Ontological Syncretistic Noneism

In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed in both Routley 1980 and Priest 20162) and Crane’s (2013) psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions

Ontological Syncretistic Noneism

In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed in both Routley 1980 and Priest 20162) and Crane’s (2013) psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions

From the Meinongian Point of View

In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear

Existence, actuality and logical pluralism

This work considers data about the intentional nature of human cognition, and traces their consequences for debates in the philosophy and epistemology of logic, and metaphysics. The first part of this work, comprising its first three chapters, investigates the prospect of revising logic in light of de re intentionality, that is, more precisely, in light of the fact that via their cognitive abilities agents can relate to objects that do not exist. We will consider two candidate systems for logical revision, expressions of two forms of logical revisionism, and eventually motivate, from anti-exceptionalist grounds, our preference for one of them. We will start in Ch. 1 by illustrating the anti-exceptionalist methodological framework assumed in this work. Subsequently, in Ch. 2, we will discuss four classically valid principles inadequate to the data of de re intentionality, reject possible attempts, by proponents of so-called realist abstractionist theories of fiction, to deny those data, and present the system P of positive free logic. We will then go on, in Ch. 3, to illustrate the noneist programme of logical revision and a system, N^R, implementing its principles. We will thus argue from anti-exceptionalist grounds that rational theory choice is exercised by choosing N^R. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to defend a realist account about the ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. Ch. 4 and Ch. 5 are dedicated to refute attempts, by Timothy Williamson, to reduce disagreements about non-existent objects to cases of merely verbal disagreements. In Ch. 4, we take issue with arguments to the extent that logical disputes about `exists' are genuine only if the parties use it in deductively ways. In Ch. 5 we address his scepticism towards the dispute, about merely possible objects, between actualism and possibilism, and find it unwarranted

Liberated Presentism

(The version now posted is a revision of what was posted earlier. Final version now published.) The article gives a novel argument to show that there is sense of 'exists' suitable for posing a substantive issue between presentists and eternalists. It then seeks to invigorate a neglected variety of presentism. There are seven doctrines, widely accepted even among presentists, that create problems for presentism. Without distinguishing existence and being, presentists can comfortably reject all seven. Doing so would dispose of the majority of presentism’s problems. Further, it would enable presentists to reduce A-judgments to B-judgments, thereby insulating presentism from doubts about the intelligibility of A-theories. For reasons indicated very briefly, it might also make presentism less difficult to reconcile with special relativity, though the point is not pursued here

Truthmaker Commitments

On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory t

Existência

Neste ensaio, discutem-se cinco questões acerca da existência: 1. É a existência representável em termos de quantificação? 2. É a existência um predicado" real", de primeira ordem? 3. É existir o mesmo que ser? 4. Existe tudo? 5. Qual é a forma lógica de afirmações de existência? São introduzidas e examinadas algumas das mais salientes posições acerca destas questões, em especial a concepção Frege-Russell da existência e diversas concepções recentes neo-Meinongianas. Defendemos as seguintes três teses acerca daquilo que deve ser um bom predicado de existência:(a) um predicado puramente lógico e parcialmente definível em termos do quantificador existencial;(b) invariavelmente um predicado de primeira ordem (dadas certas suposições de partida acerca do universo do discurso);(c) um predicado universal, verdadeiro de tudo e falso de nada