Economics of sociality

Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die grundlegenden Mechanismen kooperativen sowie kompetitiven Verhaltens zu erläutern. Da gerade in den letzten Jahren vermehrt versucht wurde, Ergebnisse verhaltensökonomischer Studien auch anhand evolutionsbiologischer Hypothesen über das Verhalten von Menschen zu erklären, werden in einem ersten Schritt die Grundannahmen der evolutionären Biologie und Anthropologie über das Entstehen und die Entwicklung kooperativer Verhaltensmuster aufgeführt. Da die Organisationsstruktur der Gruppe substanziellen Ein&uss auf die adaptierten sozialen und kompetitiven Verhaltensstrategien von Individuen nimmt, wird des weiteren ein besonderer Fokus auf die Evolution hierarchischer Strukturen, sowohl beim Menschen, als auch bei nicht menschlichen Primaten, gelegt. Die folgende Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse verhaltensökonomischer Studien über das Entstehen und die Charakteristika sozialer Präferenzen komplettiert den Stand der Forschung und erlaubt eine kritische Evaluation der heutigen Sichtweise kooperativen Verhaltens. Hierdurch ist es möglich einige strukturelle Fehler der experimentellen Forschung, sowie mögliche Fehlinterpretationen kooperativer Verhaltensstrategien aufzudecken. Es zeigt sich, dass die interdisziplinäre Orientierung der verhaltensökonomischen Forschung über soziale Präferenzen diverse Probleme mit sich bringt. Ein kurzer Exkurs in die aktuellen Fragestellungen der Forschung zum sozio-ökonomischen Status, soll auf der einen Seite noch einmal die Wichtigkeit der sozialen Struktur als möglichen Steuerungsmechanismus sozialer Präferenzen herausstellen. Auf der anderen Seite soll hierdurch ein interdisziplinäres Forschungsprojekt, Occupational Ethology (Wallner et al., 2008 ) vorgestellt werden. Ziel dieses Projektes ist es, genau an der Schnittstelle zwischen Kooperation und Wettbewerb in der Hierarchie zu forschen und soziale Strategien und deren Folgen zu erklären.This master thesis aims at providing a more complete understanding of what are the underlying mechanisms of cooperation and competition and the behavioral transition Schritt die Grundannahmen der evolutionären Biologie und Anthropologie über das Entstehen und die Entwicklung kooperativer Verhaltensmuster aufgeführt. Da die Organisationsstruktur der Gruppe substanziellen Ein&uss auf die adaptierten sozialen und kompetitiven Verhaltensstrategien von Individuen nimmt, wird des weiteren ein besonderer Fokus auf die Evolution hierarchischer Strukturen, sowohl beim Menschen, als auch bei nicht menschlichen Primaten, gelegt. Die folgende Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse verhaltensökonomischer Studien über das Entstehen und die Charakteristika sozialer Präferenzen komplettiert den Stand der Forschung und erlaubt eine kritische Evaluation der heutigen Sichtweise kooperativen Verhaltens. Hierdurch ist es möglich einige strukturelle Fehler der experimentellen Forschung, sowie mögliche Fehlinterpretationen kooperativer Verhaltensstrategien aufzudecken. Es zeigt sich, dass die interdisziplinäre Orientierung der verhaltensökonomischen Forschung über soziale Präferenzen diverse Probleme mit sich bringt. Ein kurzer Exkurs in die aktuellen Fragestellungen der Forschung zum sozio-ökonomischen Status, soll auf der einen Seite noch einmal die Wichtigkeit der sozialen Struktur als möglichen Steuerungsmechanismus sozialer Präferenzen herausstellen. Auf der anderen Seite soll hierdurch ein interdisziplinäres Forschungsprojekt, Occupational Ethology (Wallner et al., 2008 ) vorgestellt werden. Ziel dieses Projektes ist es, genau an der Schnittstelle zwischen Kooperation und Wettbewerb in der Hierarchie zu forschen und soziale Strategien und deren Folgen zu erklären

