Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment

In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. \ud To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed

A Multiresolution Stochastic Process Model for Predicting Basketball Possession Outcomes

Basketball games evolve continuously in space and time as players constantly interact with their teammates, the opposing team, and the ball. However, current analyses of basketball outcomes rely on discretized summaries of the game that reduce such interactions to tallies of points, assists, and similar events. In this paper, we propose a framework for using optical player tracking data to estimate, in real time, the expected number of points obtained by the end of a possession. This quantity, called \textit{expected possession value} (EPV), derives from a stochastic process model for the evolution of a basketball possession; we model this process at multiple levels of resolution, differentiating between continuous, infinitesimal movements of players, and discrete events such as shot attempts and turnovers. Transition kernels are estimated using hierarchical spatiotemporal models that share information across players while remaining computationally tractable on very large data sets. In addition to estimating EPV, these models reveal novel insights on players' decision-making tendencies as a function of their spatial strategy.Comment: 31 pages, 9 figure