ELECTRONIC TEXTBOOK “NETWORK ECONOMICS”

Electronic textbook "Network Economics" has been developed for student teaching on appropriate discipline. This contains the theoretical material, practical exercises and control tests. This electronic manual can be used as an additional tool for student teaching in “Network Economics” courseСоздано электронное учебное пособие «Сетевая экономика» для обучения студентов соответствующей дисциплине. Оно содержит теоретический материал, практические занятия и контрольные тесты. Это электронное пособие можно использовать в качестве дополнительного средства при обучении студентов предмету «Сетевая экономика

Essays in network economics

The content of the following three chapters concerns different fields of application. In Chapter 2 we analyse the passengers' journeys within the framework of complex network analysis. In Chapter 3, we focus on social support networks of people in old age and the association with well-being and mental health. In Chapter 4, we discuss the association between religion and moral behavior and attitudes

Essays in Network Economics

Chapter 1 explores possibilities for non-parametrically identifying peer effects. In my model, outcomes associated with individuals are an unknown function of expected peer outcomes and other individual-specific attributes. Unobserved heterogeneity in outcomes across individuals is captured by an additively separable individual-specific error. The error is mean dependent on peer group, rendering expected peer outcome an endogenous covariate. Exogenous peer attributes are absent from the individuals’ remaining covariates.\\ When the data is cross-sectional, I propose imposing a stringent but intuitive assumption on how individual outcomes depend on expected peer outcomes and remaining individual-specific attributes. Specifically, I assume one of the individual-specific characteristics indexes how strongly an individual interacts with his peers. If the index is zero, the individual is not directly affected by peer outcomes. Under this assumption, the model is identified, up to a normalization. When panel data is available, the assumption is unrequired, and the model is identified via a more traditional IV-based approach. The cross-sectional result leads to tests for whether peer effects estimates reflect forces associated with social interactions or not.\\ Chapter 2 studies how economies of scale and product differentiation affect manufacturer-supplier relationships. A model consisting of two manufacturers, each with pre-existing relationships to two separate suppliers, is analyzed. At the start, an unrelated manufacturer-supplier pair decides whether to invest in a new relationship. Based on the resulting network of manufacturer-supplier relationships, a manufacturer\u27s input price is determined by Nash bargaining if it\u27s related to one supplier, and a first-price auction if otherwise. When manufacturers are horizontally differentiated, hold-up of investment by neighbor manufacturers causes manufacturer-supplier network connectivity to be too low. On the other hand, overinvestment in outside option relationships causes network connectivity to be inefficiently high. Shocks to individual manufacturers or suppliers have disproportionately large (small) welfare consequences vis-a-vis ex-ante market shares when the network is under (overly) connected compared to the socially optimal network.\\ Chapter 2 also estimates a micro-founded model of firm-to-firm relationship formation, using prices, quantities and product-supplier-level network data for 2008-16 U.S. automobiles. The model incorporates the theoretical model\u27s key elements - supplier-level economies of scale, downstream market product differentiation and relationship network contingent input pricing. To identify the model, I assume manufacturers Nash bargain with suppliers inherited from previous periods. I then exploit variation in these suppliers\u27 quantities to identify how production costs vary with rival product output. I find, on average, main suppliers of chassis, exterior and combined inputs experience significant economies of scale. Ex-post and on average, manufacturers do not benefit from forming their chosen relationships, absent rents from outside option relationship overinvestment or compensation from other firms. In comparison, hold-up of relationship investment is less significant in affecting incentives to form relationships

Prospects for the hydrogen transition based on the network economic approach : Insights from the electricity and gas experience in Europe

This paper aims to investigate the transition to a new energy system based on hydrogen in the European liberalized framework. After analyzing the literature on the hydrogen infrastructure needs in Europe, we estimate the size and scope of the transition challenge.We take the theoretical framework of network economics to analyze early hydrogen infrastructure needs. Therefore, several concepts are applied to hydrogen economics such as demand club effects, scale economies on large infrastructures, scope economies, and positive socio-economical externalities. On the examples of the electric and natural gas industry formation in Europe, we argue for public intervention in order to create conditions to reach more rapidly the critical size of the network and to prompt network externalities allowing for the market diffusion of and, thus, an effective transition to the new energy system.Economics of regulation ; network economics ; technological change ; energy economics ; hydrogen ; electricity ; natural gas

NEW TECHNIQUES APPLIED IN ECONOMICS. ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK

The present paper has the objective to inform the public regarding the use of new techniques for the modeling, simulate and forecast of system from different field of activity. One of those techniques is Artificial Neural Network, one of the artificial inartificial neural network, economics, simulate, artificial intelligence

Networks and economic policy

Abstract Over the past two decades, economists have made significant advances in understanding how networks affect individual behaviour and shape aggregate outcomes. We argue that insights from network economics can play an important role in the design of economic policy. Focusing on six policy domains, we show that network economics not only deepens our understanding of existing policy concerns but also suggests a number of new policy questions. In each of these policy areas, we evaluate the availability of data and assess the suitability of the network economics toolkit for policy work. We conclude with a discussion of challenges to the adoption of network-based methods in economic policy along with strategies to overcome them.</jats:p

A 10-Gb/s 1024-way-split 100-km long-reach optical-access network

Optical-access networks have been developed to remove the access-network bandwidth bottleneck. However, the current solutions do not adequately address the network economics to provide a truly cost-effective solution. Long-reach optical-access networks introduce a cost-effective solution by connecting the customer directly to the core network, bypassing the metro network, and, hence, removing significant cost. This paper charts the design and development of a 1024-way-split 100-km 10-Gb/s symmetrical network, which experimentally proves the feasibility of long-reach optical-access networks for both the upstream and downstream transmission

On the Guifi.net community network economics

How costs are distributed among the participants is a key question in the management and viability of shared resources. Although all cost-sharing mechanisms are subjective and thus it is eventually up to the participants to accept one or another, some general criteria seem desirable, such as being budget-balanced and that, in any case, a participant pays more when not cooperating with anyone else. In this paper, we analyse the cost-sharing mechanism that the Guifi.net community network has developed and put in practice to split the transit costs among their more than 20 participants for almost a decade. Our results show that the Guifi.net’s cost-sharing mechanism of the external connectivity, which comprises an equal membership fee for each participant plus a proportional distribution of the remaining costs according to the resource consumption, yields a cost assignment similar to the Shapley value. Our analysis also shows that any alternative to the coalition of all participants entails significant total cost increases and detrimental widespread cost allocation.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft