Modular, Fully-abstract Compilation by Approximate Back-translation

A compiler is fully-abstract if the compilation from source language programs to target language programs reflects and preserves behavioural equivalence. Such compilers have important security benefits, as they limit the power of an attacker interacting with the program in the target language to that of an attacker interacting with the program in the source language. Proving compiler full-abstraction is, however, rather complicated. A common proof technique is based on the back-translation of target-level program contexts to behaviourally-equivalent source-level contexts. However, constructing such a back- translation is problematic when the source language is not strong enough to embed an encoding of the target language. For instance, when compiling from STLC to ULC, the lack of recursive types in the former prevents such a back-translation. We propose a general and elegant solution for this problem. The key insight is that it suffices to construct an approximate back-translation. The approximation is only accurate up to a certain number of steps and conservative beyond that, in the sense that the context generated by the back-translation may diverge when the original would not, but not vice versa. Based on this insight, we describe a general technique for proving compiler full-abstraction and demonstrate it on a compiler from STLC to ULC. The proof uses asymmetric cross-language logical relations and makes innovative use of step-indexing to express the relation between a context and its approximate back-translation. The proof extends easily to common compiler patterns such as modular compilation and it, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first compiler full abstraction proof to have been fully mechanised in Coq. We believe this proof technique can scale to challenging settings and enable simpler, more scalable proofs of compiler full-abstraction

Beyond Good and Evil: Formalizing the Security Guarantees of Compartmentalizing Compilation

Compartmentalization is good security-engineering practice. By breaking a large software system into mutually distrustful components that run with minimal privileges, restricting their interactions to conform to well-defined interfaces, we can limit the damage caused by low-level attacks such as control-flow hijacking. When used to defend against such attacks, compartmentalization is often implemented cooperatively by a compiler and a low-level compartmentalization mechanism. However, the formal guarantees provided by such compartmentalizing compilation have seen surprisingly little investigation. We propose a new security property, secure compartmentalizing compilation (SCC), that formally characterizes the guarantees provided by compartmentalizing compilation and clarifies its attacker model. We reconstruct our property by starting from the well-established notion of fully abstract compilation, then identifying and lifting three important limitations that make standard full abstraction unsuitable for compartmentalization. The connection to full abstraction allows us to prove SCC by adapting established proof techniques; we illustrate this with a compiler from a simple unsafe imperative language with procedures to a compartmentalized abstract machine.Comment: Nit

CapablePtrs: Securely Compiling Partial Programs using the Pointers-as-Capabilities Principle

Capability machines such as CHERI provide memory capabilities that can be used by compilers to provide security benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory safety). The C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety by following a principle called "pointers as capabilities" (PAC). Informally, PAC says that a compiler should represent a source language pointer as a machine code capability. But the security properties of PAC compilers are not yet well understood. We show that memory safety is only one aspect, and that PAC compilers can provide significant additional security guarantees for partial programs: the compiler can provide guarantees for a compilation unit, even if that compilation unit is later linked to attacker-controlled machine code. This paper is the first to study the security of PAC compilers for partial programs formally. We prove for a model of such a compiler that it is fully abstract. The proof uses a novel proof technique (dubbed TrICL, read trickle), which is of broad interest because it reuses and extends the compiler correctness relation in a natural way, as we demonstrate. We implement our compiler on top of the CHERI platform and show that it can compile legacy C code with minimal code changes. We provide performance benchmarks that show how performance overhead is proportional to the number of cross-compilation-unit function calls

On the Semantic Expressiveness of Iso- and Equi-Recursive Types

Recursive types extend the simply-typed lambda calculus (STLC) with the additional expressive power to enable diverging computation and to encode recursive data-types (e.g., lists). Two formulations of recursive types exist: iso-recursive and equi-recursive. The relative advantages of iso- and equi-recursion are well-studied when it comes to their impact on type-inference. However, the relative semantic expressiveness of the two formulations remains unclear so far. This paper studies the semantic expressiveness of STLC with iso- and equi-recursive types, proving that these formulations are equally expressive. In fact, we prove that they are both as expressive as STLC with only term-level recursion. We phrase these equi-expressiveness results in terms of full abstraction of three canonical compilers between these three languages (STLC with iso-, with equi-recursive types and with term-level recursion). Our choice of languages allows us to study expressiveness when interacting over both a simply-typed and a recursively-typed interface. The three proofs all rely on a typed version of a proof technique called approximate backtranslation. Together, our results show that there is no difference in semantic expressiveness between STLCs with iso- and equi-recursive types. In this paper, we focus on a simply-typed setting but we believe our results scale to more powerful type systems like System F

In defense of compilation: A response to Davis' form and content in model-based reasoning

In a recent paper entitled 'Form and Content in Model Based Reasoning', Randy Davis argues that model based reasoning research aimed at compiling task specific rules from underlying device models is mislabeled, misguided, and diversionary. Some of Davis' claims are examined and his basic conclusions are challenged about the value of compilation research to the model based reasoning community. In particular, Davis' claim is refuted that model based reasoning is exempt from the efficiency benefits provided by knowledge compilation techniques. In addition, several misconceptions are clarified about the role of representational form in compilation. It is concluded that techniques have the potential to make a substantial contribution to solving tractability problems in model based reasoning

A generic, context sensitive analysis framework for object oriented programs

Abstract interpreters rely on the existence of a nxpoint algorithm that calculates a least upper bound approximation of the semantics of the program. Usually, that algorithm is described in terms of the particular language in study and therefore it is not directly applicable to programs written in a different source language. In this paper we introduce a generic, block-based, and uniform representation of the program control flow graph and a language-independent nxpoint algorithm that can be applied to a variety of languages and, in particular, Java. Two major characteristics of our approach are accuracy (obtained through a topdown, context sensitive approach) and reasonable efficiency (achieved by means of memoization and dependency tracking techniques). We have also implemented the proposed framework and show some initial experimental results for standard benchmarks, which further support the feasibility of the solution adopted

Universal Composability is Secure Compilation

Universal composability is a framework for the specification and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a strong compositionality guarantee: UC protocols are secure even when composed with other protocols. Secure compilation tells whether compiled programs are as secure as their source-level counterparts, no matter what target-level code they interact with. These two disciplines are studied in isolation, but we believe there is a deeper connection between them with benefits from both worlds to reap. This paper outlines the connection between universal composability and robust compilation, the latest of secure compilation theories. We show how to read the universal composability theorem in terms of a robust compilation theorem and vice-versa. This, in turn, shows which elements of one theory corresponds to which element in the other theory. We believe this is the first step towards understanding how can secure compilation theories be used in universal composability settings and vice-versa