Agent-based simulation of power exchange with heterogeneous production companies

Since early nineties, worldwide production and distribution of electricity has been characterized by a progressive liberalization. The state-owned monopolistic production of electricity has been substituted by organized power exchanges (PEs). PEs are markets which aggregate the effective supply and demand of electricity. Usually spot-price market are Day Ahead Market (DAM) and are requested in order to provide an indication for the hourly unit commitment. This first session of the complex daily energy market collects and orders all the offers, determining the market price by matching the cumulative demand and supply curves for every hour of the day after according to a merit order rule. Subsequent market sessions (also online) operate in order to guarantee the feasibility and the security of this plan. The electric market is usually characterized by a reduced number of competitors, thus oligopolistic scenario may arise. Understanding how electricity prices depend on oligopolistic behavior of suppliers and on production costs has become a very important issue. Several restructuring designs for the electric power industry have been proposed. Main goal is to increase the overall market efficiency, trying to study, to develop and to apply different market mechanisms. Auction design is the standard domain for commodity markets. However, properties of different auction mechanism must be studied and determined correctly before their appliance. Generally speaking, different approaches have been proposed in the literature. Game theory analysis has provided an extremely useful methodology to study and derive properties of economic "games", such as auctions. Within this context, an interesting computational approach, for studying market inefficiencies, is the theory of learning in games. This methodology is useful in the context of infinitely repeated games. This paper investigates the nature of the clearing mechanism comparing two different methods, i.e., discriminatory and uniform auctions. The theoretical framework used to perform the analysis is the theory of learning in games. We consider an inelastic demand faced by sellers which use learning algorithms to understand proper strategies for increasing their profits. We model the auction mechanism in two different duopolistic scenario, i.e., a low demand situation, where one seller can clear all the demand, and a high demand condition, where both sellers are requested. Moreover, heterogeneity in the linear cost function is considered. Consistent results are achieved with two different learning algorithmsAgent-based simulation; power-exchange market; market power, reinforcement learning, electricity production costs

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field

Marshall versus Walras on Equilibrium and Time

The aim of this paper is to ponder upon Marshall’s conception of equilibrium and to confront it withWalras’s. In a first section, I present a rational reconstruction of the Marshallian conception. In contrast to its standard tripartite classification interpretation, I claim that this conception is based on two interlinked equilibrium concepts, normal equilibrium and market equilibrium. Several features are brought out : (a) this conception is based on what I call the ‘period of analysis’ hypothesis; (b) in this conception disequilibrium states have an effective; (c) the notion of long period equilirium then turns out to have a most elusive meaning; In a second section, I compare Marshall and Walras on equilibrium and time. Whenever the comparison bears on their production models, a sharp contrast emerges in particular with regard to the meaning and possibility of disequilibrim. When Walras credit model is taken into account the result is more complicated. An important difference is still present which can be traced back to the fact that when it comes to time the Marshallian appproach privileges the duration aspect while dodging the irreversibility or arrow of time aspect while the contrary is true for the Walrasian approach.Marshall; Walras; equilbrium

Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition

We analyze tax competition between large and asymmetric countries and derive conditions under which countries assist foreign authorities in collecting tax revenues via information exchange. It turns out that voluntary exchange of information is a Nash equilibrium between asymmetric countries, resulting in an efficient use of taxes by governments. However, this equilibrium is not unique and the structure of the resulting equilibrium-selection problem depends on the relative size of countries. Our model gives an explanation for the empirical observation that especially smaller countries are reluctant to co-ordinate on the full-information equilibrium, whereas countries of similar size kan solve the information problem.

Monetary policy with single instrument feedback rules

We consider a standard cash in advance monetary model with flexible prices or prices set in advance and show that there are interest rate or money supply rules such that equilibria are unique. The existence of these single instrument rules depends on whether the economy has an infinite horizon or an arbitrarily large but finite horizon.Monetary policy ; Prices

Factor demand modelling: the theory and the practice

Since the work of Cobb and Douglas [18], two main innovations have been introduced in applied factor demand analysis, i.e. the use of flexible functional forms and the modelling of dynamics, expectations, and the interrelatedness of the adjustment process. Recently, cointegration theory has provided an additional important contribution, yielding empirical content to the notion of equilibrium employed in economic analysis, encompassing both the idea of centre of gravity relationship, suggested byClassical economists, and the notion of market-clearing position, employed by Neoclassical economist. Also in the light of the most recent generalizations of the concept of cointegration, allowing for economic attractors changing over time, as the evolution of the structural features of the economy proceeds, this paper critically assess the key theoretical and empirical issues in factor demand analysis.factor demand, flexible functional forms, error correction model, cointegration.

How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax Base Restrictions

This paper studies constitutional restrictions on the tax base that protect future generations from expropriation and improve the optimality of investment in Intergenerational Public Goods (IPGs). The choice of the tax base matters because it affects how intergenerational (IG) spillovers are capitalized into assets that are owned by current generations, and thus the IG politics. We show that with an income tax base, present generations expropriate future generations and produce inefficiently low levels of IPGs. By contrast, with a land tax base, IG expropriation using debt is impossible, the level of investment in IPGs is higher and, for some types of IPGs, Pareto optimal.

Inside-outside money competition

We study how competition from privately supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore, if "inside monies" can be produced at a sufficiently low cost, outside money is driven out of circulation. Whenever a 'benevolent' government can commit to its fiscal policy, sequential monetary policy is efficient and inside money competition plays no role.Money ; Payment systems

Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation

We consider a general equilibrium model where groups operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the group and make it on their own or join another group. We study the effect of these outside options on group formation, group stability, equilibrium existence, and equilibrium efficiency.household behavior, household formation, collective decision making, general equilibrium

Online Auctions

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).