A Fully Abstract Symbolic Semantics for Psi-Calculi

We present a symbolic transition system and bisimulation equivalence for psi-calculi, and show that it is fully abstract with respect to bisimulation congruence in the non-symbolic semantics. A psi-calculus is an extension of the pi-calculus with nominal data types for data structures and for logical assertions representing facts about data. These can be transmitted between processes and their names can be statically scoped using the standard pi-calculus mechanism to allow for scope migrations. Psi-calculi can be more general than other proposed extensions of the pi-calculus such as the applied pi-calculus, the spi-calculus, the fusion calculus, or the concurrent constraint pi-calculus. Symbolic semantics are necessary for an efficient implementation of the calculus in automated tools exploring state spaces, and the full abstraction property means the semantics of a process does not change from the original

Formalising the pi-calculus using nominal logic

We formalise the pi-calculus using the nominal datatype package, based on ideas from the nominal logic by Pitts et al., and demonstrate an implementation in Isabelle/HOL. The purpose is to derive powerful induction rules for the semantics in order to conduct machine checkable proofs, closely following the intuitive arguments found in manual proofs. In this way we have covered many of the standard theorems of bisimulation equivalence and congruence, both late and early, and both strong and weak in a uniform manner. We thus provide one of the most extensive formalisations of a process calculus ever done inside a theorem prover. A significant gain in our formulation is that agents are identified up to alpha-equivalence, thereby greatly reducing the arguments about bound names. This is a normal strategy for manual proofs about the pi-calculus, but that kind of hand waving has previously been difficult to incorporate smoothly in an interactive theorem prover. We show how the nominal logic formalism and its support in Isabelle accomplishes this and thus significantly reduces the tedium of conducting completely formal proofs. This improves on previous work using weak higher order abstract syntax since we do not need extra assumptions to filter out exotic terms and can keep all arguments within a familiar first-order logic.Comment: 36 pages, 3 figure

On the Expressiveness of Intensional Communication

The expressiveness of communication primitives has been explored in a common framework based on the pi-calculus by considering four features: synchronism (asynchronous vs synchronous), arity (monadic vs polyadic data), communication medium (shared dataspaces vs channel-based), and pattern-matching (binding to a name vs testing name equality). Here pattern-matching is generalised to account for terms with internal structure such as in recent calculi like Spi calculi, Concurrent Pattern Calculus and Psi calculi. This paper explores intensionality upon terms, in particular communication primitives that can match upon both names and structures. By means of possibility/impossibility of encodings, this paper shows that intensionality alone can encode synchronism, arity, communication-medium, and pattern-matching, yet no combination of these without intensionality can encode any intensional language.Comment: In Proceedings EXPRESS/SOS 2014, arXiv:1408.127

Proofs about Network Communication: For Humans and Machines

Many concurrent and distributed systems are safety-critical and therefore have to provide a high degree of assurance. Important properties of such systems are frequently proved on the specification level, but implementations typically deviate from specifications for practical reasons. Machine-checked proofs of bisimilarity statements are often useful for guaranteeing that properties of specifications carry over to implementations. In this paper, we present a way of conducting such proofs with a focus on network communication. The proofs resulting from our approach are not just machine-checked but also intelligible for humans.Comment: In Proceedings ICE 2023, arXiv:2308.0892

Modal logics are coalgebraic

Applications of modal logics are abundant in computer science, and a large number of structurally different modal logics have been successfully employed in a diverse spectrum of application contexts. Coalgebraic semantics, on the other hand, provides a uniform and encompassing view on the large variety of specific logics used in particular domains. The coalgebraic approach is generic and compositional: tools and techniques simultaneously apply to a large class of application areas and can moreover be combined in a modular way. In particular, this facilitates a pick-and-choose approach to domain specific formalisms, applicable across the entire scope of application areas, leading to generic software tools that are easier to design, to implement, and to maintain. This paper substantiates the authors' firm belief that the systematic exploitation of the coalgebraic nature of modal logic will not only have impact on the field of modal logic itself but also lead to significant progress in a number of areas within computer science, such as knowledge representation and concurrency/mobility

Constraint Design Rewriting

We propose an algebraic approach to the design and transformation of constraint networks, inspired by Architectural Design Rewriting. The approach can be understood as (i) an extension of ADR with constraints, and (ii) an application of ADR to the design of reconfigurable constraint networks. The main idea is to consider classes of constraint networks as algebras whose operators are used to denote constraint networks with terms. Constraint network transformations such as constraint propagations are specified with rewrite rules exploiting the network’s structure provided by terms

A static analysis framework for security properties in mobile and cryptographic systems

We introduce a static analysis framework for detecting instances of security breaches in infinite mobile and cryptographic systems specified using the languages of the 7r-calculus and its cryptographic extension, the spi calculus. The framework is composed from three components: First, standard denotational semantics of the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus are constructed based on domain theory. The resulting model is sound and adequate with respect to transitions in the operational semantics. The standard semantics is then extended correctly to non-uniformly capture the property of term substitution, which occurs as a result of communications and successful cryptographic operations. Finally, the non-standard semantics is abstracted to operate over finite domains so as to ensure the termination of the static analysis. The safety of the abstract semantics is proven with respect to the nonstandard semantics. The results of the abstract interpretation are then used to capture breaches of the secrecy and authenticity properties in the analysed systems. Two initial prototype implementations of the security analysis for the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus are also included in the thesis. The main contributions of this thesis are summarised by the following. In the area of denotational semantics, the thesis introduces a domain-theoretic model for the spi calculus that is sound and adequate with respect to transitions in the structural operational semantics. In the area of static program analysis, the thesis utilises the denotational approach as the basis for the construction of abstract interpretations for infinite systems modelled by the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus. This facilitates the use of computationally significant mathematical concepts like least fixed points and results in an analysis that is fully compositional. Also, the thesis demonstrates that the choice of the term-substitution property in mobile and cryptographic programs is rich enough to capture breaches of security properties, like process secrecy and authenticity. These properties are used to analyse a number of mobile and cryptographic protocols, like the file transfer protocol and the Needham-Schroeder, SPLICE/AS, Otway-Rees, Kerberos, Yahalom and Woo Lam authentication protocols