137 research outputs found
Algorithms for generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables
We consider generalized potential games, that constitute a fundamental subclass of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We propose different methods to compute solutions of generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables, i.e., games in which some variables are continuous while the others are discrete. We investigate which types of equilibria of the game can be computed by minimizing a potential function over the common feasible set. In particular, for a wide class of generalized potential games, we characterize those equilibria that can be computed by minimizing potential functions as Pareto solutions of a particular multi-objective problem, and we show how different potential functions can be used to select equilibria. We propose a new Gauss–Southwell algorithm to compute approximate equilibria of any generalized potential game with mixed-integer variables. We show that this method converges in a finite number of steps and we also give an upper bound on this number of steps. Moreover, we make a thorough analysis on the behaviour of approximate equilibria with respect to exact ones. Finally, we make many numerical experiments to show the viability of the proposed approaches
Computing equilibria of Cournot oligopoly models with mixed-integer quantities
We consider Cournot oligopoly models in which some variables represent indivisible quantities. These models can be addressed by computing equilibria of Nash equilibrium problems in which the players solve mixed-integer nonlinear problems. In the literature there are no methods to compute equilibria of this type of Nash games. We propose a Jacobi-type method for computing solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables. This algorithm is a generalization of a recently proposed method for the solution of discrete so-called “2-groups partitionable” Nash equilibrium problems. We prove that our algorithm converges in a finite number of iterations to approximate equilibria under reasonable conditions. Moreover, we give conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria. Finally, we give numerical results to show the effectiveness of the proposed method
Merit functions: a bridge between optimization and equilibria
In the last decades, many problems involving equilibria, arising from engineering, physics and economics, have been formulated as variational mathematical models. In turn, these models can be reformulated as optimization problems through merit functions. This paper aims at reviewing the literature about merit functions for variational inequalities, quasi-variational inequalities and abstract equilibrium problems. Smoothness and convexity properties of merit functions and solution methods based on them will be presented
Computing all solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with discrete strategy sets
The Nash equilibrium problem is a widely used tool to model non-cooperative
games. Many solution methods have been proposed in the literature to compute
solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with continuous strategy sets, but,
besides some specific methods for some particular applications, there are no
general algorithms to compute solutions of Nash equilibrium problems in which
the strategy set of each player is assumed to be discrete. We define a
branching method to compute the whole solution set of Nash equilibrium problems
with discrete strategy sets. This method is equipped with a procedure that, by
fixing variables, effectively prunes the branches of the search tree.
Furthermore, we propose a preliminary procedure that by shrinking the feasible
set improves the performances of the branching method when tackling a
particular class of problems. Moreover, we prove existence of equilibria and we
propose an extremely fast Jacobi-type method which leads to one equilibrium for
a new class of Nash equilibrium problems with discrete strategy sets. Our
numerical results show that all proposed algorithms work very well in practice
Linear Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden verallgemeinerte Nash Spiele (LGNEPs) unter Linearitätsannahmen eingeführt und untersucht. Durch Ausnutzung der speziellen Struktur lassen sich theoretische und algorithmische Resultate erzielen, die weit über die Ergebnisse für allgemeine LGNEPs hinausgehen
Gap functions for quasi-equilibria
An approach for solving quasi-equilibrium problems (QEPs) is proposed relying on gap functions, which allow reformulating QEPs as global optimization problems. The (generalized) smoothness properties of a gap function are analysed and an upper estimates of its Clarke directional derivative is given.
Monotonicity assumptions on both the equilibrium and constraining bifunctions are a key tool to guarantee that all the stationary points of a gap function actually solve QEP. A few classes of constraints satisfying such assumptions are identified covering a wide range of situations. Relying on these results, a descent method for solving QEP is devised and its convergence proved. Finally, error bounds are given in order to guarantee the boundedness of the sequence generated by the algorithm
Gap functions for quasi-equilibria
An approach for solving quasi-equilibrium problems (QEPs) is proposed relying on gap functions, which allow reformulating QEPs as global optimization problems. The (generalized) smoothness properties of a gap function are analysed and an upper estimate of its Clarke directional derivative is given. Monotonicity assumptions on both the equilibrium and constraining bifunctions are a key tool to guarantee that all the stationary points of a gap function actually solve QEP. A few classes of constraints satisfying such assumptions are identified covering a wide range of situations. Relying on these results, a descent method for solving QEP is devised and its convergence proved. Finally, error bounds are given in order to guarantee the boundedness of the sequence generated by the algorithm
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