We present the concept of ordered majority rule, a property of Instant Runoff
Voting, and compare it to the familiar concept of pairwise majority rule of
Condorcet methods. Ordered majority rule establishes a social order among the
candidates such that that relative order between any two candidates is
determined by voters who do not prefer another major candidate. It ensures the
election of a candidate from the majority party or coalition while preventing
an antagonistic opposition party or coalition from influencing which candidate
that may be. We show how IRV is the only voting method to satisfy ordered
majority rule, for a self-consistently determined distinction between major and
minor candidates, and that ordered majority rule is incompatible with the
properties of Condorcet compliance, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and monotonicity. Finally, we present some arguments as to why ordered majority
rule may be preferable to pairwise majority rule, using the 2022 Alaska special
congressional election as a case study.Comment: 11 page