlying dynamics of the various economic decision-makers, subsequently, I develop a dynamic network economic model of a service-oriented Internet with price and quality competition using projected dynamical systems theory. Then, to assess the prices for various contract durations at the demand markets, I consider a game theory model of a service-oriented Internet in which the network providers compete in usage service rates, quality levels, and duration-based contracts. Finally, I construct a model that captures the competition among manufacturers and freight service providers in a supply chain network. This model is the first one in the literature that handles both price and quality competition with multiple modes of shipment from both equilibrium and dynamic perspectives. For each model, I derive the governing equilibrium conditions and provide the equivalent variational inequality formulations. In order to illustrate the modeling framework and the algorithm, I present computed solutions to several numerical examples for each model as well as sensitivity analysis results. This dissertation is heavily based on the following papers: Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014), Nagurney et al. (2014a), Nagurney et al. (2015b), and Nagurney et al. (2015a) as well as additional results and conclusions

Standing on the shoulders of tech giants: Media delivery, streaming television, and the rise of global suppliers

This article uses the case study of Internet Protocol (IP) delivery for streaming television to demonstrate how technology and globalization combine to change what media firms do, how they create value, and with whom. Media delivery - the sum of the value-adding tasks necessary to transfer content from source to audience - has become a mosaic of technologies that sustain a complex and fast-evolving video ecosystem. Broadcasters had been in charge of the full transmission process once, of tasks deemed core to their business. Today, media delivery is externalized to the market and devolved to a network of suppliers. These suppliers are no ordinary firms, but tech giants that have developed deep global capabilities. They gain further leverage by being cross-sectoral, serving clients across multiple industries. Who are these suppliers? What makes them unique? And what are the implications for the television industry

Data and Digital Platforms in Industry: Implication for enterprises strategies and governance

This article explores the position of industrial internet platforms (IIP) in manufacturing value chains. We develop an understanding of the role of data in global value chains (GVCs), referring to literature on intangible assets and theories on platform business models. We use data from a qualitative empirical study based on 45 interviews on platforms active on the German market to answer (1) whether there are tendencies of oligopolization that lead to an accumulation of power on the side of the platforms, and (2) whether it is the platforms that capture most of the gains derived from higher productivity or lower transaction costs. The analysis shows that platforms mainly act as service providers and/or intermediaries that support manufacturing companies in reaping benefits from data. While the relationship between platforms and manufacturers currently corresponds to a symbiosis, a stronger power imbalance could evolve in the future since processes of oligopolization are likely

Common Carriage’s Domain

The judicial decision invalidating the Federal Communications Commission\u27s first Open Internet Order has led advocates to embrace common carriage as the legal basis for network neutrality. In so doing, network neutrality proponents have overlooked the academic literature on common carriage as well as lessons from its implementation history. This Essay distills these learnings into five factors that play a key role in promoting common carriage\u27s success: (1) commodity products, (2) simple interfaces, (3) stability and uniformity in the transmission technology, (4) full deployment of the transmission network, and (5) stable demand and market shares. Applying this framework to the Internet suggests that common carriage is not particularly well suited as a basis for regulating broadband Internet access

Common Carriage\u27s Domain

The judicial decision invalidating the Federal Communications Commission\u27s first Open Internet Order has led advocates to embrace common carriage as the legal basis for network neutrality. In so doing, network neutrality proponents have overlooked the academic literature on common carriage as well as lessons from its implementation history

The economic effects of network neutrality: a policy perspective

Network neutrality - regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) to ensure equal treatment of all traffic - is becoming something many people have heard about. While the context is technical, network neutrality ultimately boils down to economics. The political weight of the subject is heavy, and the international debate is fierce. Still, surprisingly little rigorous research appears to be behind it. In this paper, I review economic literature on network neutrality and ISP regulation, covering both practical and theoretical implications for the broadband market. I define the degrees of network neutrality with more granularity than papers so far, evaluate the qualitative economic effects of regulation, and describe the broadband market, frameworks for modeling it, and its peculiar economic characteristics. In particular, I review and compare different theoretical modeling approaches and models' predictions of the welfare effects of different regulatory regimes. Throughout the paper, I incorporate economic literature from relevant areas into the analysis. I do not make definite policy recommendations, but I draw conclusions that are potentially of interest from a policy point of view. My analysis would indicate that the complexity of the Internet ecosystem and interrelations between market participants make effective regulation difficult. There is no economic evidence that network neutrality generally increases total welfare. In fact, it turns out that from a well-rounded economic perspective, strong network neutrality appears in most cases as detrimental to both consumer surplus and total welfare. In certain scenarios, however, models predict that neutrality can increase static and dynamic efficiency. The results depend crucially on model specifications and parameters, which differ significantly across the literature. So far, there is no consensus among economists on the optimal level of ISP regulation. Market-driven solutions such as dynamic pricing might provide a way to circumvent the neutrality question. Verkkoneutraliteetti - teleoperaattorien sääntely tietoliikenteen tasa-arvoisen kohtelun varmistamiseksi - on astunut käsitteenä julkisuuteen. Vaikka konteksti onkin tekninen, verkkoneutraliteetti viime kädessä redusoituu taloustieteeseen. Aiheen poliittinen painoarvo on suuri ja kansainvälinen keskustelu kiivasta. Tästä huolimatta sen takaa vaikuttaa löytyvän yllättävän vähän tieteellistä tutkimusta. Lopputyössäni tarkastelen taloustieteellistä kirjallisuutta verkkoneutraliteetista ja teleoperaattorien sääntelystä ja sen vaikutuksia laajakaistamarkkinaan käytännöllisestä kuin myös teoreettisesta näkökulmasta. Määrittelen verkkoneutraliteetin asteet hienojakoisemmin kuin aikaisemmat julkaisut, arvioin sääntelyn laadullisia vaikutuksia ja kuvailen laajakaistamarkkinaa, viitekehyksiä sen mallintamiseksi sekä sen eriskummallisia taloudellisia piirteitä. Kuvaan teoreettisia lähestymistapoja ja merkittävimpien mallien ennusteita sääntelymallien hyvinvointivaikutuksista. Liitän analyysini relevanttiin taloustieteelliseen kirjallisuuteen. En anna suoria politiikkasuosituksia, mutta teen johtopäätöksiä, jotka ovat mahdollisesti mielenkiintoisia poliittisesta näkökulmasta. Analyysini perusteella vaikuttaa, että Internet-ekosysteemin monimutkaisuus ja toimijoiden väliset suhteet tekevät tehokkaasta sääntelystä vaikeaa. Taloustieteellistä näyttöä verkkoneutraliteetin hyvinvointia kasvattavista vaikutuksista ei ole. Tasapainoisesta taloudellisesta näkökulmasta katsottuna tiukka neutraliteettisääntely näyttää useimmissa tapauksissa sekä pienentävän kuluttajan ylijäämää että laskevan kokonaishyvinvointia. Joissakin skenaarioissa mallit toisaalta ennustavat neutraliteetin lisäävän staattista ja dynaamista tehokkuutta. Tulokset riippuvat rajusti mallin rakenteesta ja parametreistä, jotka vaihtelevat merkittävästi tutkimuksesta tutkimukseen. Toistaiseksi taloustieteilijät eivät ole päässeet yhteisymmärrykseen optimaalisesta teleoperaattorien sääntelyn asteesta. Markkinalähtöiset ratkaisut kuten dynaaminen hinnoittelu saattavat mahdollistaa neutraliteettikysymyksen kiertämisen