LOGISTICS IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS

This report examines the transport and delivery of logistics in contested environments within the context of great-power competition (GPC). Across the Department of Defense (DOD), it is believed that GPC will strain our current supply lines beyond their capacity to maintain required warfighting capability. Current DOD efforts are underway to determine an appropriate range of platforms, platform quantities, and delivery tactics to meet the projected logistics demand in future conflicts. This report explores the effectiveness of various platforms and delivery methods through analysis in developed survivability, circulation, and network optimization models. Among other factors, platforms are discriminated by their radar cross-section (RCS), noise level, speed, cargo capacity, and self-defense capability. To maximize supply delivered and minimize the cost of losses, the results of this analysis indicate preference for utilization of well-defended convoys on supply routes where bulk supply is appropriate and smaller, and widely dispersed assets on shorter, more contested routes with less demand. Sensitivity analysis on these results indicates system survivability can be improved by applying RCS and noise-reduction measures to logistics assets.Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N9I)Major, Israel Defence ForcesCivilian, Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd, SingaporeCommander, Republic of Singapore NavyCommander, United States NavyCaptain, Singapore ArmyLieutenant, United States NavyLieutenant, United States NavyMajor, Republic of Singapore Air ForceCaptain, United States Marine CorpsLieutenant, United States NavyLieutenant, United States NavyLieutenant, United States NavyLieutenant, United States NavyLieutenant, United States NavyCaptain, Singapore ArmyLieutenant Junior Grade, United States NavyCaptain, Singapore ArmyLieutenant Colonel, Republic of Singapore Air ForceApproved for public release. distribution is unlimite

After Action Report

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review.Prepared by Lyla Englehorn, NPS Faculty Associate – Research for VADM David Lewis USN (ret) NWSI Director; CAPT Jeff Kline USN retired, Professor of the Practice NPS Operations Research Department; and Dr. Brian Bingham, CRUSER DirectorThe September 2021 workshop “Hybrid Force 2045” tasked participants to apply emerging technologies to shape the way we fight in a 2045 global conflict depicted in the fictional scenario “Hybrid War 2045.” Concept generation teams were given the design challenge: How might emerging technologies, new operational concepts, and alternative fleet designs contribute to a more effective naval force across the spectrum from competition to conflict? How do the alternative fleet designs enhance the effectiveness and resilience of joint, combined and coalition forces across all domains? Following panel discussions and presentations from leading technical and policy experts, the teams and their embedded facilitators had fourteen hours of scheduled concept generation time to meet that challenge and presented their best concepts on the final morning of the workshop.UNCLASSIFIED//Approved for public release: distribution unlimite

China Near Seas Combat Capabilities

The capstone U.S. Defense Department study on the future operational environment declares, China\u27s rise represents the most significant single event on the international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War. Understanding and assessing changes in China\u27s traditionally defensive naval strategy, doctrine, and force structure are of obvious importance to the U.S. Navy (USN) and other Pacific navies concerned with the possible security implications of that rise. This chapter examines the development of the Chinese navy\u27s Houbei (Type 022) fast-attack-craft force and its roles and missions in China\u27s near seas and discusses implications for the U.S. Navy and other navies in the region.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/1010/thumbnail.jp

Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Oral History Project: Interview of Mr. Francesco “Frank” Campanile

Interviewers: Michael W. Garrambone, MORS Fellow of the Society (FS),1 and Bob Sheldon, FS

Acquiring the Tools of Grand Strategy: The US Navy\u27s LCS as a Case Study

Grand strategy is about how states allocate resources and employ these resources to achieve desired political conditions. In examining the match between desired ends and available ways and means, an often-overlooked subject is how the specific tools of grand strategy are forged. One of these tools is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) that started in 2000. LCS remains a controversial and often unpopular program with many stakeholders to this day. This study examines how the means of grand strategy, in this case a new ship class, are acquired. It also looks at how these means are employed (ways) to achieve the desired outcomes (ends) and the feedback loop between means, ways, and ends. The initial portion of the study examines how the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of the Navy formally acquire systems or “systems of systems.” The second portion of the study examines the design, construction, and fielding of the LCS class or the attainment of Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The final portion analyzes the design, construction, and introduction of the LCS into the fleet in terms of the three models used by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision; the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior, and Governmental Politics – Models I, II, and III respectively. The hypothesis is that individual personalities may have more influence than any of these models account for and that instances of individual impact may offer more nuanced insights into these models of state behavior. This study reveals that the process of evolutionary acquisition and spiral development caused increased risk in the time-line for achieving Final Operational Capacity (FOC) of LCS. It also provides insight into the reaction and adaption of a large organization to changes in its environment. This study does not however reveal strong evidence to support the hypothesis of individual personalities significantly influencing decision making or action taking compared to organizations in Models I-III. The details of individual participation and internal deliberations are obscured by security and proprietary rules which privileges models I and II in the analysis

Next generation mine countermeasures for the very shallow water zone in support of amphibious operations