Sexual conflict over parental care in penduline tits

Sexual conflict, the different interests of males and females over reproduction, is a potent evolutionary force. Here I investigate sexual conflict in the context of parental care by focussing on two questions: (i) which behavioural, morphological and environmental traits influence the parents’ decision to care for the brood or desert? (ii) How does sexual conflict influence the evolution of behaviour and morphology? I investigate both questions using a small, polygamous passerine bird, the Eurasian penduline tit Remiz pendulinus, which exhibits intense sexual conflict over parental care such that either the male, the female or both parents desert the clutch. Using detailed behavioural observations during the crucial few days preceding desertion, I argue that it may be in the parents’ best interest to conceal their intention to care for (or desert) their brood. The rapid resulting process that leads to variable parental care resembles a coordination game in which either parent may desert first. I developed a game-theoretical model that suggests that a key to resolving the conflict between parents is the sex difference in reproductive payoffs for given parental care strategies, rather than differences in parental quality per se. Environmental variables (e.g. food availability and mating opportunities) seem only subsidiary in the decision-making process of parents. My final chapter explores ramifications of sexual conflict at an evolutionary timescale. By comparing the highly polygamous Eurasian penduline tit with the monogamous Cape penduline tit, I show that morphological and behavioural differences between these two species are consistent with predictions of sexual conflict theory. During my PhD I also identified that there is considerable variation in breeding systems within different species of penduline tits. I argue that by studying these systems new insights will emerge into (i) the drivers of breeding systems, and (ii) neural and genomic traits that underlie breeding system evolution.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

On the Problem of Sustainable Economic Development: A Theoretical Solution to this Prisoner's Dilemma

This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and a universal theory of value. We introduce axioms which serve as the first of two derivations of our solution, our methods, the origin and evolution of our theory, field notes from Mustique, Iceland, and Prince Edward Island, and set the stage for a more thorough discourse. Next we demonstrate that value (V) is a derivative function of relative insularity (IR): V=f´(IR), then model economic development by dividing the world into geo-political islands: Relatively Insular States (RIS), and Global Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS). Our axioms deduce two opposing development strategies: Maximum Economic Development (MED), and Maximum Ecological Preservation (MEP). We clarify this by applying our Theory of Value within geo-political contexts which reveal divergent, optimizing strategies for GEMS and RIS economic development. We discover GEMS and RIS strategies are antithetical, yet also discover these naturally opposing strategies represent the most tenable, rational solution-set possible. In light of the inherent and inescapable planetary uncertainties our axiom reveal, we discover the optimal RIS strategy = MEP and GEMS = MED. We note our solution represents the Prisoner's Dilemma. We also note, that, ceteris paribus, based upon revealed 20th and 21st century preferences, RIS strategy has been suboptimal/irrational. Strategic Equilibrium is attained when players pursue respective rational, opposing development strategies. Equilibrium, however, offers windfalls: surplus value is created (RIS-driven ecological preservation, and GEMS-driven Global Security and Planetary Protection). In essence, this non-cooperative, strategic equilibrium paves the way for rational, mutually beneficial, cooperative behaviour, and yields surplus ecological and planetary insularities, and thus surplus economic and biologic value: RIS cooperate, form coalitions, and struggle for greater ecological insularity (ecological preservation). At the same time, GEMS fight for economic development and planetary insularity (planetary preservation, i.e. financing national and global defense, extraterrestrial exploration, and solutions to mission-critical, extra-planetary threats to human existence). Furthermore, surplus value is maximized through strategic transparency: If all players recognize the value of respective, opposing, and antithetical, rational strategies, then all players negotiate more rationally, efficiently, and peacefully. We refer to our solution based upon two opposing, rational strategies as The Funk- Zweikampf Solution. Moreover, we demonstrate our solution is as powerful at local and individual levels as it is at the national level, including its use as a tool for strategic decisionmaking under uncertainty and variable insularity. Furthermore, our Theory of Value illuminates an entrenched, systemic, strategic RIS error which reflects the false application of widely misunderstood economic principles, and fundamental constitutional defects which promote The Tragedy of the Commons. Our theory also suggests that it is no coincidence that the island which best exhibits optimal pure RIS economic development strategy (MEP) is the uniquely independent, autonomous, privately-controlled island of Mustique. All RIS, however, may optimize with our counter-intuitive solution through individual, regional, and state coalitions. Furthermore, our Theory of Value promotes self-organization, constitutional amendment, self-sufficiency, independence, and thus places stones along the illusive path to a tenable solution to The Problem of Sustainable Development.Tragedy of the commons; sustainable economic development; island economic development; global threat mitigation; relative insularity; theory of value

Overfishing: an empirical study of fisheries and call for action

Since the 1950s, the capacity of fishing fleets has increased significantly. As a result, there have been frequent cases of overfishing, particularly of some marine species that have not yet recovered. In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international treaty, was adopted and signed. It has led to the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and defined the rights and responsibilities of States with regard to the use of the seas and oceans. The Convention has become the legal framework for marine and maritime activities. However, the lack of stronger agreements leaves a wide range of problems, such as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, a rapidly growing world population, the environment and human degradation. These problems are exacerbated by climate change, ocean warming, and increasing pollution of our marine spaces. One third of the world's fisheries is currently overexploited and calls for a global approach to restore once abundant ocean resources. Through case studies and analysis of the status quo in fisheries management, this thesis aims to provide the reader with an understanding of the multi-faceted anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic issues facing our oceans. Nature-based solutions are available and must be integrated. The institutional framework of Ostrom's institutions provides answers to some of the governance problems.Desde a década de 1950, a capacidade das frotas de pesca aumentou significativamente. Em consequência, registaram-se casos frequentes de sobrepesca, especialmente de algumas espécies marinhas que ainda não recuperaram. Em 1982, foi adoptada e assinada a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (UNCLOS), um tratado internacional. Conduziu à criação de Zonas Económicas Exclusivas (ZEE) e definiu os direitos e responsabilidades dos Estados no que respeita à utilização dos mares e oceanos. No entanto, a falta de acordos mais fortes deixa uma vasta gama de problemas, como a pesca ilegal, não declarada e não regulamentada (IUU), o rápido crescimento da população mundial, o ambiente e a degradação humana. Estes problemas são exacerbados pelas alterações climáticas, pelo aquecimento dos oceanos e pela crescente poluição dos nossos espaços marinhos. Um terço da pesca mundial está actualmente sobreexplorada e exige uma abordagem global para restaurar os abundantes recursos dos oceanos. Através de estudos de caso e análise do status quo na gestão das pescas, esta tese visa proporcionar ao leitor uma compreensão das multifacetadas questões antropogénicas e não antropogénicas que os nossos oceanos enfrentam. Soluções baseadas na natureza estão disponíveis e devem ser integradas. O quadro institucional da Ostrom (1990) fornece respostas para alguns dos problemas de governança

Institutionelle Arrangements im kollektiven Management natürlicher Ressourcen im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam.

