12,464 research outputs found

    From Parallel Sequence Representations to Calligraphic Control: A Conspiracy of Neural Circuits

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    Calligraphic writing presents a rich set of challenges to the human movement control system. These challenges include: initial learning, and recall from memory, of prescribed stroke sequences; critical timing of stroke onsets and durations; fine control of grip and contact forces; and letter-form invariance under voluntary size scaling, which entails fine control of stroke direction and amplitude during recruitment and derecruitment of musculoskeletal degrees of freedom. Experimental and computational studies in behavioral neuroscience have made rapid progress toward explaining the learning, planning and contTOl exercised in tasks that share features with calligraphic writing and drawing. This article summarizes computational neuroscience models and related neurobiological data that reveal critical operations spanning from parallel sequence representations to fine force control. Part one addresses stroke sequencing. It treats competitive queuing (CQ) models of sequence representation, performance, learning, and recall. Part two addresses letter size scaling and motor equivalence. It treats cursive handwriting models together with models in which sensory-motor tmnsformations are performed by circuits that learn inverse differential kinematic mappings. Part three addresses fine-grained control of timing and transient forces, by treating circuit models that learn to solve inverse dynamics problems.National Institutes of Health (R01 DC02852

    Adaptive intermittent control: A computational model explaining motor intermittency observed in human behavior

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    It is a fundamental question how our brain performs a given motor task in a real-time fashion with the slow sensorimotor system. Computational theory proposed an influential idea of feed-forward control, but it has mainly treated the case that the movement is ballistic (such as reaching) because the motor commands should be calculated in advance of movement execution. As a possible mechanism for operating feed-forward control in continuous motor tasks (such as target tracking), we propose a control model called "adaptive intermittent control" or "segmented control," that brain adaptively divides the continuous time axis into discrete segments and executes feed-forward control in each segment. The idea of intermittent control has been proposed in the fields of control theory, biological modeling and nonlinear dynamical system. Compared with these previous models, the key of the proposed model is that the system speculatively determines the segmentation based on the future prediction and its uncertainty. The result of computer simulation showed that the proposed model realized faithful visuo-manual tracking with realistic sensorimotor delays and with less computational costs (i.e., with fewer number of segments). Furthermore, it replicated "motor intermittency", that is, intermittent discontinuities commonly observed in human movement trajectories. We discuss that the temporally segmented control is an inevitable strategy for brain which has to achieve a given task with small computational (or cognitive) cost, using a slow control system in an uncertain variable environment, and the motor intermittency is the side-effect of this strategy

