Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers. Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide access to conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other networks to the Internet. However, most of the existing routing protocols for WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most routing protocols for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes are all assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does not hold. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First, it identifies security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and the network layers. Various possibilities of compromising data confidentiality, data integrity, replay attacks and offline cryptanalysis are also discussed. Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network layers are discussed. After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC and the network layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms for these attacks.Comment: 44 pages, 17 figures, 5 table

Social-aware hybrid mobile offloading

Mobile offloading is a promising technique to aid the constrained resources of a mobile device. By offloading a computational task, a device can save energy and increase the performance of the mobile applications. Unfortunately, in existing offloading systems, the opportunistic moments to offload a task are often sporadic and short-lived. We overcome this problem by proposing a social-aware hybrid offloading system (HyMobi), which increases the spectrum of offloading opportunities. As a mobile device is always co- located to at least one source of network infrastructure throughout of the day, by merging cloudlet, device-to-device and remote cloud offloading, we increase the availability of offloading support. Integrating these systems is not trivial. In order to keep such coupling, a strong social catalyst is required to foster user's participation and collaboration. Thus, we equip our system with an incentive mechanism based on credit and reputation, which exploits users' social aspects to create offload communities. We evaluate our system under controlled and in-the-wild scenarios. With credit, it is possible for a device to create opportunistic moments based on user's present need. As a result, we extended the widely used opportunistic model with a long-term perspective that significantly improves the offloading process and encourages unsupervised offloading adoption in the wild

Trust model for certificate revocation in Ad hoc networks

In this paper we propose a distributed trust model for certificate revocation in Adhoc networks. The proposed model allows trust to be built over time as the number of interactions between nodes increase. Furthermore, trust in a node is defined not only in terms of its potential for maliciousness, but also in terms of the quality of the service it provides. Trust in nodes where there is little or no history of interactions is determined by recommendations from other nodes. If the nodes in the network are selfish, trust is obtained by an exchange of portfolios. Bayesian networks form the underlying basis for this model

Offloading in Software Defined Network at Edge with Information Asymmetry: A Contract Theoretical Approach

The proliferation of highly capable mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets has significantly increased the demand for wireless access. Software defined network (SDN) at edge is viewed as one promising technology to simplify the traffic offloading process for current wireless networks. In this paper, we investigate the incentive problem in SDN-at-edge of how to motivate a third party access points (APs) such as WiFi and smallcells to offload traffic for the central base stations (BSs). The APs will only admit the traffic from the BS under the precondition that their own traffic demand is satisfied. Under the information asymmetry that the APs know more about own traffic demands, the BS needs to distribute the payment in accordance with the APs' idle capacity to maintain a compatible incentive. First, we apply a contract-theoretic approach to model and analyze the service trading between the BS and APs. Furthermore, other two incentive mechanisms: optimal discrimination contract and linear pricing contract are introduced to serve as the comparisons of the anti adverse selection contract. Finally, the simulation results show that the contract can effectively incentivize APs' participation and offload the cellular network traffic. Furthermore, the anti adverse selection contract achieves the optimal outcome under the information asymmetry scenario.Comment: 10 pages, 9 figure