In the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam, property rights on water and land change with the seasonally occurring flood. Land is usually cultivated on an individual basis with people holding at least private use rights to the parcels. In contrast, water is a public good and as soon as water covers the individual plots, the streams, lakes and reservoirs are legally accessed by many households using the water for many different purposes. Actually, during wet season, an open access to the water resources is found as the water use is not restricted, meaning that de facto there are no rules in place that govern the water use. This thesis focuses on the institutional arrangements that influence the management of land, water and fisheries in the region. It is assessed how property rights influence the natural resource use and how collective action can contribute to the sustainable management of land and water. The research was conducted in a community-based fish culture project that functions as a reference frame. This aquaculture project was implemented in the Mekong region by the WorldFish Center from 2005 until 2010. The aim was to test, whether community-based aquaculture can increase the food security of local communities. The thesis also addresses the question whether such a community-based approach can be successfully introduced in the described complex system of property rights. The underlying theories for this dissertation are New Institutional Economics and Game theory. As a framework for the analysis the Institutional Analysis and Design Framework (Ostrom 2005b) is used. Further, the dissertation draws upon findings from other scholars in the realm of public goods and common-pool resources. The research uses as a mixed methods approach and contains qualitative as well as quantitative results. In four case study sites, action research was conducted along with the aquaculture project implementation. Further, a socio-economic survey was implemented, providing information about different livelihood aspects of a large amount of households. Based on the findings of both these methods, hypotheses in regard to resource users’ behaviour towards natural resources were elaborated. Those were then tested using the methods of experimental economics. The implementation of the community-based project faced several challenges and the pilot phase was discontinued by most of the villages. The results presented in this thesis show that reasons for this cannot be seen in the low willingness for cooperation of participants, but rather in the underlying property rights on natural resources. Due to a missing legal base as well as other informal regulations, the project members had no possibility to exclude other local users from the project sites and thus to protect their investments in material and fingerlings. Recommendations mainly focus on the decentralisation of land and water management in the region.Die vorliegende Forschung befasst sich mit den institutionellen Arrangements, die die Nutzung und das Management von Land, Wasser und Fischressourcen im Mekong Delta beeinflussen. Es wird untersucht inwieweit Verfügungsrechte und kollektives Handeln die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung in der Region beeinflussen. Für die Mehrheit der Kambodschaner und Vietnamesen spielt der Zugang zu natürlichen Ressourcen wie Land, Wasser und Fischbeständen eine bedeutende Rolle. Die formellen und informellen Regeln, die den Zugang zu und die Nutzung von diesen natürlichen Ressourcen auf lokaler Ebene regeln stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit. Im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam wechseln die Verfügungsrechte an Wasser und Land mit der halbjährlichen auftretenden Flut. Land ist vornehmlich privates Eigentum oder es bestehen zumindest private Nutzungsrechte. Wasser hingegen wird in beiden Ländern als öffentliches Gut betrachtet, welches allgemein zugänglich ist. De facto liegt sowohl in Kambodscha als auch in Vietnam dann eine open access Situation vor: die Nutzung des Wassers ist nicht beschränkt und vorliegende Nutzungsregeln werden nicht oder kaum durchgesetzt. Es bestehen zwar formelle Regeln, die die Nutzung von Land-, Wasser- und Fischerei regulieren, diese sind jedoch stark miteinander verwoben, überlappen oft aufgrund der dynamischen natürlichen Gegebenheiten und Verantwortlichkeiten zur Durchsetzung sind oft auf verschiedene Jurisdiktionen verteilt. Dies führt zu einem nicht nachhaltigen Management der natürlichen Ressourcen vor Ort und eine Degradierung mit einem Rückgang der natürlichen Fischbestände ist bereits zu beobachten. Die Dissertation nutzt ein Fischzuchtprojekt als Referenzrahmen. Dieses wurde vom WorldFish Center von 2005 bis 2010 in der Region durchgeführt. Im Interesse der vorliegenden Untersuchung stehen die verschiedenen institutionellen Faktoren die den Erfolg oder Misserfolg von kollektivem Handeln für das nachhaltige Management natürlicher Ressourcen im Mekong Delta von Kambodscha und Vietnam beeinflussen (Forschungsproblem). Zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen wurde in dieser Dissertation ein Methodenmix mit sowohl qualitativer als auch quantitativer Datenanalyse gewählt. Die Implementierung des gemeinschaftsbasierten Projekts in den Projektdörfern in Kambodscha und Vietnam stellte sich offensichtlich als problematisch heraus und die Pilotphase wurde nach meist einem Jahr wieder eingestellt. Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die Gründe dafür nicht in der mangelnden Kooperationsbereitschaft der Teilnehmer liegen, sondern vielmehr mit den vorliegenden Verfügungsrechten an den natürlichen Ressourcen zusammenhängen. Aufgrund der mangelnden Rechtsgrundlage sowie verschiedener informeller Regeln, ist es den Projektgruppen nicht gelungen andere lokale Nutzer von den Projektgebieten auszuschließen und somit ihre Investitionen in Material und Fischsaat zu schützen. Die Arbeit schließt mit Empfehlungen insbesondere hinsichtlich der Dezentralisierung von Wasser- und Landmanagement in der Region

