Bank Networks from Text: Interrelations, Centrality and Determinants

In the wake of the still ongoing global financial crisis, bank interdependencies have come into focus in trying to assess linkages among banks and systemic risk. To date, such analysis has largely been based on numerical data. By contrast, this study attempts to gain further insight into bank interconnections by tapping into financial discourse. We present a text-to-network process, which has its basis in co-occurrences of bank names and can be analyzed quantitatively and visualized. To quantify bank importance, we propose an information centrality measure to rank and assess trends of bank centrality in discussion. For qualitative assessment of bank networks, we put forward a visual, interactive interface for better illustrating network structures. We illustrate the text-based approach on European Large and Complex Banking Groups (LCBGs) during the ongoing financial crisis by quantifying bank interrelations and centrality from discussion in 3M news articles, spanning 2007Q1 to 2014Q3.Comment: Quantitative Finance, forthcoming in 201

Systemic risk diagnostics: coincident indicators and early warning signals

We propose a novel framework to assess financial system risk. Using a dynamic factor framework based on state-space methods, we construct coincident measures (‘thermometers’) and a forward looking indicator for the likelihood of simultaneous failure of a large number of financial intermediaries. The indicators are based on latent macro-financial and credit risk components for a large data set comprising the U.S., the EU-27 area, and the respective rest of the world. Credit risk conditions can significantly and persistently de-couple from macro-financial fundamentals. Such decoupling can serve as an early warning signal for macro-prudential policy. JEL Classification: G21, C33credit portfolio models, financial crisis, frailty-correlated defaults, state space methods, systemic risk

Four Futures for Finance; A scenario study

This document presents four scenarios for the future of finance. The goal of our study is to imagine the future of finance and to identify challenges faced by policymakers in fighting systemic risk. It builds upon a tradition within the CPB to develop scenarios for policy analysis. We develop four scenarios for the future of finance. Our scenarios differ in two dimensions. First, to what extent soft information lies at the core of banks’ business. Second, to what extent scope economies exist between different banking activities. By combining these two dimensions, we obtain four scenarios: Isolated Islands, Big Banks, Competing Conglomerates, and Flat Finance. Market structure, market failures, and government failures vary between scenarios. These differences then translate into differences in the complexity of balance sheets, the ability to coordinate policy internationally, the information gap faced by regulators, the size of banks’ balance sheets, the tradability of banks’ assets, the level of interconnectedness, the potential for market discipline, and the threat of regulatory capture. As a result, each scenario calls for a different set of policies to combat systemic risk.

An Evaluation and Management of the Systemic Risk of the Banking System -A Literature Review

There is consensus among financial regulators that the recent global financial crisis has highlighted the need of addressing incomplete reforms, one of them being the contribution of financial risks in destabilizing the financial markets. One of the most important form of financial risks is the systemic risk that is imposed by the inter linkages and interdependencies in a financial system. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the updated research articles published on the evaluation and management of the systemic risk between 2005 and 2015 by using diverse systemic risk analytics. The paper highlights the main contributions of the authors to the research. The discussion on the literature is classified into two parts namely empirical and non-empirical studies. The results show that the cross section measures proposed down by Acharya et al (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeir (2011) MES and CoVaR respectively have gained popularity in evaluating the systemic risk, however the proposed measures should be used with warning. Moreover, despite the fact that the interest in the topic of management of systemic risk has grown tremendously, but little research has been conducted in developing countries. Keywords: Macroprudential policy, Systemic risk, Systemic financial institutions, financial regulation

An evolutionary theory of systemic risk and its mitigation for the global financial system

This thesis is the outcome of theory development research into an identified gap in knowledge about systemic risk of the global financial system. It takes a systems-theoretic approach, incorporating a simulation-constructivist orientation towards the meaning of theory and theory development, within a realist constructivism epistemology for knowledge generation about complex social phenomena. The specific purpose of which is to describe systemic risk of failure, and explain how it occurs in the global financial system, in order to diagnose and understand circumstances in which it arises, and offer insights into how that risk may be mitigated. An outline theory is developed, introducing a new operational definition of systemic risk of failure in which notions from evolutionary economics, finance and complexity science are combined with a general interpretation of entropy, to explain how catastrophic phenomena arise in that system. When a conceptual model incorporating the Icelandic financial system failure over the years 2003 – 2008 is constructed from this theory, and the results of simulation experiments using a verified computational representation of the model are validated with empirical data from that event, and corroborated by theoretical triangulation, a null-hypothesis about the theory is refuted. Furthermore, results show that interplay between a lack of diversity in system participation strategies and shared exposure to potential losses may be a key operational mechanism of catastrophic tensions arising in the supply and demand of financial services. These findings suggest new policy guidance for pre-emptive intervention calls for improved operational transparency from system participants, and prompt access to data about their operational behaviour, in order to prevent positive feedback inducing a failure of the system to operate within required parameters. The theory is then revised to reflect new insights exposed by simulation, and finally submitted as a new theory capable of unifying existing knowledge in this problem domain

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk in Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks� assets has led to the idea of �too interconnected to fail� resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.

Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk In Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks

Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of “too interconnected to fail” resulting, as in the case of AIG, of having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. This paper also includes a brief discussion of the complex system Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) approach to financial network modeling for systemic risk assessment. Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008 (see, BIS and DTCC). The May-Wigner stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We provide a Systemic Risk Ratio and an implementation of concentration risk in CDS settlement for major US banks in terms of the loss of aggregate core capital. We also compare our stress test results with those provided by SCAP (Supervisory Capital Assessment Program). Finally, in the context of the Basel II credit risk transfer and synthetic securitization framework, there is little evidence that the CDS market predicated on a system of offsets to minimize final settlement can provide the credit risk mitigation sought by banks for reference assets in the case of a significant credit event. The large negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS financial network from the demise of a big CDS seller undermines the justification in Basel II that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontinued.Credit Default Swaps; Financial Networks; Systemic Risk; Agent BasedCredit Default Swaps, Financial Networks, Systemic Risk, Agent Based Models, Complex Systems, Stress Testing

ENTERPRISE CREDIT RISK ASSESSMENT ANALYZING THE DATA OF SHORT TERM ACTIVITY PERIOD

This research investigates the possibility to classify the companies into default and non-default groups analyzing the financial data of 1 year. The developed statistical model enables banks to predict the default of new companies that have no sufficient financial information for the credit risk assessment using other models. The classification and regression tree predicts the default of companies with the 96% probability. The complementary analysis the financial data of 2 years by probit model allows to increase the classification accuracy to 99%. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15544/ssaf.2012.2