New error bounds for Solomonoff prediction

Solomonoff sequence prediction is a scheme to predict digits of binary strings without knowing the underlying probability distribution. We call a prediction scheme informed when it knows the true probability distribution of the sequence. Several new relations between universal Solomonoff sequence prediction and informed prediction and general probabilistic prediction schemes will be proved. Among others, they show that the number of errors in Solomonoff prediction is finite for computable distributions, if finite in the informed case. Deterministic variants will also be studied. The most interesting result is that the deterministic variant of Solomonoff prediction is optimal compared to any other probabilistic or deterministic prediction scheme apart from additive square root corrections only. This makes it well suited even for difficult prediction problems, where it does not suffice when the number of errors is minimal to within some factor greater than one. Solomonoff's original bound and the ones presented here complement each other in a useful way

Algorithmic Complexity Bounds on Future Prediction Errors

We bound the future loss when predicting any (computably) stochastic sequence online. Solomonoff finitely bounded the total deviation of his universal predictor $M$ from the true distribution $mu$ by the algorithmic complexity of $mu$. Here we assume we are at a time $t>1$ and already observed $x=x_1...x_t$. We bound the future prediction performance on $x_{t+1}x_{t+2}...$ by a new variant of algorithmic complexity of $mu$ given $x$, plus the complexity of the randomness deficiency of $x$. The new complexity is monotone in its condition in the sense that this complexity can only decrease if the condition is prolonged. We also briefly discuss potential generalizations to Bayesian model classes and to classification problems.Comment: 21 page

Solomonoff Induction Violates Nicod's Criterion

Nicod's criterion states that observing a black raven is evidence for the hypothesis H that all ravens are black. We show that Solomonoff induction does not satisfy Nicod's criterion: there are time steps in which observing black ravens decreases the belief in H. Moreover, while observing any computable infinite string compatible with H, the belief in H decreases infinitely often when using the unnormalized Solomonoff prior, but only finitely often when using the normalized Solomonoff prior. We argue that the fault is not with Solomonoff induction; instead we should reject Nicod's criterion.Comment: ALT 201

Optimality of Universal Bayesian Sequence Prediction for General Loss and Alphabet

Various optimality properties of universal sequence predictors based on Bayes-mixtures in general, and Solomonoff's prediction scheme in particular, will be studied. The probability of observing $x_t$ at time $t$, given past observations $x_1...x_{t-1}$ can be computed with the chain rule if the true generating distribution $\mu$ of the sequences $x_1x_2x_3...$ is known. If $\mu$ is unknown, but known to belong to a countable or continuous class \M one can base ones prediction on the Bayes-mixture $\xi$ defined as a $w_\nu$-weighted sum or integral of distributions \nu\in\M. The cumulative expected loss of the Bayes-optimal universal prediction scheme based on $\xi$ is shown to be close to the loss of the Bayes-optimal, but infeasible prediction scheme based on $\mu$. We show that the bounds are tight and that no other predictor can lead to significantly smaller bounds. Furthermore, for various performance measures, we show Pareto-optimality of $\xi$ and give an Occam's razor argument that the choice $w_\nu\sim 2^{-K(\nu)}$ for the weights is optimal, where $K(\nu)$ is the length of the shortest program describing $\nu$. The results are applied to games of chance, defined as a sequence of bets, observations, and rewards. The prediction schemes (and bounds) are compared to the popular predictors based on expert advice. Extensions to infinite alphabets, partial, delayed and probabilistic prediction, classification, and more active systems are briefly discussed.Comment: 34 page

On Universal Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation

The Bayesian framework is a well-studied and successful framework for inductive reasoning, which includes hypothesis testing and confirmation, parameter estimation, sequence prediction, classification, and regression. But standard statistical guidelines for choosing the model class and prior are not always available or fail, in particular in complex situations. Solomonoff completed the Bayesian framework by providing a rigorous, unique, formal, and universal choice for the model class and the prior. We discuss in breadth how and in which sense universal (non-i.i.d.) sequence prediction solves various (philosophical) problems of traditional Bayesian sequence prediction. We show that Solomonoff's model possesses many desirable properties: Strong total and weak instantaneous bounds, and in contrast to most classical continuous prior densities has no zero p(oste)rior problem, i.e. can confirm universal hypotheses, is reparametrization and regrouping invariant, and avoids the old-evidence and updating problem. It even performs well (actually better) in non-computable environments.Comment: 24 page

Ultimate Intelligence Part I: Physical Completeness and Objectivity of Induction

We propose that Solomonoff induction is complete in the physical sense via several strong physical arguments. We also argue that Solomonoff induction is fully applicable to quantum mechanics. We show how to choose an objective reference machine for universal induction by defining a physical message complexity and physical message probability, and argue that this choice dissolves some well-known objections to universal induction. We also introduce many more variants of physical message complexity based on energy and action, and discuss the ramifications of our proposals.Comment: Under review at AGI-2015 conference. An early draft was submitted to ALT-2014. This paper is now being split into two papers, one philosophical, and one more technical. We intend that all installments of the paper series will be on the arxi

Towards a Universal Theory of Artificial Intelligence based on Algorithmic Probability and Sequential Decision Theory

Decision theory formally solves the problem of rational agents in uncertain worlds if the true environmental probability distribution is known. Solomonoff's theory of universal induction formally solves the problem of sequence prediction for unknown distribution. We unify both theories and give strong arguments that the resulting universal AIXI model behaves optimal in any computable environment. The major drawback of the AIXI model is that it is uncomputable. To overcome this problem, we construct a modified algorithm AIXI^tl, which is still superior to any other time t and space l bounded agent. The computation time of AIXI^tl is of the order t x 2^l.Comment: 8 two-column pages, latex2e, 1 figure, submitted to ijca

On the Computability of Solomonoff Induction and Knowledge-Seeking

Solomonoff induction is held as a gold standard for learning, but it is known to be incomputable. We quantify its incomputability by placing various flavors of Solomonoff's prior M in the arithmetical hierarchy. We also derive computability bounds for knowledge-seeking agents, and give a limit-computable weakly asymptotically optimal reinforcement learning agent.Comment: ALT 201