This report describes system engineering efforts exploring next generation mine countermeasure (MCM) systems to satisfy high priority capability gaps in the Very Shallow Water (VSW) zone in support of amphibious operations. A thorough exploration of the problem space was conducted, including stakeholder analysis, MCM threat analysis, and current and future MCM capability research. Solution-neutral requirements and functions were developed for a bounded next generation system. Several alternative architecture solutions were developed that included a critical evaluation that compared performance and cost. The resulting MCM system effectively removes the man from the minefield through employment of autonomous capability, reduces operator burden with sensor data fusion and processing, and provides a real-time communication for command and control (C2) support to reduce or eliminate post mission analysis.http://archive.org/details/nextgenerationmi109456968N

The Military Industrial Complex In a Developing Country: Lessons from the Republic of Turkey

Turkey is an example of a developing country concerns with the development of its defense industry. Since the early of its republican in 1923, there are many defense indus­try companies established, owned by both state and private sectors. Lately, Turkish defense industry development has shown significant progress by the capability to build its indigenous defense products such as tanks and ships with most local content. The current objective of the Turkish defense industry under Erdogan administrative is to establish a ‘full’ defense industry independency by 2023, precisely a hundred years of its republic age. To achieve the objective, Turkey has established its ‘defense industry structure’ similar to Eisenhower’s concept of ‘Military-Industrial Complex’. The synergy of stakeholders among the Turkish Military-Industrial Complex has led Turkey to progressively fulfill Erdogan’s objective of a ‘full’ military independency through the execution and success of its national defense projects. Therefore, by using the explanatory research method, the authors explain the existence of the Turkish Military-Industrial Complex from each role and synergy, bringing significant impacts to the state. This article argues that the development of the military industry in Turkey, covering a timeframe of 2011 to 2017, could provide valuable experiences and lessons for other developing countries to strengthen their national defense industry level

Strategic guidelines for enabling research and development to support Australian defence

This paper assesses strategic factors that will affect the relevance and applicability of future science and technology developments to Australian defence, on the basis of these factors sets criteria for defence enabling research and development (R&D), then assigns priorities to defence technology fields for future development against these criteria. Sections of the paper summarise Australia's strategic outlook, Australia's defence policy, military trends, current and projected Australian Defence Force capabilities, the criteria for defence enabling R&D and particular defence technology areas. The paper was produced to assist the Enabling R&D Advisory Group of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation of the Australian Department of Defence. It will also be useful for those planning future directions for defence-related science and technology research in industry, universities, or other research bodies

Increasing Combat Aircraft Survivability Through Coherent Self-Protection Jammers

When the battlefields were within the visual range, the objective of deception tactics in warfare was to deceive the human senses. In the battlefield of electromagnetic spectrum, the objective of deception is to deceive the sensors of the enemy weapon systems. The survivability of the aircraft operating in hostile environment is of prime importance to the mission planner. If the aircraft can deny its location information to the tracking radar of the radar guided threat missile system, this, in return, may increase its survivability. The deception, a tactic which stems from the wisdom of ancient battles, incarnated in the form of Electronic Attack (EA) can give this capability to the aircraft operating in a hostile environment. Self-Protection Jammers (SPJs) mounted on aircraft that employ deception-repeater jamming techniques and the resulting effect of the deception jamming on the enemy sensor systems will be examined in this study. The impact of the specific flight path and formation geometry should be considered both from the perspective of coherent SPJs effectiveness and the survivability. The individual effectiveness of the EA by SPJs is usually limited by the available Effective Radiated Power (ERP). Due to limitations on the size of the aircraft, one can not afford to build powerful SPJs. The jamming technique and the effect of multiple jammers with respect to jamming effectiveness need to be examined for mission planning analysis. The specific jamming technique evaluated is the combined Range Gate Pull-Off (RGPO) and Velocity Gate Pull-Off (VGPO) against pulse Doppler radar. The challenge is to decide the least vulnerable flight path and the formation geometry for a strike formation in an air-to-ground engagement scenario. The degree of survivability provided by the combination of the formation geometry, flight path and the EA (multiple spatially dispersed coherent jammers) is the focus of this research. The modeling and simulation of the interactions between the self-protection jammer and the pulse Doppler tracking radar with respect to formation geometry and flight path is the initial objective

Rethinking SEAD: Employment of contemporary Fighter Aircraft Capabilities against an A2/AD-System of Systems of a peer Adversary in Europe

The Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, how relevant the discussion about a potential NATO article 5 intervention in Europe is. A frequently used term in this context is Anti Access/ Area Denial. While this term is not existent in Russian strategy, the Integrated Air Defense System it encompasses poses a major challenge to NATO’s freedom of movement in case of a conflict. The air power role Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses can provide means to tackle the threat the Russian IADS poses to NATO. This thesis elaborates on NATO’s capabilities to counter the Russian IADS with SEAD capabilities. The topics SEAD and A2/AD are analyses in an extensive literature review. A qualitative small-N study based on subject matter expert interviews is conducted in order to identify, how the way SEAD operations are executed must be adjusted based in the present SEAD capabilities in NAT