Towards Secure and Safe Appified Automated Vehicles

The advancement in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) has created an enormous market for the development of self-driving functionalities,raising the question of how it will transform the traditional vehicle development process. One adventurous proposal is to open the AV platform to third-party developers, so that AV functionalities can be developed in a crowd-sourcing way, which could provide tangible benefits to both automakers and end users. Some pioneering companies in the automotive industry have made the move to open the platform so that developers are allowed to test their code on the road. Such openness, however, brings serious security and safety issues by allowing untrusted code to run on the vehicle. In this paper, we introduce the concept of an Appified AV platform that opens the development framework to third-party developers. To further address the safety challenges, we propose an enhanced appified AV design schema called AVGuard, which focuses primarily on mitigating the threats brought about by untrusted code, leveraging theory in the vehicle evaluation field, and conducting program analysis techniques in the cybersecurity area. Our study provides guidelines and suggested practice for the future design of open AV platforms

A Survey of Prevent and Detect Access Control Vulnerabilities

Broken access control is one of the most common security vulnerabilities in web applications. These vulnerabilities are the major cause of many data breach incidents, which result in privacy concern and revenue loss. However, preventing and detecting access control vulnerabilities proactively in web applications could be difficult. Currently, these vulnerabilities are actively detected by bug bounty hunters post-deployment, which creates attack windows for malicious access. To solve this problem proactively requires security awareness and expertise from developers, which calls for systematic solutions. This survey targets to provide a structured overview of approaches that tackle access control vulnerabilities. It firstly discusses the unique feature of access control vulnerabilities, then studies the existing works proposed to tackle access control vulnerabilities in web applications, which span the spectrum of software development from software design and implementation, software analysis and testing, and runtime monitoring. At last we discuss the open problem in this field

Ensuring Cyber-Security in Smart Railway Surveillance with SHIELD

Modern railways feature increasingly complex embedded computing systems for surveillance, that are moving towards fully wireless smart-sensors. Those systems are aimed at monitoring system status from a physical-security viewpoint, in order to detect intrusions and other environmental anomalies. However, the same systems used for physical-security surveillance are vulnerable to cyber-security threats, since they feature distributed hardware and software architectures often interconnected by ‘open networks’, like wireless channels and the Internet. In this paper, we show how the integrated approach to Security, Privacy and Dependability (SPD) in embedded systems provided by the SHIELD framework (developed within the EU funded pSHIELD and nSHIELD research projects) can be applied to railway surveillance systems in order to measure and improve their SPD level. SHIELD implements a layered architecture (node, network, middleware and overlay) and orchestrates SPD mechanisms based on ontology models, appropriate metrics and composability. The results of prototypical application to a real-world demonstrator show the effectiveness of SHIELD and justify its practical applicability in industrial settings

Proposing a secure component-based-application logic and system’s integration testing approach

Software engineering moved from traditional methods of software enterprise applications to com-ponent based development for distributed system’s applications. This new era has grown up forlast few years, with component-based methods, for design and rapid development of systems, butfact is that , deployment of all secure software features of technology into practical e-commercedistributed systems are higher rated target for intruders. Although most of research has been con-ducted on web application services that use a large share of the present software, but on the otherside Component Based Software in the middle tier ,which rapidly develops application logic, alsoopen security breaching opportunities .This research paper focus on a burning issue for researchersand scientists ,a weakest link in component based distributed system, logical attacks, that cannotbe detected with any intrusion detection system within the middle tier e-commerce distributed ap-plications. We proposed An Approach of Secure Designing application logic for distributed system,while dealing with logically vulnerability issue

Mayall:a framework for desktop JavaScript auditing and post-exploitation analysis

Writing desktop applications in JavaScript offers developers the opportunity to write cross-platform applications with cutting edge capabilities. However in doing so, they are potentially submitting their code to a number of unsanctioned modifications from malicious actors. Electron is one such JavaScript application framework which facilitates this multi-platform out-the-box paradigm and is based upon the Node.js JavaScript runtime --- an increasingly popular server-side technology. In bringing this technology to the client-side environment, previously unrealized risks are exposed to users due to the powerful system programming interface that Node.js exposes. In a concerted effort to highlight previously unexposed risks in these rapidly expanding frameworks, this paper presents the Mayall Framework, an extensible toolkit aimed at JavaScript security auditing and post-exploitation analysis. The paper also exposes fifteen highly popular Electron applications and demonstrates that two thirds of applications were found to be using known vulnerable elements with high CVSS scores. Moreover, this paper discloses a wide-reaching and overlooked vulnerability within the Electron Framework which is a direct byproduct of shipping the runtime unaltered with each application, allowing malicious actors to modify source code and inject covert malware inside verified and signed applications without restriction. Finally, a number of injection vectors are explored and appropriate remediations are proposed