Modeling an Asynchronous Circuit Dedicated to the Protection Against Physical Attacks

Asynchronous circuits have several advantages for security applications, in particular their good resistance to attacks. In this paper, we report on experiments with modeling, at various abstraction levels, a patented asynchronous circuit for detecting physical attacks, such as cutting wires or producing short-circuits.Comment: In Proceedings MARS 2020, arXiv:2004.1240

On Borrowed Time -- Preventing Static Power Side-Channel Analysis

In recent years, static power side-channel analysis attacks have emerged as a serious threat to cryptographic implementations, overcoming state-of-the-art countermeasures against side-channel attacks. The continued down-scaling of semiconductor process technology, which results in an increase of the relative weight of static power in the total power budget of circuits, will only improve the viability of static power side-channel analysis attacks. Yet, despite the threat posed, limited work has been invested into mitigating this class of attack. In this work we address this gap. We observe that static power side-channel analysis relies on stopping the target circuit's clock over a prolonged period, during which the circuit holds secret information in its registers. We propose Borrowed Time, a countermeasure that hinders an attacker's ability to leverage such clock control. Borrowed Time detects a stopped clock and triggers a reset that wipes any registers containing sensitive intermediates, whose leakages would otherwise be exploitable. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our countermeasure by performing practical Correlation Power Analysis attacks under optimal conditions against an AES implementation on an FPGA target with and without our countermeasure in place. In the unprotected case, we can recover the entire secret key using traces from 1,500 encryptions. Under the same conditions, the protected implementation successfully prevents key recovery even with traces from 1,000,000 encryptions

Industrial networks and IIoT: Now and future trends

Connectivity is the one word summary for Industry 4.0 revolution. The importance of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT) have been increased dramatically with the rise of industrialization and industry 4.0. As new opportunities bring their own challenges, with the massive interconnected devices of the IIoT, cyber security of those networks and privacy of their users have become an important aspect. Specifically, intrusion detection for industrial networks (IIoT) has great importance. For instance, it is a key factor in improving the safe operation of the smart grid systems yet protecting the privacy of the consumers at the same time. In the same manner, data streaming is a valid option when the analysis is to be pushed from the cloud to the fog for industrial networks to provide agile response, since it brings the advantage of fast action on intrusion detection and also can buy time for intrusion mitigation. In order to dive deep in industrial networks, basic ground needs to be settled. Hence, this chapter serves in this manner, by presenting basic and emerging technologies along with ideas and discussions: First, an introduction of semiconductor evolution is provided along with the up-to-date hi-tech wired/wireless communication solutions for industrial networks. This is followed by a thorough representation of future trends in industrial environments. More importantly, enabling technologies for industrial networks is also presented. Finally, the chapter is concluded with a summary of the presentations along with future projections of IIoT networks

Side-channel Analysis of Subscriber Identity Modules

Subscriber identity modules (SIMs) contain useful forensic data but are often locked with a PIN code that restricts access to this data. If an invalid PIN is entered several times, the card locks and may even destroy its stored data. This presents a challenge to the retrieval of data from the SIM when the PIN is unknown. The field of side-channel analysis (SCA) collects, identifies, and processes information leaked via inadvertent channels. One promising side-channel leakage is that of electromagnetic (EM) emanations; by monitoring the SIM\u27s emissions, it may be possible to determine the correct PIN to unlock the card. This thesis uses EM SCA techniques to attempt to discover the SIM card\u27s PIN. The tested SIM is subjected to simple and differential electromagnetic analysis. No clear data dependency or correlation is apparent. The SIM does reveal information pertaining to its validation routine, but the value of the card\u27s stored PIN does not appear to leak via EM emissions. Two factors contributing to this result are the black-box nature of PIN validation and the hardware and software SCA countermeasures. Further experimentation on SIMs with known operational characteristics is recommended to determine the viability of future SCA attacks on these devices

D2.1 - Report on Selected TRNG and PUF Principles

This report represents the final version of Deliverable 2.1 of the HECTOR work package WP2. It is a result of discussions and work on Task 2.1 of all HECTOR partners involved in WP2. The aim of the Deliverable 2.1 is to select principles of random number generators (RNGs) and physical unclonable functions (PUFs) that fulfill strict technology, design and security criteria. For example, the selected RNGs must be suitable for implementation in logic devices according to the German AIS20/31 standard. Correspondingly, the selected PUFs must be suitable for applying similar security approach. A standard PUF evaluation approach does not exist, yet, but it should be proposed in the framework of the project. Selected RNGs and PUFs should be then thoroughly evaluated from the point of view of security and the most suitable principles should be implemented in logic devices, such as Field Programmable Logic Arrays (FPGAs) and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) during the next phases of the project