Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets: Access Control and Efficiency Loss

This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in open and discriminatory access platforms under networked Cournot competition. In open platforms, every firm connects to every market, while discriminatory platforms limit connections between firms and markets to improve social welfare. We provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both platforms; (i) that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium under open access is bounded by 3/2, and (ii) for discriminatory access platforms, we provide a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections that guarantees efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is bounded by 4/3, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions

Evaluating market pricing competition with the Bertrand Network

Mestrado de dupla diplomação com a UTFPR - Universidade Tecnológica Federal do ParanáRecently in the literature, there have been many attempts to expand classic models of market competition analysis. Considering firms are competing globally against many different sellers over different markets, recent works proposed a model where it is possible to represent competition among companies where they compete against each other directly and indirectly, using a hypergraph to represent the competition structure. This document presents an attempt to demonstrate how the young and maturing networked price competition model, which allows finding the best price for the companies from the competition structure and market sizes, can be used in any case of study. This work continues the recent demand to adapt the famous Bertrand competition model, where sellers ask for prices. Since there are no recent works which use the recent model, it has been presented how to use it in such a way that is possible to guess the competition structure and the distribution of the buyers by only by observing how companies are pricing. To better understand the applications of the existing method, the first real case of study which has used the Bertrand Network model is presented: a competition among 6 flight companies, where prices were collected by using the Google Flight tracking service, concluding that the proofs and claims developed in this work are useful to enhance market analysis

Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets

Unlike traditional firms, platforms do not manufacture products. Instead, they arrange matches between firms and consumers, facilitating a safe and simple trading process, providing value for all parties involved. Among the many design considerations for platforms is the trade-off between transparency and search costs. In this talk, we discuss the impact of transparency and search on the economic efficiency of platforms

Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets

Unlike traditional firms, platforms do not manufacture products. Instead, they arrange matches between firms and consumers, facilitating a safe and simple trading process, providing value for all parties involved. Among the many design considerations for platforms is the trade-off between transparency and search costs. In this talk, we discuss the impact of transparency and search on the economic efficiency of platforms

Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets: Access Control and Efficiency Loss

This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in online platforms using the model of networked Cournot competition. We consider two styles of platforms: open access platforms and discriminatory access platforms. In open access platforms, every firm can connect to every market, while discriminatory access platforms limit connections between firms and markets in order to improve social welfare. Our results provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both open access and discriminatory access platforms. For open access platforms, we show that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 3/2. In the case of discriminatory access platforms, we prove that, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions, a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections can guarantee the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 4/3

Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets: Access Control and Efficiency Loss

This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in online platforms using the model of networked Cournot competition. We consider two styles of platforms: open access platforms and discriminatory access platforms. In open access platforms, every firm can connect to every market, while discriminatory access platforms limit connections between firms and markets in order to improve social welfare. Our results provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both open access and discriminatory access platforms. For open access platforms, we show that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 3/2. In the case of discriminatory access platforms, we prove that, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions, a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections can guarantee the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 4/3