    Probabilistic Models of Motor Production

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    N. Bernstein defined the ability of the central neural system (CNS) to control many degrees of freedom of a physical body with all its redundancy and flexibility as the main problem in motor control. He pointed at that man-made mechanisms usually have one, sometimes two degrees of freedom (DOF); when the number of DOF increases further, it becomes prohibitively hard to control them. The brain, however, seems to perform such control effortlessly. He suggested the way the brain might deal with it: when a motor skill is being acquired, the brain artificially limits the degrees of freedoms, leaving only one or two. As the skill level increases, the brain gradually "frees" the previously fixed DOF, applying control when needed and in directions which have to be corrected, eventually arriving to the control scheme where all the DOF are "free". This approach of reducing the dimensionality of motor control remains relevant even today. One the possibles solutions of the Bernstetin's problem is the hypothesis of motor primitives (MPs) - small building blocks that constitute complex movements and facilitite motor learnirng and task completion. Just like in the visual system, having a homogenious hierarchical architecture built of similar computational elements may be beneficial. Studying such a complicated object as brain, it is important to define at which level of details one works and which questions one aims to answer. David Marr suggested three levels of analysis: 1. computational, analysing which problem the system solves; 2. algorithmic, questioning which representation the system uses and which computations it performs; 3. implementational, finding how such computations are performed by neurons in the brain. In this thesis we stay at the first two levels, seeking for the basic representation of motor output. In this work we present a new model of motor primitives that comprises multiple interacting latent dynamical systems, and give it a full Bayesian treatment. Modelling within the Bayesian framework, in my opinion, must become the new standard in hypothesis testing in neuroscience. Only the Bayesian framework gives us guarantees when dealing with the inevitable plethora of hidden variables and uncertainty. The special type of coupling of dynamical systems we proposed, based on the Product of Experts, has many natural interpretations in the Bayesian framework. If the dynamical systems run in parallel, it yields Bayesian cue integration. If they are organized hierarchically due to serial coupling, we get hierarchical priors over the dynamics. If one of the dynamical systems represents sensory state, we arrive to the sensory-motor primitives. The compact representation that follows from the variational treatment allows learning of a motor primitives library. Learned separately, combined motion can be represented as a matrix of coupling values. We performed a set of experiments to compare different models of motor primitives. In a series of 2-alternative forced choice (2AFC) experiments participants were discriminating natural and synthesised movements, thus running a graphics Turing test. When available, Bayesian model score predicted the naturalness of the perceived movements. For simple movements, like walking, Bayesian model comparison and psychophysics tests indicate that one dynamical system is sufficient to describe the data. For more complex movements, like walking and waving, motion can be better represented as a set of coupled dynamical systems. We also experimentally confirmed that Bayesian treatment of model learning on motion data is superior to the simple point estimate of latent parameters. Experiments with non-periodic movements show that they do not benefit from more complex latent dynamics, despite having high kinematic complexity. By having a fully Bayesian models, we could quantitatively disentangle the influence of motion dynamics and pose on the perception of naturalness. We confirmed that rich and correct dynamics is more important than the kinematic representation. There are numerous further directions of research. In the models we devised, for multiple parts, even though the latent dynamics was factorized on a set of interacting systems, the kinematic parts were completely independent. Thus, interaction between the kinematic parts could be mediated only by the latent dynamics interactions. A more flexible model would allow a dense interaction on the kinematic level too. Another important problem relates to the representation of time in Markov chains. Discrete time Markov chains form an approximation to continuous dynamics. As time step is assumed to be fixed, we face with the problem of time step selection. Time is also not a explicit parameter in Markov chains. This also prohibits explicit optimization of time as parameter and reasoning (inference) about it. For example, in optimal control boundary conditions are usually set at exact time points, which is not an ecological scenario, where time is usually a parameter of optimization. Making time an explicit parameter in dynamics may alleviate this

    Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self-Location

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    At the phenomenal level, consciousness arises in a consistently coherent fashion as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness (subjectivity) with explicitly orientational characteristics—that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain. Understanding these twin elements of consciousness begins with the recognition that ultimately (and most primitively), cognitive systems serve the biological self-regulatory regime in which they subsist. The psychological structures supporting self-located subjectivity involve an evolutionary elaboration of the two basic elements necessary for extending self-regulation into behavioral interaction with the environment: an orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing interaction in terms of controllable spatiotemporal parameters, and processing architecture that relates behavior to homeostatic needs via feedback. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged the emergence of anticipative feedforward processing mechanisms, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive self-locational schema processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness-as-subjectivity

    Learning and Acting in Peripersonal Space: Moving, Reaching, and Grasping

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    The young infant explores its body, its sensorimotor system, and the immediately accessible parts of its environment, over the course of a few months creating a model of peripersonal space useful for reaching and grasping objects around it. Drawing on constraints from the empirical literature on infant behavior, we present a preliminary computational model of this learning process, implemented and evaluated on a physical robot. The learning agent explores the relationship between the configuration space of the arm, sensing joint angles through proprioception, and its visual perceptions of the hand and grippers. The resulting knowledge is represented as the peripersonal space (PPS) graph, where nodes represent states of the arm, edges represent safe movements, and paths represent safe trajectories from one pose to another. In our model, the learning process is driven by intrinsic motivation. When repeatedly performing an action, the agent learns the typical result, but also detects unusual outcomes, and is motivated to learn how to make those unusual results reliable. Arm motions typically leave the static background unchanged, but occasionally bump an object, changing its static position. The reach action is learned as a reliable way to bump and move an object in the environment. Similarly, once a reliable reach action is learned, it typically makes a quasi-static change in the environment, moving an object from one static position to another. The unusual outcome is that the object is accidentally grasped (thanks to the innate Palmar reflex), and thereafter moves dynamically with the hand. Learning to make grasps reliable is more complex than for reaches, but we demonstrate significant progress. Our current results are steps toward autonomous sensorimotor learning of motion, reaching, and grasping in peripersonal space, based on unguided exploration and intrinsic motivation.Comment: 35 pages, 13 figure
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