Cryptanalysis of two mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is appearing as a favorite technology for automated identification, which can be widely applied to many applications such as e-passport, supply chain management and ticketing. However, researchers have found many security and privacy problems along RFID technology. In recent years, many researchers are interested in RFID authentication protocols and their security flaws. In this paper, we analyze two of the newest RFID authentication protocols which proposed by Fu et al. and Li et al. from several security viewpoints. We present different attacks such as desynchronization attack and privacy analysis over these protocols.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, 1 table, International Journal of Distributed and Parallel system

Radio Frequency Identification Technology: Applications, Technical Challenges and Strategies

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to discuss the technology behind RFID systems, identify the applications of RFID in various industries, and discuss the technical challenges of RFID implementation and the corresponding strategies to overcome those challenges. Design/methodology/approach - Comprehensive literature review and integration of the findings from literature. Findings - Technical challenges of RFID implementation include tag cost, standards, tag and reader selection, data management, systems integration and security. The corresponding solution is suggested for each challenge. Research limitations/implications - A survey type research is needed to validate the results. Practical implications - This research offers useful technical guidance for companies which plan to implement RFID and we expect it to provide the motivation for much future research in this area. Originality/value - As the infancy of RFID applications, few researches have existed to address the technical issues of RFID implementation. Our research filled this gap

Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low Cost RFID Tags

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology one of the most promising technologies in the field of ubiquitous computing. Indeed, RFID technology may well replace barcode technology. Although it offers many advantages over other identification systems, there are also associated security risks that are not easy to be addressed. When designing a real lightweight authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags, a number of challenges arise due to the extremely limited computational, storage and communication abilities of Low-cost RFID tags. This paper proposes a real mutual authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags. The proposed protocol prevents passive attacks as active attacks are discounted when designing a protocol to meet the requirements of low cost RFID tags. However the implementation of the protocol meets the limited abilities of low cost RFID tags.Comment: 11 Pages, IJNS

Privacy Guaranteed Mutual Authentication on EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2 Scheme

Concerning the security weakness of EPC scheme especially on privacy concerned applications, an anonymous mutual authentication protocol is proposed for light-weight security inauguration on Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID (EPC C1G2) scheme. By utilizing the existing functions and memory bank of tag, we amend the processing sequence based on current EPC architecture. And an auto-updating index number IDS is enrolled to provide privacy protection to EPC code. A light weight encryption algorithm utilizing tagpsilas existing PRNG and keys are introduced for mutual authentication. Several attacks to the RFID solutions can be effectively resolved through our improvement.published_or_final_versio

PGMAP: a privacy guaranteed mutual authentication protocol conforming to EPC class 1 gen 2 standards

To resolve the security vulnerabilities and comply with EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID (EPC C1G2) Standard at the same time, we present a Privacy Guaranteed Mutual Authentication Protocol (PGMAP). By utilizing the existing functions and memory bank of tag, we amend the processing sequence based on current EPC architecture. An auto-updating index number IDS is enrolled to provide privacy protection to EPC code and a set of light weight algorithms utilizing tag's PRNG are added for authentication. Several attacks to the existing security solutions can be effectively resolved in our protocol. © 2008 IEEE.published_or_final_versionThe IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE 2008), Xi'an, China, 22-24 October 2008. In Proceedings of ICEBE, 2008, p. 289-29

On the Privacy of Two Tag Ownership Transfer Protocols for RFIDs

In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID tag ownership transfer protocols are investigated against the tag owners as adversaries. The first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides a privacy-preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-based authentication with public key encryption. However, our passive attack on this protocol shows that any legitimate owner which has been the owner of a specific tag is able to trace it either in the past or in the future. Tracing the tag is also possible via an active attack for any adversary who is able to tamper the tag and extract its information. The second protocol called, Chen et al.'s protocol, is an ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which conforms EPC Class1 Generation2 standard. Our attack on this protocol shows that the previous owners of a particular tag are able to trace it in future. Furthermore, they are able even to obtain the tag's secret information at any time in the future which makes them capable of impersonating the tag