Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker-than-classical K3 logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to--whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non-classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities

Against Classical Paraconsistent Metatheory

There was a time when 'logic' just meant classical logic. The climate is slowly changing and non-classical logic cannot be dismissed off-hand. However, a metatheory used to study the properties of non-classical logic is often classical. In this paper, we will argue that this practice of relying on classical metatheories is problematic. In particular, we will show that it is a bad practice because the metatheory that is used to study a non-classical logic often rules out the very logic it is designed to study

Tipos de lógica utilizadas en la toma de decisiones estratégicas de marketing

Para el administrador el proceso de la toma de decisiones es uno de sus mayores retos y responsabilidades, ya que en su desarrollo se debe definir el camino más acertado en un sin número de alternativas, teniendo en cuenta los obstáculos sociales, políticos y económicos del entorno empresarial. Para llegar a la decisión adecuada no hay que perder de vista los objetivos y metas propuestas, además de tener presente el proceso lógico, detectando, analizando y demostrando el porqué de esa elección. Consecuentemente el análisis que propone esta investigación aportara conocimientos sobre los tipos de lógica utilizados en la toma de decisiones estratégicas al administrador para satisfacer las demandas asociadas con el mercadeo para que de esta manera se pueda generar y ampliar eficientemente las competencia idóneas del administrador en la inserción internacional de un mercado laboral cada vez mayor (Valero, 2011). A lo largo de la investigación se pretende desarrollar un estudio teórico para explicar la relación entre la lógica y la toma de decisiones estratégicas de marketing y como estos conceptos se combinan para llegar a un resultado final. Esto se llevara a cabo por medio de un análisis de planes de marketing, iniciando por conceptos básicos como marketing, lógica, decisiones estratégicas, dirección de marketing seguido de los principios lógicos y contradicciones que se pueden llegar a generar entre la fundamentación teóricaFor the administrator the process of decision-making is one of its greatest challenges and responsibilities, as their development should define the most successful way, taking account social, political and economic obstacles in the business environment. To reach the right decision it’s important not lose the objectives and targets, in addition to this, the logical process, detecting, analyzing and demonstrating the reason for this choice. Consequently, the analysis proposed by this research provides insights into the types of logic used in making strategic decisions, to meet the demands associated with marketing in that way can efficiently generate and expand best competition in the international integration a growing labor market (Valero Cordoba, 2011). Throughout the research aims to develop a theoretical study to clarify the relationship between logic and make strategic marketing decisions and how these concepts are combined to reach a final result. This was carried out through an analysis of marketing plans, starting with basic concepts such as marketing, logic, strategic decisions, followed by marketing management principles and logical contradictions that may generate between the theoretical foundationsUniversidad del Rosari

Quine e o pluralismo lógico

Investiga-se a possibilidade de uma abordagem do fenômeno do pluralismo lógico a partir de uma perspectiva inspirada no pensamento de Quine. A matematização da lógica termina por levar à flexibilização da teoria lógica, logo surgindo, não apenas sistemas complementares e alternativos à lógica clássica, mas também a questão da admissibilidade de mais do que um sistema lógico. A tal posição se dá o nome “pluralismo lógico”. Quine foi um destacado defensor da lógica clássica a partir de uma perspectiva monista, ainda que admitisse em princípio a possibilidade de sua revisão. Pode-se, contudo, investigar se as linhas gerais do pensamento quineano são compatíveis com uma perspectiva pluralista. Algumas possibilidades são levantadas tomando em consideração propostas como as teorias pluralistas de Carlo Dalla Pozza e Richard Epstein. Conclui-se que, embora Quine não concebesse a possibilidade de apoiar o pluralismo lógico, a sua filosofia ajuda a enquadrar e avaliar as maneiras de estudar o assunto

The Nature and Logic of Vagueness

The PhD thesis advances a new approach to vagueness as dispersion, comparing it with the main philosophical theories of vagueness in the analytic tradition

Logic as a Puzzle-Solving Activity

Some authors have recently argued in favor of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The general idea is that logic is not different from the other sciences, and its principles are as revisable as scientific principles. This paper has three sections. In section 1, I discuss the meaning of anti-exceptionalism and its place in contemporary logic. In section 2, I analyze some recent developments on this topic by Williamson (2017) and Hjortland (2017), which will motivate my view. In section 3, I propose a puzzle-solving perspective on logical practice. According to my view, there is a common methodology, in which scientists may use non-classical in order to solve some specific puzzles, but classical logic stays in a privileged position, as a common language and as a general theory of reasoning. This role cannot be fulfilled by other logics, and therefore the comparison between classical and non-classical logic is not like a regular comparison between competing hypotheses in science. The methodology of logical practice is therefore not abductive, at least in many important cases. Classical logic is not the “best available theory”, but the fundamental piece of our scientific methodology. My position is still anti-exceptionalist: logic is like any other science, or at least like any other science which can be characterized by a puzzle-solving methodology

Logical Akrasia

The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, §3 and §4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano Arithmetic or akratic in our arithmetical theorizing. If successful, these sections will underscore the pertinence and persistence of akrasia in arithmetic (by appeal to Gödel’s seminal work). Thirdly, §5 concludes by suggesting a way of translating the dilemma of arithmetical akrasia into a case of regular epistemic akrasia; and further how one might try to escape the dilemma when it’s framed this way

Computation in non-classical foundations?

The Church-Turing Thesis is widely regarded as true, because of evidence that there is only one genuine notion of computation. By contrast, there are nowadays many different formal logics, and different corresponding foundational frameworks. Which ones can deliver a theory of computability? This question sets up a difficult challenge: the meanings of basic mathematical terms (like "set", "function", and "number") are not stable across frameworks. While it is easy to compare what different frameworks say, it is not so easy to compare what they mean. We argue for some minimal conditions that must be met if two frameworks are to be compared; if frameworks are radical enough, comparison becomes hopeless. Our aim is to clarify the dialectical situation in this bourgeoning area of research, shedding light on the nature of non-classical logic and the notion of computation alike

How to Adopt a Logic

What is commonly referred to as the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the idea that the principles of logic can be rationally revised. The argument is based on a reconstruction of unpublished work by Saul Kripke. As the reconstruction has it, Kripke extends the scope of Willard van Orman Quine's regress argument against conventionalism to the possibility of adopting new logical principles. In this paper we want to discuss the scope of this challenge. Are all revisions of logic subject to the Adoption Problem? If not, are there significant cases of logical revision that are subject to the Adoption Problem? We will argue that both questions should be answered negatively