On the Problem of Sustainable Economic Development: A Theoretical Solution to this Prisoner's Dilemma

This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and a universal theory of value. We introduce axioms which serve as the first of two derivations of our solution, our methods, the origin and evolution of our theory, field notes from Mustique, Iceland, and Prince Edward Island, and set the stage for a more thorough discourse. Next we demonstrate that value (V) is a derivative function of relative insularity (IR): V=f´(IR), then model economic development by dividing the world into geo-political islands: Relatively Insular States (RIS), and Global Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS). Our axioms deduce two opposing development strategies: Maximum Economic Development (MED), and Maximum Ecological Preservation (MEP). We clarify this by applying our Theory of Value within geo-political contexts which reveal divergent, optimizing strategies for GEMS and RIS economic development. We discover GEMS and RIS strategies are antithetical, yet also discover these naturally opposing strategies represent the most tenable, rational solution-set possible. In light of the inherent and inescapable planetary uncertainties our axiom reveal, we discover the optimal RIS strategy = MEP and GEMS = MED. We note our solution represents the Prisoner's Dilemma. We also note, that, ceteris paribus, based upon revealed 20th and 21st century preferences, RIS strategy has been suboptimal/irrational. Strategic Equilibrium is attained when players pursue respective rational, opposing development strategies. Equilibrium, however, offers windfalls: surplus value is created (RIS-driven ecological preservation, and GEMS-driven Global Security and Planetary Protection). In essence, this non-cooperative, strategic equilibrium paves the way for rational, mutually beneficial, cooperative behaviour, and yields surplus ecological and planetary insularities, and thus surplus economic and biologic value: RIS cooperate, form coalitions, and struggle for greater ecological insularity (ecological preservation). At the same time, GEMS fight for economic development and planetary insularity (planetary preservation, i.e. financing national and global defense, extraterrestrial exploration, and solutions to mission-critical, extra-planetary threats to human existence). Furthermore, surplus value is maximized through strategic transparency: If all players recognize the value of respective, opposing, and antithetical, rational strategies, then all players negotiate more rationally, efficiently, and peacefully. We refer to our solution based upon two opposing, rational strategies as The Funk- Zweikampf Solution. Moreover, we demonstrate our solution is as powerful at local and individual levels as it is at the national level, including its use as a tool for strategic decisionmaking under uncertainty and variable insularity. Furthermore, our Theory of Value illuminates an entrenched, systemic, strategic RIS error which reflects the false application of widely misunderstood economic principles, and fundamental constitutional defects which promote The Tragedy of the Commons. Our theory also suggests that it is no coincidence that the island which best exhibits optimal pure RIS economic development strategy (MEP) is the uniquely independent, autonomous, privately-controlled island of Mustique. All RIS, however, may optimize with our counter-intuitive solution through individual, regional, and state coalitions. Furthermore, our Theory of Value promotes self-organization, constitutional amendment, self-sufficiency, independence, and thus places stones along the illusive path to a tenable solution to The Problem of Sustainable Development

