4 research outputs found
Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale
We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a
good that confers its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other
individuals around them. For example, a snow-blower is potentially useful not
only to the household that buys it, but also to others on the same street.
Given that the seller is constrained to selling such a (locally) public good
via individual private sales, how should he set his prices given the
distribution of values held by the agents?
We study this problem as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the seller
chooses and announces a price for the product. In the second stage, the agents
(each having a private value for the good) decide simultaneously whether or not
they will buy the product. In the resulting game, which can exhibit a
multiplicity of equilibria, agents must strategize about whether they will
themselves purchase the good to receive its benefits.
In the case of a fully public good (where all agents benefit whenever any
agent purchases), we describe a pricing mechanism that is approximately
revenue-optimal (up to a constant factor) when values are drawn from a regular
distribution. We then study settings in which the good is only "locally"
public: agents are arranged in a network and share benefits only with their
neighbors. We describe a pricing method that approximately maximizes revenue,
in the worst case over equilibria of agent behavior, for any -regular
network. Finally, we show that approximately optimal prices can be found for
general networks in the special case that private values are drawn from a
uniform distribution. We also discuss some barriers to extending these results
to general networks and regular distributions.Comment: accepted to EC'1
Mechanisms and Allocations with Positive Network Externalities
With the advent of social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn, and online offers/deals web sites, network externalties raise the possibility of marketing and advertising to users based on influence they derive from their neighbors in such networks. Indeed, a user’s knowledge of which of his neighbors “liked ” the product, changes his valuation for the product. Much of the work on the mechanism design under network externalities has addressed the setting when there is only one product. We consider a more natural setting when there are multiple competing products, and each node in the network is a unit-demand agent. We first consider the problem of welfare maximization under various different types of externality functions. Specifically we get a O(lognlog(nm)) approximation for concave externality functions, 2 O(d)-approximation for convex externality functions that are bounded above by a polynomial of degree d, and we give a O(log 3 n)-approximation when the externality function is submodular. Our techniques involve formulating non-trivial linear relaxations in each case, and developing novel rounding schemes that yield bounds vastly superior to those obtainable by directly applying results from combinatorial welfare maximization. We then consider the problem of Nash equilibrium where each node in the network is a player whose strategy space corresponds to selecting an item. We develop tight characterization of the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Lastly, we consider the question of pricing and revenue optimizatio