A review of game theory and multi-criteria decision-making methods with 10 application to the oil production and price

The oil production and price issues have been discovered a long time ago, and always be a continuous problem to the globe especially during the current global threats of the coronavirus pandemic. This paper provides a literature review that involves game theory and multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) methods with its applications to oil production and price problems. This paper identifies and analyses the use of the game theory and MCDM methods on oil production and price to compare the situation studied, to determine the model that has been used, the trend of past literature and also the details of the basic elements for the game theory framework. Therefore, the oil production and price problem using the game theory and MCDM methods are reviewed and numerous applications studied from the past works of literature are highlighted. The trend of oil production and price which used the game theory and MCDM methods based on the year 2001 till 2021 is still lacking sources from the Web of Science and Scopus databases. The main contribution of the recent study is the employment of the game theory and MCDM methods to the oil production and price problem

Revealing Robust Oil and Gas Company Macro-Strategies using Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

The energy transition potentially poses an existential risk for major international oil companies (IOCs) if they fail to adapt to low-carbon business models. Projections of energy futures, however, are met with diverging assumptions on its scale and pace, causing disagreement among IOC decision-makers and their stakeholders over what the business model of an incumbent fossil fuel company should be. In this work, we used deep multi-agent reinforcement learning to solve an energy systems wargame wherein players simulate IOC decision-making, including hydrocarbon and low-carbon investments decisions, dividend policies, and capital structure measures, through an uncertain energy transition to explore critical and non-linear governance questions, from leveraged transitions to reserve replacements. Adversarial play facilitated by state-of-the-art algorithms revealed decision-making strategies robust to energy transition uncertainty and against multiple IOCs. In all games, robust strategies emerged in the form of low-carbon business models as a result of early transition-oriented movement. IOCs adopting such strategies outperformed business-as-usual and delayed transition strategies regardless of hydrocarbon demand projections. In addition to maximizing value, these strategies benefit greater society by contributing substantial amounts of capital necessary to accelerate the global low-carbon energy transition. Our findings point towards the need for lenders and investors to effectively mobilize transition-oriented finance and engage with IOCs to ensure responsible reallocation of capital towards low-carbon business models that would enable the emergence of fossil fuel incumbents as future low-carbon leaders

بررسی رفتار ایران و عربستان در سازمان اوپک با استفاده از روش مارکف سوئیچینگ

با تأسیس اوپک در سال 1960 میلادی، عرصه جدیدی برای رقابت میان دو تولیدکننده بزرگ نفت در جهان یعنی ایران و عربستان بوجود آمد و از همان زمان، تحولات داخلی اوپک و بازتاب‌های بین‌المللی آن، متأثر از رقابت‌های شدید میان این دو عضو اوپک است. بررسی و تحلیل رفتار این دو کشور در بازار جهانی نفت و سازمان اوپک از اهمیت بسیار زیادی برخوردار است. در این مقاله رفتار ایران و عربستان در سازمان اوپک با استفاده از داده‌های ماهانه 2015:12-1973:1 بررسی شده است.  بدین منظور، ابتدا با استفاده از مدل خطی گریفین گسترش ‌یافته، سپس روش مارکف سوئیچینگ با احتمال انتقال ثابت برآوردها انجام گرفته است. نتایج حاصل از روش احتمال انتقال ثابت نشان داد که رفتار ایران و عربستان غیرخطی و رژیم تبانی عمده­ترین حالت رفتاری ایران و رژیم رقابتی رفتار غالب برای کشور عربستان بوده است، به عبارتی دیگر در دوره مورد بررسی، غالباً رفتار ایران در سازمان همسو و هماهنگ با سایر اعضا و مبتنی بر توافق و تبانی و قواعد کارتل­گونه بوده است اما رفتار عربستان برخلاف قواعد کارتل و مبتنی بر رقابت بوده است. همچنین نتایج نشان می­دهد که طول مدت ماندن ایران در رژیم تبانی به‌طور متوسط تقریباً برابر 217 ماه و طول مدت ماندن در رژیم رقابتی به‌طور متوسط برابر با 13 ماه است. اما طول مدت ماندن عربستان در رژیم تبانی به طور متوسط تقریباً برابر 40 ماه و طول مدت ماندن در رژیم رقابتی به طور متوسط برابر با 68 ماه است. بنابراین در دوره مورد بررسی احتمال ماندن ایران در رژیم تبانی بسیار بیشتر از احتمال ماندن در رژیم رقابتی است اما احتمال ماندن عربستان در رژیم رقابتی بیشتر از تبانی است

