A semantics for open normal defaults via a modified preferential approach

We present a new approach for handling open normal defaults that makes it possible 1. to derive existentially quantified formulae from other existentially quantified formulae by default, 2. to derive universally quantified formulae by default, and 3. to treat cardinality formulae analogously to other formulae. This was not the case for previous approaches. Reiter uses Skolemization in his treatment of open defaults to achieve the first goal, but this has the unpleasant side-effect that logically equivalent facts may lead to different default consequences. In addition, Reiter\u27s approach does not comply with our second requirement. Lifschitz\u27s main motivation for his approach was to satisfy this second demand. However, to achieve this goal he has to violate the third requirement, and the first condition is also not observed. Differing from these two previous approaches, we will not view open defaults as schemata for certain instantiated defaults. Instead they will be used to define a preference relation on models. But unlike the usual approaches to preferential semantics we shall not always take the minimal models to construct our semantics. Due to this new treatment of preference relations the resulting nonmonotonic consequence operator has nice proof-theoretic properties such as cumulativity

Labelled tableaux for nonmonotonic reasoning: Cumulative consequence relations

In this paper we present a labelled proof method for computing nonmonotonic consequence relations in a conditional logic setting. The method exploits the strong connection between these deductive relations and conditional logics, and it is based on the usual possible world semantics devised for the latter. The label formalism KEM, introduced to account for the semantics of normal modal logics, is easily adapted to the semantics of conditional logic by simply indexing labels with formulas. The basic inference rules are provided by the propositional system KE+ - a tableau-like analytic proof system devised to be used both as a refutation method and a direct method of proof - that is the classical core of KEM which is thus enlarged with suitable elimination rules for the conditional connective. The resulting algorithmic framework is able to compute cumulative consequence relations in so far as they can be expressed as conditional implications

Applications of Intuitionistic Logic in Answer Set Programming

We present some applications of intermediate logics in the field of Answer Set Programming (ASP). A brief, but comprehensive introduction to the answer set semantics, intuitionistic and other intermediate logics is given. Some equivalence notions and their applications are discussed. Some results on intermediate logics are shown, and applied later to prove properties of answer sets. A characterization of answer sets for logic programs with nested expressions is provided in terms of intuitionistic provability, generalizing a recent result given by Pearce. It is known that the answer set semantics for logic programs with nested expressions may select non-minimal models. Minimal models can be very important in some applications, therefore we studied them; in particular we obtain a characterization, in terms of intuitionistic logic, of answer sets which are also minimal models. We show that the logic G3 characterizes the notion of strong equivalence between programs under the semantic induced by these models. Finally we discuss possible applications and consequences of our results. They clearly state interesting links between ASP and intermediate logics, which might bring research in these two areas together.Comment: 30 pages, Under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic Programmin

A semantics for open normal defaults via a modified preferential approach

We present a new approach for handling open normal defaults that makes it possible 1. to derive existentially quantified formulae from other existentially quantified formulae by default, 2. to derive universally quantified formulae by default, and 3. to treat cardinality formulae analogously to other formulae. This was not the case for previous approaches. Reiter uses Skolemization in his treatment of open defaults to achieve the first goal, but this has the unpleasant side-effect that logically equivalent facts may lead to different default consequences. In addition, Reiter's approach does not comply with our second requirement. Lifschitz's main motivation for his approach was to satisfy this second demand. However, to achieve this goal he has to violate the third requirement, and the first condition is also not observed. Differing from these two previous approaches, we will not view open defaults as schemata for certain instantiated defaults. Instead they will be used to define a preference relation on models. But unlike the usual approaches to preferential semantics we shall not always take the minimal models to construct our semantics. Due to this new treatment of preference relations the resulting nonmonotonic consequence operator has nice proof-theoretic properties such as cumulativity

Paranormal modal logic – Part I. The system K? and the foundations of the logic of skeptical and credulous plausibility

In this two-parts paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility

Belief revision and default reasoning : syntax-based approaches

Belief revision leads to temporal nonmonotonicity, i.e., the set of beliefs does not grow monotonically with time. Default reasoning leads to logical nonmonotonicity, i.e., the set of consequences does not grow monotonically with the set of premises. The connection between these forms of nonmonotonicity will be studied in this paper focusing on syntax-based approaches. It is shown that a general form of syntax-based belief revision corresponds to a special kind of partial meet revision in the sense of variants of logics for default reasoning. Additionally, the computational complexity of the membership problem in revised belief sets and of the equivalent problem of derivability in default logics is analyzed, which turns out to be located at the lower end of the polynomial hierarchy