Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

We examine the relationship between the matching structure of a bipartite (buyer-seller) network and the (expected) shares of the unit surplus that each connected pair in this network can create. We show that in different bargaining environments, these shares are closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Structure Theorem. This theorem characterizes the structure of maximum matchings in an undirected graph. We show that the relationship between the (expected) shares and the tructure Theorem is not an artefact of a particular bargaining mechanism or trade centralization. However, this relationship does not necessarily generalize to non-bipartite networks or to networks with heterogeneous link values

Locally Optimal Load Balancing

This work studies distributed algorithms for locally optimal load-balancing: We are given a graph of maximum degree $\Delta$, and each node has up to $L$ units of load. The task is to distribute the load more evenly so that the loads of adjacent nodes differ by at most $1$. If the graph is a path ($\Delta = 2$), it is easy to solve the fractional version of the problem in $O(L)$ communication rounds, independently of the number of nodes. We show that this is tight, and we show that it is possible to solve also the discrete version of the problem in $O(L)$ rounds in paths. For the general case ($\Delta > 2$), we show that fractional load balancing can be solved in $\operatorname{poly}(L,\Delta)$ rounds and discrete load balancing in $f(L,\Delta)$ rounds for some function $f$, independently of the number of nodes.Comment: 19 pages, 11 figure

Bi-Criteria and Approximation Algorithms for Restricted Matchings

In this work we study approximation algorithms for the \textit{Bounded Color Matching} problem (a.k.a. Restricted Matching problem) which is defined as follows: given a graph in which each edge $e$ has a color $c_e$ and a profit $p_e \in \mathbb{Q}^+$, we want to compute a maximum (cardinality or profit) matching in which no more than $w_j \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ edges of color $c_j$ are present. This kind of problems, beside the theoretical interest on its own right, emerges in multi-fiber optical networking systems, where we interpret each unique wavelength that can travel through the fiber as a color class and we would like to establish communication between pairs of systems. We study approximation and bi-criteria algorithms for this problem which are based on linear programming techniques and, in particular, on polyhedral characterizations of the natural linear formulation of the problem. In our setting, we allow violations of the bounds $w_j$ and we model our problem as a bi-criteria problem: we have two objectives to optimize namely (a) to maximize the profit (maximum matching) while (b) minimizing the violation of the color bounds. We prove how we can "beat" the integrality gap of the natural linear programming formulation of the problem by allowing only a slight violation of the color bounds. In particular, our main result is \textit{constant} approximation bounds for both criteria of the corresponding bi-criteria optimization problem

Partitioning 3-colored complete graphs into three monochromatic cycles

We show in this paper that in every 3-coloring of the edges of Kn all but o(n) of its vertices can be partitioned into three monochromatic cycles. From this, using our earlier results, actually it follows that we can partition all the vertices into at most 17 monochromatic cycles, improving the best known bounds. If the colors of the three monochromatic cycles must be different then one can cover ( 3 4 − o(1))n vertices and this is close to best possible

LP-Duality Theory and the Cores of Games

LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of the core, right from its early days to the present time. The 1971 paper of Shapley and Shubik, which gave a characterization of the core of the assignment game, has been a paradigm-setting work in this regard. However, despite extensive follow-up work, basic gaps still remain. We address these gaps using the following building blocks from LP-duality theory: 1). Total unimodularity (TUM). 2). Complementary slackness conditions and strict complementarity. TUM plays a vital role in the Shapley-Shubik theorem. We define several generalizations of the assignment game whose LP-formulations admit TUM; using the latter, we characterize their cores. The Hoffman-Kruskal game is the most general of these. Its applications include matching students to schools and medical residents to hospitals, and its core imputations provide a way of enforcing constraints arising naturally in these applications: encouraging diversity and discouraging over-representation. Complementarity enables us to prove new properties of core imputations of the assignment game and its generalizations.Comment: 30 pages. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2202.0061