Control Strategies for Multi-Controller Multi-Objective Systems

This dissertation\u27s focus is control systems controlled by multiple controllers, each having its own objective function. The control of such systems is important in many practical applications such as economic systems, the smart grid, military systems, robotic systems, and others. To reap the benefits of feedback, we consider and discuss the advantages of implementing both the Nash and the Leader-Follower Stackelberg controls in a closed-loop form. However, closed-loop controls require continuous measurements of the system\u27s state vector, which may be expensive or even impossible in many cases. As an alternative, we consider a sampled closed-loop implementation. Such an implementation requires only the state vector measurements at pre-specified instants of time and hence is much more practical and cost-effective compared to the continuous closed-loop implementation. The necessary conditions for existence of such controls are derived for the general linear-quadratic system, and the solutions developed for the Nash and Stackelberg controls in detail for the scalar case. To illustrate the results, an example of a control system with two controllers and state measurements available at integer multiples of 10% of the total control interval is presented. While both Nash and Stackelberg are important approaches to develop the controls, we then considered the advantages of the Leader-Follower Stackelberg strategy. This strategy is appropriate for control systems controlled by two independent controllers whose roles and objectives in terms of the system\u27s performance and implementation of the controls are generally different. In such systems, one controller has an advantage over the other in that it has the capability of designing and implementing its control first, before the other controller. With such a control hierarchy, this controller is designated as the leader while the other is the follower. To take advantage of its primary role, the leader\u27s control is designed by anticipating and considering the follower\u27s control. The follower becomes the sole controller in the system after the leader\u27s control has been implemented. In this study, we describe such systems and derive in detail the controls of both the leader and follower. In systems where the roles of leader and follower are negotiated, it is important to consider each controller\u27s leadership property. This property considers the question for each controller as to whether it is preferable to be a leader and let the other controller be a follower or be a follower and let the other controller be the leader. In this dissertation, we try to answer this question by considering two models, one static and the other dynamic, and illustrating the results with an example in each case. The final chapter of the dissertation considers an application in microeconomics. We consider a dynamic duopoly problem, and we derive the necessary conditions for the Stackelberg solution with one firm as a leader controlling the price in the marke

Oil supply between OPEC and non-OPEC based on game theory

The competing strategies between OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and non-OPEC producers make the oil supply market a complex system, and thus, it is very difficult to model and to make predictions. In this paper, we combine the macro-model based on game theory and micro-model to propose a new approach for forecasting oil supply. We take into account the microscopic behaviour in the clearing market and also use the game relationships to adjust oil supplies in our approach. For the supply model, we analyse and consider the different behaviour of non-OPEC and OPEC producers. According to our analysis, limiting the oil supply, and thus maintaining oil price, is the best strategy for OPEC in the low-price scenario, while the rising supply is the best strategy in the high-price scenario. No matter what the oil price is, the dominant strategy for non-OPEC producers is to increase their oil supply. In the high-price scenario, OPEC will try to deplete non-OPEC’s share in the oil supply market, which is to OPEC’s advantage

“We don’t want to be the bad guys”: Exploring the future of international oil companies in a ‘well below 2 degrees’ world

Meeting the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement necessitates large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The emissions of the global oil industry contribute significantly to global warming, and the traditional business models of oil companies are incompatible with a sustainable energy transition. International oil companies (IOCs), which include some of the largest and most powerful corporations in the world, continue to generate enormous profits from fossil fuels while facing growing public criticism and pressure to change in response to the climate crisis. There is no clear pathway to a more sustainable future. To address this issue, this thesis explores from several angles what meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement might mean for IOCs. The thesis first examines how professionals working in the oil industry make sense of the contradiction between the IOC business model and the urgency of climate change mitigation. A novel framework of employee responses to the oil-climate tension is developed based on in-depth interviews with 12 professionals. Against this background, the thesis explores potential outcomes for IOCs’ business models and geopolitical and market positions. Insights from industry interviews are combined with literature to produce comprehensive typologies of the strategy and diversification options available for IOCs in a sustainable energy transition. The options are discussed in the context of their business potential, ability to reduce carbon emissions, and strategic fit to oil industry skills and assets. The geopolitical positions of IOCs in the energy transition are researched through 12 further expert interviews. Potential changes in IOC market positions in the energy transition are explored with a novel proof-of-concept model of the upstream oil market and an original data set constructed from publicly available sources. This thesis makes clear that while IOCs can contribute to the energy transition through diversification, changes to the core fossil fuel business are also needed for alignment with the Paris Agreement goals. IOCs stand to lose out in the energy transition, as a sustained decrease in oil demand would lead them to lose both market share and geopolitical influence relative to national oil companies. Overall, the oil industry is not on track to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement and needs to prepare better for the scenarios studied in this thesis.Open Acces