The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism

PIn Solid Waste Association of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ( SWANCC ), the Supreme Court considered whether federal regulatory authority reaches isolated wetlands and ponds due to the potential presence of migratory birds. In rejecting such an expansive view of federal authority, the Court\u27s majority underlined its devotion to the federalism principles enunciated in Lopez and other recent cases. The federalist majority further reiterated its support for a canon of statutory construction which holds that federal statutes will not be interpreted to intrude into state matters, such as local land-use control, absent a clear statement by Congress. The dissent argued that the majority ignored Congress\u27 clear intent and, in the process, exposed millions of acres of wetlands to destruction. This paper argues that there is little reason to believe that interstate competition amongst states will produce a race to the bottom in environmental regulation today, if it ever did. Interstate competition is not likely to result in sub-optimal environmental protection, at least when compared with the federal alternative. States will make trade-offs between environmental protection and other values that are most consistent with the values of the people in those states and because inter-jurisdictional competition will promote discovery of preferable environmental protection strategies. The presence of interstate externalities can, in certain circumstances, justify federal environmental regulation. However, the presence of such externalities is often overstated, and the costs of addressing such externalities through federal regulation may well be greater than maintaining state primacy. Insofar as wetlands represent public goods that are undersupplied by states, federal intervention may be justified, but this need not mean federal regulation. Fiscal policy, such as economic incentives or the direct provision of environmental goods, are sufficient. In short, there is little basis for the argument that interstate externalities justify a departure from the Lopez federalism analysis. The SWANCC majority articulated its federalism rationale without addressing environmental concerns. The opinion rested on the broad federalism principles underlying the Court\u27s prior decisions. The interpretive canon that seeks to avoid facing constitutional questions? in this case whether a given statute exceeds Congress commerce clause power ? serves the same purpose as the federalism doctrine itself: It preserves the preeminence of state authority in the broadest possible sphere. Where Congress has been ambiguous about the extent to which it is asserting federal authority, such a canon will be sufficient to advance the aims of federalism. This will not be true in all cases, however. There are other environmental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, which assert equally far-reaching federal authority with less statutory ambiguity. In such cases, the Court will need to confront the arguments against federalism head-on to preserve inter-jurisdictional competition amongst the states

The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism

PIn Solid Waste Association of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ( SWANCC ), the Supreme Court considered whether federal regulatory authority reaches isolated wetlands and ponds due to the potential presence of migratory birds. In rejecting such an expansive view of federal authority, the Court\u27s majority underlined its devotion to the federalism principles enunciated in Lopez and other recent cases. The federalist majority further reiterated its support for a canon of statutory construction which holds that federal statutes will not be interpreted to intrude into state matters, such as local land-use control, absent a clear statement by Congress. The dissent argued that the majority ignored Congress\u27 clear intent and, in the process, exposed millions of acres of wetlands to destruction. This paper argues that there is little reason to believe that interstate competition amongst states will produce a race to the bottom in environmental regulation today, if it ever did. Interstate competition is not likely to result in sub-optimal environmental protection, at least when compared with the federal alternative. States will make trade-offs between environmental protection and other values that are most consistent with the values of the people in those states and because inter-jurisdictional competition will promote discovery of preferable environmental protection strategies. The presence of interstate externalities can, in certain circumstances, justify federal environmental regulation. However, the presence of such externalities is often overstated, and the costs of addressing such externalities through federal regulation may well be greater than maintaining state primacy. Insofar as wetlands represent public goods that are undersupplied by states, federal intervention may be justified, but this need not mean federal regulation. Fiscal policy, such as economic incentives or the direct provision of environmental goods, are sufficient. In short, there is little basis for the argument that interstate externalities justify a departure from the Lopez federalism analysis. The SWANCC majority articulated its federalism rationale without addressing environmental concerns. The opinion rested on the broad federalism principles underlying the Court\u27s prior decisions. The interpretive canon that seeks to avoid facing constitutional questions? in this case whether a given statute exceeds Congress commerce clause power ? serves the same purpose as the federalism doctrine itself: It preserves the preeminence of state authority in the broadest possible sphere. Where Congress has been ambiguous about the extent to which it is asserting federal authority, such a canon will be sufficient to advance the aims of federalism. This will not be true in all cases, however. There are other environmental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, which assert equally far-reaching federal authority with less statutory ambiguity. In such cases, the Court will need to confront the arguments against federalism head-on to preserve inter-jurisdictional competition amongst the states