Bibliography of Research Litera ture on Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)

This bibliography lists a diversity of publications related to Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). This voting method is a particular type of Single Transferable Vote (STV), applied in single-seat elections. It is a sequential elimination voting procedure, and due to the use of ranked-ordered ballots, it belongs to the group of preferential-voting methods. It is also called Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) or Alternative Vote. One set of publications included in this bibliography is concerned with the impact of IRV, or runoff methods in general, on the party system, candidate behavior, voter choice, and minority representation. In particular, some authors compare the complexity of the system, and the incentives for strategic voter choice, and cooperation between candidates, relative to alternative methods. Another set of publications deals with the experience of several countries with the use of IRV –such as Australia, Fiji, and New Guinea, with some scholars focusing specifically on the encouragement of inter-ethnic cooperation and minority inclusion in divided societies, and on the moderation-character of policy outcomes. Finally, an additional group of publications considers the need for electoral reform in the US, and evaluates the adoption and results of the use of IRV in recent elections in the city of San Francisco. The selection criteria for inclusion in this bibliography was being a published book or peer reviewed article, making a significant contribution to the understanding of the voting system, by either studying its properties, its advantages and disadvantages relative to alternative methods, or providing evidence of its performance in real world situations

A Majority Rule Philosophy for Instant Runoff Voting

We present the concept of ordered majority rule, a property of Instant Runoff Voting, and compare it to the familiar concept of pairwise majority rule of Condorcet methods. Ordered majority rule establishes a social order among the candidates such that that relative order between any two candidates is determined by voters who do not prefer another major candidate. It ensures the election of a candidate from the majority party or coalition while preventing an antagonistic opposition party or coalition from influencing which candidate that may be. We show how IRV is the only voting method to satisfy ordered majority rule, for a self-consistently determined distinction between major and minor candidates, and that ordered majority rule is incompatible with the properties of Condorcet compliance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and monotonicity. Finally, we present some arguments as to why ordered majority rule may be preferable to pairwise majority rule, using the 2022 Alaska special congressional election as a case study.Comment: 11 page

Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric weights. We propose proportional representation axioms and clarify how they fit into other preference aggregation settings, such as multi-winner voting and approval-based multi-winner voting. As a result of our study, we also discover a new solution concept for approval-based multi-winner voting, which we call Inclusion PSC (IPSC). IPSC is stronger than proportional justified representation (PJR), incomparable to extended justified representation (EJR), and yet compatible with EJR. The well-studied Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule produces a committee that satisfies both EJR and IPSC; however, both these axioms can also be satisfied by an algorithm that runs in polynomial-time

Strategic voting and nomination

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs.strategic voting; tactical voting; strategic nomination; Condorcet; alternative vote; Borda count; approval voting

Strategic voting and nomination

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs

Strategic voting and nomination

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs