10 research outputs found
Meaning, Truth, and Physics
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L,S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics
Meaning, Truth, and Physics
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L,S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics
Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed
Meaning, Truth, and Physics
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system (L,S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics
Physicalism without the idols of mathematics
On the basis of a coherently applied physicalist ontology, I will argue that there is nothing conceptual in logic and mathematics. What we usually call “mathematical concepts”—from the most exotic ones to the most “evident” ones—are just names tagged to various elements of mathematical formalism. In fact they have nothing to do with concepts, as they have nothing to do with the actual things; they can be completely ignored by both philosophy and physics
The multiple-computations theorem and the physics of singling out a computation
The problem of multiple-computations discovered by Hilary Putnam presents a deep
difficulty for functionalism (of all sorts, computational and causal). We describe in out-
line why Putnam’s result, and likewise the more restricted result we call the Multiple-
Computations Theorem, are in fact theorems of statistical mechanics. We show why
the mere interaction of a computing system with its environment cannot single out a
computation as the preferred one amongst the many computations implemented by
the system. We explain why nonreductive approaches to solving the multiple-
computations problem, and in particular why computational externalism, are dualistic
in the sense that they imply that nonphysical facts in the environment of a computing
system single out the computation. We discuss certain attempts to dissolve Putnam’s
unrestricted result by appealing to systems with certain kinds of input and output
states as a special case of computational externalism, and show why this approach is
not workable without collapsing to behaviorism. We conclude with some remarks
about the nonphysical nature of mainstream approaches to both statistical mechanics
and the quantum theory of measurement with respect to the singling out of partitions
and observables
Physicalism Without the Idols of Mathematics
I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore
Mathematical Facts in a Physicalist Ontology
If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. The aim of this paper is to clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are and how these facts can be accommodated in a purely physical world