Membership in citizen groups

We analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good. With asymmetric information about the cost of provision, the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee. We show that heterogeneity in valuations for the excludable benefits is always detrimental to the group. However, in a dynamic contest in which heterogeneity arises endogenously (returning members receive additional seniority benefits at the expense of junior members), we show that, in the ex-ante optimal contract, offering seniority benefits is beneficial for the group, despite the heterogeneity in valuations created

Membership in Citizen Groups

We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods

Membership in Citizen Groups

We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods

Incentives to Join Associations: The Case of Agritourism

Agritourism is a rapidly growing tourism sector due to the farmers’ need to increase their revenues and the public desire to reconnect with local food systems. Yet, agritourism development posits an additional burden to farmers who may not possess the business skills and resources required to serve visitors. In this scenario, associations emerged to provide business or technical assistance to agritourism farmers. However, these associations have been experiencing a decline of their membership body over the last decade, which is affecting the quality of their services. Although explanations on such decline are not available, it is plausible due to a change of incentives farmers seek when joining their associations. To elucidate about the reasons behind declined membership, members of two agritourism associations were surveyed. Results show members seek 11 different incentives when joining their agritourism association, which were reduced into four categories (educational, networking, policy and advocacy, economic). Based on the incentives sought, respondents were clustered into three groups (Maximizer, Progressist, Indifferent), which had statistically significant different socio-demographic, agricultural, and membership profiles. Groups also reported different levels of satisfaction with their associations and information needs. Study results contribute to the scholarly advancement of the Logic of Membership and provide marketing and management intelligence to associations, which can help to strengthen the agritourism sector

ELITE CAPTURE, FREE RIDING, AND PROJECT DESIGN: A CASE STUDY OF A COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN CEARÁ, BRAZIL

This dissertation explores the successes and failures of a community-driven development project, São José Agrário (SJA), conducted in Northeastern Brazil. The project was co-funded by the World Bank and the State of Ceará and co-directed by a social movement (the Landless Workers Movement, MST) and the State of Ceará. The dissertation employs a mixed methods approach based on eight case studies, a census survey of six communities, and interviews with a wide variety of actors connected to the project. I address the problem of elite capture, either by non-targeted communities or by an elite within the targeted communities disproportionately benefiting from projects. Case study communities met project targeting criteria. I found no evidence of elite capture of project funds or subproject benefits in the case studies. I then evaluate the free rider problem. The settlers, for the most part, overcame problems of free riding in both their collective work and in the SJA subprojects. Solving the challenges of free riding depended on the community and collective work institutions, such as clear, enforceable rules, monitoring, and graduated sanctions. Accompanying groups, such as the Landless Workers\u27 Movement, agricultural workers\u27 unions, local and state governments, and technical agencies assisted in preventing or resolving free riding problems. I found that even when the problems of elite capture and free riding were avoided, three of the eight subprojects I studied had failed, and one had been suspended for two years. I trace the source of subproject failure to problems of subproject design. First, subprojects required a greater skill set and knowledge base than the participants had. Power differentials between the participants and the private actors created dependency and allowed for participants to be taken advantage of rather than creating empowerment. Second, the duration of technical assistance for productive subprojects was too short and private technical agencies sometimes provided low-quality subprojects. Third, participants had little ability to accurately forecast their costs and benefits of subproject participation, resulting in subproject attrition

Membership in citizen groups

We analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good. With asymmetric information about the cost of provision, the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee. We show that heterogeneity in valuations for the excludable benefits is always detrimental to the group. However, in a dynamic contest in which heterogeneity arises endogenously (returning members receive additional seniority benefits at the expense of junior members), we show that, in the ex-ante optimal contract, offering seniority benefits is beneficial for the group, despite the heterogeneity in valuations created.